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Abstract 
The links between HIV/AIDS and national security have played a major and under 
recognized role in impacting efforts to fight the pandemic. To date, critical studies of the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus have been limited. Using 27 semi-structured 
interview and extensive literature review, this thesis creates the first global history of the 
nexus, from 1985-2007. This long-timeframe analysis allows a novel examination of the 
risks and benefits of this politically potent linkage, an assessment of the role of global 
health actors in the nexus, and a testing of the published conceptual frameworks that seek 
to explain the relationship between global health and national security. 
This thesis examines the history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus in three 
parts. First, the early and beneficial securitizations of the epidemic in Uganda and 
Thailand are examined. Two other events, the U. S. and USSR intelligence community 
interest in HIV/AIDS and the likely spread of HIV/AIDS by the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, illustrate hazards of the nexus and complete this 
section. Second, the factors and events that led to the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the 
United Nations Security Council and within the U. S. are evaluated. Third, the 
consequences of securitization are considered, including the impact on global priority 
and funding, Security Council Resolution 1308, the U. S. President's Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief, and military HIV/AIDS programs. 
This thesis finds that where policymakers have framed HIV/AIDS as a direct threat to 
national security and prioritized the disease, clear benefits in fighting the epidemic have 
resulted. However the role of global health actors in these political events has been 
limited, and hazards of the nexus include the classification of public health data and the 
divergent interests of the global health and national security communities. 
2 
Dedication 
For my family: Nicole, Maddox, Nora, Mom, Dad, Mia, Jimbo, Max, Craig, Austin, 
Maureen, Matt, Alan, Carol, Sam, Julia and Sue. 
Acknowledgements 
I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Dr. Kelley Lee at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). Dr. Lee adopted me as a student, and proved to be a 
perfect advisor. She is brilliant and critical, insightful about interdisciplinary studies, 
generous with time, slashing with a red pen or tracked changes, helpful with funding, and 
encouraging throughout. I learned more about producing critical, original work by 
writing with Dr. Lee than in any course. While any errors remain my own, this thesis 
would not have been possible without the sound guidance of Dr. Lee. Thank you Kelley. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Preeti Patel for her early advice and advising of this thesis 
during her time at LSHTM. Thank you at LSHTM to Drs. Andy Haines, Gill Walt, 
Egbert Sondorp, Shakoor Hajat, and David Leon, and to Olga Bornemisza and to the 
staff of the Centre on Global Change and Health, especially Nadja Doyle and Ela Gohil. 
Thanks also to fellow students Noel Stone, Sara Nam, and Isolde Birdthistle. 
Dr. Colin McInnes at Aberystwyth University in Wales has been a constant source of 
advice and intelligent thought on the relationship between national security and global 
health. This thesis benefited, in particular, from his input on securitization theory and 
the levels of analysis concept. Thanks also to my colleague Dr. Owain Williams at 
Aberystwyth. And safe travels to my friends on the Llanberis Mountain Rescue Team, 
who welcomed me into the Welsh mountains and offered exciting breaks from work. 
At John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, I owe 
tremendous thanks to Dr. Scott Barrett for giving me the chance to help create and direct 
the Global Health and Foreign Policy Initiative. I have learned a great deal from Dr. 
Barrett's conceptualization of global collective action problems and their relevance to 
global health. He has also been a strong source of support and encouragement as I 
completed this thesis. Thanks also to my terrific colleague Josh Michaud at SAIS, and to 
Marge! Highet and Andrea Norris for their humor and support. 
In addition to Drs. Lee, McInnes and Barrett, I have benefited enormously from the 
intellectual guidance and contributions of Dr. Chris Beyrer and David Fidler. Since 
meeting Dr. Beyrer in Chiang Mai in 1997, he has been a source of intellectual and 
personal inspiration. In many ways this thesis is my attempt to follow his 
interdisciplinary path to better understand our response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. I 
am also thankful for David Fidler and his rich body of work on the relationship between 
international relations and global health, which lit the way for this thesis. 
I thank the interviewees detailed in this thesis, who generously shared with me their time 
and thoughts. Thank you also to the examiners of this thesis, Drs. Stefan Elbe and Alan 
Ingram, whose writings and thoughts have shaped my inquiries in this thesis. Funding 
for this research was generously provided by The Nuffield Trust, the 21 S` Century Trust, 
and the United Kingdom's Overseas Research Awards program. 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ 4 Statement 
............................................................................................................................. 
6 
Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Rationale for the study ....................................................................................... .... 7 
1.2 Purpose and objectives ....................................................................................... .. 13 
1.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 13 
1.3.1 Document review .......................................................................................... 14 
1.3.2 Semi-structured interviews ........................................................................... 14 
1.3.3 Data analysis ................................................................................................. 16 
1.4 Thesis outline ....................................................................................................... 
16 
1.5 Limitations and biases .......................................................................................... 
18 
Chapter 2: A conceptual framework for understanding the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus ................................................................................................................................ . 
23 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... . 
23 
2.2 The global epidemiology of HIV/AIDS ............................................................. . 
23 
2.3 The global response to HIV/AIDS ...................................................................... . 27 
2.4 What is Security? ................................................................................................ . 
28 
2.4.1 National Security ......................................................................................... . 
29 
2.4.2 Broadening of national security ................................................................... . 
30 
2.4.3 Backlash against expansive definitions of security ..................................... . 34 
2.4.4 The enduring nature of national security ..................................................... . 35 
2.5 How do issues become securitized? .................................................................... . 
36 
2.6 Frameworks for understanding the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus.......... . 
38 
2.6.1 Communitarianism and cosmopolitanism in the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus ........................................................................................................... . 
39 
2.6.2 Models of engagement for global health and national security ................... . 44 
2.6.3 The high politics of national security and the low politics of health ........... . 46 
2.6.4 The cause of the transformation: Revolution, remediation or regression? ... 48 
2.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 
51 
Chapter 3: Literature Review ........................................................................................... 53 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 
53 
3.2 Strategically Important Populations: Armed Forces ............................................ 
54 
3.3 Peacekeepers ........................................................................................................ 
63 
3.4 Impact of HIV/AIDS on state stability in highly-affected states ......................... 
66 
3.5 Impact of HIV/AIDS in second wave states of Russia, India, China, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia ......................................................................................................................... 
68 
3.6 Critical Perspectives on HIV/AIDS and National Security ................................. 
71 
3.7 Securitization of HIV/AIDS: Elbe and Peterson ................................................... 
72 
3.7.1 Susan Peterson: Epidemic Disease and National Security .......................... 
73 
3.7.2 Stefan Elbe: Should HIV/AIDS be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of 
Linking HIV/AIDS and Security .............................................................................. 78 
3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 85 Chapter 4: The early history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus: 1985-1995... 86 
4.1 Early recognition in Uganda ................................................................................ 87 4.2 Intelligence Services and HIV/AIDS: Cases of CIA and KGB Involvement..... 91 
4.2.1 The 1987 U. S. National Security Estimate: Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Implications of the AIDS Pandemic ......................................................................... 
92 
4.2.2 1991 Intelligence Memorandum "The Global AIDS Disaster" .................... 
95 
4.2.3 The KGB Disinformation Campaign ............................................................ 
97 
4 
4 IA llicnnccinn IAA . "r. . r.. vv.,. vv........................................................................................................ 1 V'f 
4.3 The role of national security concerns in Thailand's HIV success .................... 106 4.4 Peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS in Cambodia ............................................ 114 4.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 119 Chapter 5: The Global Securitization of HIV/AIDS ...................................................... 123 5.1 The Introduction of Emerging Diseases into U. S. National Security ................ 124 5.2 The role of global health actors: Providing the evidence base on the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic ..................................................................................................................... 127 5.3 Injecting health issues into U. S. national security ............................................. 131 5.4 U. S. National Intelligence Estimate 99-17 ........................................................ 134 5.5 The Impact of NIE 99-17 ................................................................................... 140 
5.5.1 Discussion ................................................................................................... 146 
5.6 The United Nations Security Council, HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308 .......... 148 
5.6.1 Planning and Reasons for the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS ................... 
149 
5.6.2 The 4087th Meeting of the UNSC, 10 January 2000 .................................. 155 
5.6.3 UNSC Resolution 1308 ............................................................................... 158 
5.6.4 Discussion ................................................................................................... 160 
5.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 161 Chapter 6: The consequences of securitization ............................................................... 164 
6.1 Impact on the Political Priority and Funding of HIV/AIDS .............................. 165 
6.2 The Impact of Resolution 1308 on Peacekeeping Operations ........................... 169 
6.3 National security and HIV/AIDS during the George W. Bush Administration 176 
6.3.1 The "Next Wave of HIV/AIDS": Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and 
China 
....................................................................................................................... 
179 
6.3.2 2002 U. S. National Security Strategy ......................................................... 181 
6.3.3 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) .......................... 184 
6.3.4 U. S. Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP)... 189 
6.4 The HIV/AIDS - national security nexus outside of the U. S. and UN ............. 
194 
6.4.1 Western donor countries and high prevalence states .................................. 
195 
6.4.2 African militaries ........................................................................................ 198 
6.5 Secret data: revision of HIV prevalence estimates among armed forces and 
peacekeepers ............................................................................................................... 200 6.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 206 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................ 210 7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 210 7.2 The process and consequences of the securitization of HIV/AIDS ................... 210 7.3 Strengths and weaknesses in conceptualizing global health as a "security" issue 
..................................................................................................................................... 217 
7.4 Final Observations ............................................................................................. 220 
7.5 Recommendations .............................................................................................. 222 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 227 
5 
Statement 
I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in 
this thesis is entirely my own. 
-"'ýV` 
Harley Feldbaum 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
"No war on the face of the earth is more destructive than the AIDS pandemic. I 
was a soldier. But I know of no enemy in war more insidious or vicious than 
AIDS. An enemy that poses a clear and present danger to the world. " 
- Colin Powell (2001: para. 16) to the UN General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS 
1.1 Rationale for the study 
This statement by the U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001 describes HIV/AIDS 
as one of the world's most critical security threats. This represents a staggering 
transformation of the political response to the 25 year-old pandemic that has been 
accurately characterized as "glacial" (Barnett and Whiteside 2004: 5). Fidler (2004: 45) 
describes the rise of HIV/AIDS, and other select global health issues, to the top of the 
international agenda as a "revolution" unprecedented in the history of global health. 
Powell's statement directly stemmed from two events in 2000 that framed HIV/AIDS as 
a threat to national and international security. The first was the declassified publication 
of a 1999 U. S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) report that examined global 
infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, and their implications for U. S. national 
security. The second was the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meetings on the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa, and the resulting UNSC 
Resolution 1308 on HIV/AIDS and UN peacekeeping forces. Together these events 
dramatically increased the political stature of HIV/AIDS, and contributed to a massive 
increase in international funding available to fight the pandemic. The response to 
HIV/AIDS was moved from ministries of health and aid organizations, to the highest 
levels of national and international politics, and now included ministries of defense and 
heads of state. Looking back to 2005, the Executive Director of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Peter Piot said that the UNSC meetings on 
HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308: 
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transformed how the world views AIDS. I say `transformed' because many now 
view AIDS as a threat to national security and stability... because of that 
transformation that I believe today, for the first time ever, we have a real 
opportunity to halt and begin to reverse this devastating epidemic... (UNSC 2005: 
5) 
This is not the first time a disease has impacted what we today call foreign policy and 
national security. The black death of the fourteenth century had a radical impact on 
European society, and contributed to the decline of the feudal system (Garrett 2005). 
The spread of smallpox by Spanish soldiers in the Americas led to the decimation of the 
Aztec and Incan empires, and paved the way for European colonization (McNeill 1976). 
These infectious disease epidemics had major impacts on political, economic and social 
stability. As such, they were major security threats of their time, influencing the survival 
of civilizations and shaping the demographic composition of the modern world. 
In more recent history, International Sanitary Conferences were held between 1851-1938 
to limit the impact of cholera, plague, yellow fever and other diseases on trade and 
commerce through improved health cooperation (Fidler 2001; King 2002). Public health 
was also closely linked with the interests of European colonial powers through efforts to 
maintain the health of soldiers and civil servants in colonial states (King 2002). Disease 
control efforts were critical to U. S. success in overcoming the malaria and yellow fever 
epidemics that had stymied previous French efforts to build a canal through Panama 
(Stern 2005). Success over these infectious diseases allowed the U. S. to control 
commerce and travel through the strategic passage for the remainder of the twentieth 
century. In these cases, public health control of diseases played an important role within 
the traditional realm of national security, enhancing the preservation and projection of 
military power, and facilitating the expansion of trade and commerce (Fidler 2003). 
This close link between the management of infectious diseases and the national security 
of powerful states became more tenuous in the latter half of the twentieth century. The 
causes of this de-linking were multifactorial. Successful sanitary reforms in 
industrialized countries reduced the impact of cholera, typhoid and other infectious 
diseases on major population centers. The advent of antibiotics and vaccines gave 
industrialized countries new tools that contributed to the successful control of polio, 
tuberculosis and other diseases (Fidler 2001 b). These advances thus reduced the 
immediate threat that infectious diseases posed to citizens of industrialized countries. 
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Concurrently, decolonization reduced the European and American presence in many 
parts of the developing world, further reducing the relevance of infectious diseases to the 
strategic interests of powerful states. The link between public health and national 
security had been temporarily broken. 
By the 1950s, the field of international health' operated independently from the strategic 
concerns of the great powers. During the Cold War, international health was largely 
operationalized through international institutions such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and non-governmental organizations (Fidler 2004). International health became 
strongly associated with "improving health conditions and services in poor, developing 
countries; " efforts that rarely affected the strategic interests of the superpowers (Fidler 
2004: 50). Removed from the powerful strategic interests of states, international health 
developed a humanitarian ethos that directly conflicted with the state-based security 
politics of the Cold War. Fidler (2004b: 110) argues that the preamble to the WHO 
Constitution best expresses this vision of international health as concerned with 
"individual rights, human solidarity and universal justice. " By the 1990s, forty years of 
separation and divergent development characterized the relationship between global 
health and national security. 
Against this recent history of a humanitarian international health disconnected from state 
interests, the debate around the national security implications of HIV/AIDS emerged in 
the late 1990s. Assisted by concern about emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism, 
HIV/AIDS and the field of global health quickly rose to the pinnacle of international 
affairs and security politics. HIV/AIDS was discussed at the UNSC, by presidents and 
prime ministers, and declared a "clear and present danger to the world" by U. S. Secretary 
of State Powell (2001: para. 16). This represents a "revolution" in the political status of 
global health, "nothing in the prior history of national and international efforts on public 
health compares to the political status public health has reached today" (Fidler 2004: 45). 
The reintroduction of global health, specifically HIV/AIDS, into the high politics of 
1 The phrase "international health" refers to cooperation between states on public health issues. "Global 
health" is used to refer to international health activities involving states and non-state actors including 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foundations and individuals. There 
is no agreed upon definition of global health, but the U. S. Institute of Medicine (1997: 2) defines global 
health as "health problems, issues, and concerns that transcend national boundaries, may be influenced by 
circumstances or experiences in other countries, and are best addressed by cooperative actions and 
solutions. " Lee and Collin (2005: 3) use different language and define global health as health issues 
"where the determinants circumvent, undermine or are oblivious to the territorial boundaries of states and, 
thus, beyond the capacity of individual countries to address through domestic institutions. " 
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national security, and what this means for the fight against the pandemic, is the subject of 
this thesis. 
The links between HIV/AIDS and national security represent a transformation of the 
politics of the disease that has had a major impact on the political and financial support 
to address the pandemic. Despite the importance of this transformation, these linkages 
have received relatively limited critical analysis from within the global health 
community. However, authors from the fields of political science and international 
relations have produced numerous analyses of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and 
national security. The majority of these summon evidence to outline logical ways the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic may threaten national security, often focusing on militaries, 
peacekeepers and the possibility of the disease contributing to state instability or failure. 
The links expounded in these papers are often accompanied by an appeal to increase 
political attention and funding for HIV/AIDS because of its potential to impact national 
security. This formulaic structure has left considerable aspects of the relationship 
between HIV/AIDS and national security under analyzed. In particular, the global health 
community has not yet analyzed the lessons of securitization, and impacts of linking 
HIV/AIDS to national security interests. 
Similarly, the lack of a detailed history of this relationship has stifled coherent analysis, 
and contributed to misunderstandings about the impacts of the linkage of HIV/AIDS and 
national security. In the global health and national security literature, only one book 
briefly outlines the events that led to the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC and in 
the U. S. (Behrman 2004). Some events before and after these developments have been 
described in other publications, but to date there has been no comprehensive analysis. 
Because of this lack of historical research and case studies, cases where HIV/AIDS was 
linked to national security considerations before 2000 have been largely ignored. This is 
unfortunate because the links between HIV/AIDS and national security from 1985 to 
1995 had major impacts on efforts to fight the pandemic and hold important lessons for 
today. Furthermore the major acts of securitization at the UNSC and in the U. S., and 
their impact on efforts to fight the pandemic, are more complex than current analysis 
suggests. 
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This thesis thus seeks to contribute to current knowledge by constructing the first history 
of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus from the beginning of the pandemic until 
2007. This nexus is defined by this thesis as historical cases where HIV/AIDS was 
securitized (as defined by Buzan et al. 1998) as well as more inclusively, cases where 
HIV/AIDS was linked to the activities of institutions of security, such as United Nation's 
peacekeeping forces and various African militaries. This history introduces important 
events from the period between 1985-1995 into the debate on HIV/AIDS and national 
security, explores the political machinations that lead to securitization, and provides a 
needed historical framework for future research. 
Constructing the first history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus allows for a 
fuller accounting of the risks and benefits of securitization than has been possible to date. 
Elbe (2006a: 125) argues that the question of whether HIV/AIDS should be addressed as 
a security issue is essential, and that debate on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus 
must be expanded beyond empirical questions to address this normative question: 
Given the growing policy resonance of arguments about the security implications 
of HIV/AIDS, the time has come to reflect more thoroughly on how such a 
framing of the pandemic could facilitate international efforts to reduce its spread 
and how this framing might also be counterproductive to these efforts. 
Only two authors have specifically sought to examine this normative question of whether 
HIV/AIDS should be securitized, both from the field of international relations. Peterson 
(2002) and Elbe (2006a) seek answers to this question by weighing the risks and benefits 
of securitizing HIV/AIDS. Peterson's conception of the risks and benefits is based on 
attempts to securitize the environment in the 1980s-l990s, as well as the linkage between 
disease and security in Europe during the nineteenth century. Elbe's analysis is based on 
an application of the securitization theory of Buzan et al. (1998). Elbe's analysis begins 
with the normative dangers and benefits of securitization, and applies these to 
HIV/AIDS. 
This thesis seeks to make a major contribution to existing knowledge by adding a third, 
namely an historical case study perspective, to the debate initiated by Peterson and Elbe 
on the risks and benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS. This thesis, like Elbe (2006a), 
adopts Buzan et al. 's (1998) securitization theory. However, unlike Elbe (2006a) the 
basis of risks and benefits of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus in this thesis are 
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located in the study of the historical links between HIV/AIDS and national security. 
Benefits in the fight against HIV/AIDS are measured as anything that increased 
resources or political attention for HIV/AIDS, and which was then used to fight the 
epidemic according to basic public health principles. For example, a benefit of 
securitization could be increased political leadership, which was used to implement 
successful prevention programs. Risks of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus are 
correspondingly anything that compromised efforts to fight the disease, or garnered 
political attention that distorted or undermined public health efforts. For example, a risk 
of securitization could be increased political attention that sought to only address 
HIV/AIDS in countries of strategic interest, and therefore undermined global efforts to 
fight the disease. This assessment is particularly targeted to address the global health 
community's interests in the determinants of the political priority of HIV/AIDS, and 
concerns about utilizing national security justifications for global health action. Based in 
historical case studies of the nexus, this assessment introduces a novel, third weighing of 
the hazards and benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS that presents a related, but different 
set of hazards and benefits from the ones identified by Elbe (2006a) and Peterson (2002). 
Constructing a history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus also allows for a fuller 
examination of the role global health actors have played in the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS to date. This represents a second critical question to address from a global 
health perspective, in addition to the broader weighing of the hazards and benefits of 
securitization. Whether and how global health actors have contributed to the revolution 
in the political treatment of HIV/AIDS has important implications for the future of global 
health and for its interactions with the national security community. The answers to this 
question will also demonstrate where and how global health has successfully influenced 
political debates on HIV/AIDS, and where and why global health leadership and research 
has failed to have political influence. Thus, evaluation of the role of global health actors 
in the securitization of HIV/AIDS is the third contribution to knowledge of this thesis. 
The final original contribution of this thesis is the testing of conceptual frameworks that 
have been put forth so far to explain this nexus and, more broadly, the relationship 
between global health and national security. This thesis brings together four conceptual 
frameworks, and tests their explanatory power against explanations of historical events 
gathered in this research from interviews and documents. The most salient aspects of the 
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conceptual frameworks are highlighted in the history and may be brought forward for 
further academic usage. Aspects of the nexus that are not explained by current 
conceptual frameworks are identified. In this way, this thesis aims to bring greater 
empirical and conceptual clarity to the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
1.2 Purpose and objectives 
The purpose of this research is to strengthen empirical and conceptual understanding of 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus by applying historical and global health 
perspectives, and to offer a novel assessment of the risks and benefits of securitizing the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
To achieve this purpose, the research will undertake the following objectives: 
Conduct a full literature review, incorporating both public health and international 
relations literature, for evidence on and conceptualizations of the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus. 
2. Create a history of events where HIV/AIDS was linked to national security 
considerations through document review and in-depth interviews with those 
involved. 
3. Assess the historical hazards and benefits of linking HIV/AIDS to national security 
considerations for efforts to fight the pandemic. 
4. Assess the role and effectiveness of global health actors in influencing events of the 
nexus and the political status of efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. 
5. Test and offer improvements for current conceptual frameworks seeking to explain 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
6. Put forth recommendations for the global heath community on engagement with the 
national security community, and for addressing the linkages between global health 
and national security. 
1.3 Methodology 
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To construct a history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, this thesis has used 
documents and semi-structured interviews with key policymakers involved in events that 
linked HIV/AIDS and national security. 
1.3.1 Document review 
An extensive review and interpretation of primary and secondary documents relating to 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus was undertaken. Four sources of documents 
were used in this review. First, national government and UN publications were used 
including official government publications from Thailand, the UK, and the U. S. In the 
case of the U. S., Freedom of Information requests have unearthed previously classified 
CIA studies of HIV/AIDS. The research also makes extensive use of transcripts of 
UNSC and UN General Assembly meetings on HIV/AIDS which are available online. 
Second, the research examines numerous NGO and grey literature sources that have 
commented on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. Third, an interdisciplinary 
search of scholarly papers on the links between national security and HIV/AIDS has 
been performed using Medline, JSTOR, Bath Information and Data Services, EBSCO 
and OCLC. Fourth, newspaper and magazine reports on the links between HIV/AIDS 
and national security have been searched using LexusNexus, Kaisernetwork. org, 
globalhealth. org, and Google. com. Citations from all of the sources above were then 
used to locate further publications and resources. 
1.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The research conducted 28 semi-structured interviews, along with numerous less formal 
exchanges with key informants at conferences, meetings and by email. Interviews were 
especially critical for unmasking the differences between the public rationales for an 
event, and the private views of policymakers and those involved. The gap between 
public rational and private explanations for political events is often large. However the 
combination of national security and global health, two fields with different objectives 
and world views, and one field with a penchant for secrecy, seemed to make this gap 
particularly vast. In much of the history revealed by this thesis, including the dramatic 
securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, the public explanations of events were shown 
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to be deficient through interviews with key policymakers and actors. Interviews were 
also essential to go beyond a sequence of historical events to uncover the motives and 
perspectives of those involved. Often in these interviews, a story from one participant's 
perspective brought aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus into clearer view 
than would have otherwise been possible. Some of these stories have been quoted at 
length in this thesis. 
The selection of key informants began with nine preliminary interviews with persons in 
the U. S. Department of Defense and Department of State, NGOs, and academia in 
Washington D. C. A snowball technique was employed to identify further contacts in 
other policy communities. Further interviews were conducted with persons involved in 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus from a wide variety of backgrounds, with a 
focus on the U. S., Africa, Asia, the UN, and military forces. Access to informants was 
better than expected. Difficulties were only occasionally encountered reaching the 
highest levels of government and international organizations. For instance, interviews 
were requested but not possible to arrange with Richard Holbrook and Peter Piot. While 
both perspectives would have been informative, an interview with Holbrook's deputy at 
the UN and an informal discussion with Peter Piot and review of his speeches largely 
compensated for the lack of formal interviews with the most senior policymakers. 
Interviews with high level military and intelligence officials were often conducted on a 
`not for attribution' basis, which allowed officials to discuss the topic freely without 
danger of compromise. This allowed important and usually secret military and 
intelligence community perspectives on HIV/AIDS to be examined. At no point did a 
lack of access to officials or other persons compromise the construction of this history. 
A full list of interviews is attached in Appendix A. 
The interviews themselves were approximately one hour in length, with follow-up 
questions asked through email. In person interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
while detailed notes were taken during phone interviews. An offer to be "off the record" 
or "not for attribution" was frequently used to obtain more honest perspectives from 
policymakers, especially when their explanation differed from official accounts or the 
perspective of their organization. In these cases, the policymaker's perspective is often 
found in a quote from a confidential source, or is represented by another source that 
corroborates their perspective. In interviews, there was always a strong attempt to obtain 
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the most honest recollections and perspectives to limit institutional biases. Those 
interviewed were generally open and candid, sometimes surprising so, resulting in 
informative and sometimes fascinating insights into the nexus that would have been 
unavailable without the use of interviews. Transcription and detailed note taking, and 
offers to be "not for attribution" or "off the record" greatly improved the quality and 
accuracy of interview data available. 
1.3.3 Data analysis 
Documents, semi-structured interviews and numerous informal discussions have been 
synthesized to create this history. In most cases, documents were used to outline the 
historical events studied. Interviews were then used to go further into depth about 
events, revealing perspectives and behind the scenes occurrences that are usually 
unpublished and unrecorded. Documents were then revisited for signs confirming or 
calling into question information from interviews. Often interviewees would be 
contacted by email with follow-up questions to clarify events or statements. 
This thesis has endeavored to provide ample confirmation of the events and arguments 
described within. In some cases such as the role of national security concerns in 
Thailand's response to HIV/AIDS, documents and interviews are in close agreement. In 
other cases such as the justifications for the U. S. President's Emergency Plan For AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) initiative, interviews contradict official documents and narratives. 
Close agreement among multiple interviewees about the rationale behind PEPFAR 
provided confidence for arguing that the official justifications were incomplete and that 
key players interpreted events differently. Multiple sources have been used to support 
the description of all historical events, arguments, and conclusions. Single sources have 
only been used to convey perspectives or ideas from an individual perspective, or how a 
policymaker's interpretation of events influenced their actions. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 begins by providing a background on HIV/AIDS and conceptions of national 
security. A review of the global epidemiology and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
followed by an outline of the responses to the disease, begin the chapter. The next 
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section includes a history and discussion of the concept of national security. This section 
concludes by adopting Buzan et al. 's (1998) securitization theory for the purposes of 
understanding national security and analysis of the process of securitization. The third 
section of the chapter brings these two fields together by outlining four conceptual 
frameworks for understanding the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. Each 
framework highlights a different aspect of the nexus, and is tested and used to draw 
attention to common themes throughout the following historical chapters. 
A review of the literature on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus comprises Chapter 
3. Based upon Feldbaum et al. (2006a), the literature review focuses on how the main 
links between HIV/AIDS and national security have to date been defined and 
conceptualized. These main links are the populations of militaries and peacekeepers, the 
potential impact of HIV/AIDS on state stability, and the impact of the epidemic on the 
strategically important states of Russia, India, China, Nigeria and Ethiopia. A review of 
critical approaches to the question of linking HIV/AIDS and global health in general to 
national security interests follows. The literature review then narrows to focus on the 
small number of articles that specifically discuss the utility, risks and benefits of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS. Two of these articles, Peterson (2002) and Elbe (2006a), are 
directly relevant to the thesis question and are discussed in detail. 
Chapters 4,5, and 6 are the historical chapters describing the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus. Chapter 4 examines the period between 1985 - 1995 and the links 
between HIV/AIDS and national security in Uganda, Thailand, Cambodia, and within 
the intelligence agencies of the U. S. and Soviet Union. Chapter 5 delineates the events 
that led to the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC and in the U. S., as well as their 
immediate impacts. Chapter 6 investigates the policy impacts of securitization between 
2000 - 2007, as well as the revision of HIV/AIDS prevalence estimates among armed 
forces. 
Each of these chapters ends with a discussion of the conclusions from that time period. 
Chapter 7 builds on the analysis and conclusions of each chapter, drawing overall 
conclusions addressing this thesis's purpose and objectives. 
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1.5 Limitations and biases 
Any attempt to create the first history of a subject is likely to have limitations. These 
limitations are likely to be exaggerated if the history is brings together two very different 
fields - global health and national security - the latter which has a strong penchant for 
secrecy and classified information. This section discusses the caveats of this thesis, and 
the actions taken to limit these problems. 
First, the choice to focus on HIV/AIDS, rather than another disease or public health 
issues more broadly, was necessary to narrow the scope of the thesis, but in turn limits 
the generalizability of this thesis in important ways. First, HIV/AIDS occupies a middle 
ground among the links between global health issues and national security. It is neither 
as accepted a national security threat as biological weapons, nor as rejected as malaria, 
injuries, or non-communicable diseases. Because of the unique characteristics of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as the politics that surround the disease, the findings of this 
thesis on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus may not be easily generalizable to 
other disease areas or to global health in general. Despite this limitation, the huge impact 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and substantial pubic health resources dedicated to fighting 
the disease allows lessons from this case-study of HIV/AIDS to be drawn about the 
broader relationship between global health and national security. 
Second, the choice to limit this thesis to examining the risk and benefits of securitization 
for the fight against HIV/AIDS, was necessary to limit the scope of the thesis. However, 
it is critical to note that this choice excludes consideration of the impact of securitization 
of HIV/AIDS on broader global health efforts aside from HIV/AIDS. This is an 
important caveat because a major criticism of the increase in funding and political 
attention for HIV/AIDS, which this thesis argues is partially due to securitization, is that 
it has improperly drawn attention and funding away from other global health efforts. 
This broader question represents a different avenue of research, and thus the question of 
what the impact of the securitization of HIV/AIDS has been on global health efforts in 
general still awaits examination. 
2 Mead Over's working paper from the Center for Global Development argues that PEPFAR has actually 
created an unprecedented global "entitlement" program, whose growth could consume other U. S. global 
health and development budgets in the coming years. This paper could form the basis of a serious critique 
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Third, this thesis examines securitization in context of national security, and only briefly 
discusses human or other levels of security. While human security has been shown to be 
a useful construct in examining the implications of HIV/AIDS (Elbe 2006b), this thesis 
focuses on national security primarily because of its relevance to political prioritization 
and funding. Issued deemed of national security importance can attract extraordinary 
funding and political attention from states. Human security issues have not traditionally 
received such attention. For the same reasons, feminist perspectives on security are not a 
focus of the analysis of this thesis (Tickner 1995). Furthermore, difficulties mustering 
political attention and funding presented a major challenge of addressing HIV/AIDS for 
the first twenty years of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and this thesis provides evidence that 
linking the disease to national security interests played a pivotal role in generating 
beneficial government action. Thus a focus on national security was chosen for its 
strong relevance to political prioritization and funding. In addition, and as described in 
the first pages of this thesis, the links between infectious diseases and national security 
are centuries old, but were largely neglected for the duration of the Cold war. This thesis 
tells some of the fascinating story of the rediscovery of the linkages between public 
health and national security. 
The fourth limitation of this thesis is imposed by the adoption of Buzan et al. 's (1998) 
securitization theory. This thesis conceives of the links between HIV/AIDS and national 
security as those cases in which securitization of the pandemic has taken place, and more 
broadly, where the disease was linked to the activities of institutions of security. While 
this conception derives directly from securitization theory, it represents a choice by the 
author which limits the scope of the thesis. Other authors writing on the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus could use a broader definition of national security that would 
change the focus of a history in important aspects. In particular, the choice to use 
securitization theory has excluded some links between HIV/AIDS and national security 
that are usually discussed in the literature on the nexus. The interactions between 
HIV/AIDS and conflict, for example, are not addressed here because they are not cases 
of securitization. Neither are military efforts to fight HIV/AIDS addressed unless they 
are part of the larger securitization of HIV/AIDS by the government. Similarly, 
of the impact of the securitization of HIV/AIDS on broader global health efforts and funding. For more 
information, see: http: //www. cgdev. org/content/publications/detail/I 5973 
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determining whether or not HIV/AIDS is a objective security threat to a state is not a 
question this thesis seeks to address, because Buzan et al. (1998) argue that security is a 
"self-referential practice, " and that it is the process of securitization that must be studied. 
Nor is the goal of this thesis to attempt to gather new evidence to support the links 
between HIV/AIDS and national security, although some new evidence is provided. 
Thus, the choice of securitization theory uses a particular concept of security which, in 
some ways, narrows the conception of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
However, this narrowing has the benefit of forming a more cohesive and concise 
definition of securitization that then allows the question of the risks and benefits of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS to be directly addressed (for a discussion of securitization theory 
see Chapter 2.5). 
Furthermore, this thesis has excluded the cases of Botswana, Russia and Fiji from 
detailed examination because of a lack of evidence concerning the political consequences 
of the use of term security in reference to HIV/AIDS. While leaders of Botswana, 
Russia and Fiji have described HIV/AIDS as a threat to their national security, strong 
evidence is lacking on whether these speech acts had a significant impact on efforts to 
address the disease that would merit inclusion in this thesis. Because of a lack of 
research on securitization in these countries, and evidence on the impact of these speech 
acts, these countries are not examined in detail in this thesis. Further research is needed 
to determine the impact of these potential securitizations, particularly in Botswana and 
Russia, (some of which is already underway, see Sjöstedt (2008) and Chabrol (2008)). 
The primary bias that affects this thesis is a form of publication bias. In traditional 
epidemiology, publication bias occurs because studies that report positive results are 
more likely to be published than those that report no association (Gordis 2000). This 
bias affects the findings of this thesis in two important ways. First, failed attempts to 
securitize HIV/AIDS are much less likely to be reported and publicized than successes. 
By definition, successful securitizations push HIV/AIDS to the highest levels of politics, 
while unsuccessful attempts do not become government policy and may go unreported. 
Because of this bias, it is possible that this thesis underreports instances of failed 
securitization. Underreporting may be greater for developing countries because highly 
affected states are more likely to view HIV/AIDS as a national security threat, and 
because developing countries generally publish fewer position papers on foreign policy 
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and national security. It has been difficult to overcome this aspect of publication bias 
because of the lack of records on failed attempts at securitization. However, two failed 
attempts at securitization of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. intelligence community have been 
uncovered, as well as a failure to address the linkages between peacekeeping operations 
in Cambodia and the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
The second way publication bias has affected this thesis is through the possibly 
disproportionate focus on well-documented events that link HIV/AIDS and national 
security. This bias may be particularly acute when examining issues related to national 
security, intelligence agencies and armed forces because the publication of policy 
documents by these communities is rare. The exception to this trend is the U. S., whose 
government, intelligence agencies, and armed forces have together published the U. S. 
national security strategy, declassified intelligence assessments of HIV/AIDS, and 
publicly discussed efforts to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS in African militaries. 
Freedom of Information legislation has also resulted in the availability of previously 
classified U. S. intelligence assessments. Partially because of the unusual availability of 
U. S. intelligence, military and national security documents, this thesis has a strong focus 
on the links between HIV/AIDS and national security as conceived by U. S. agencies and 
policymakers. The U. S. has taken the lead in addressing the HIV/AIDS - security nexus, 
and was responsible for bringing the disease to the UNSC, so a strong focus on the U. S. 
can be justified and is not solely the result of publication bias. However, it is recognized 
here that there is a greater focus on the U. S. than there would be if other countries were 
more open with analysis and policy documents from their intelligence agencies and 
armed forces. 
The representativeness, quality and depth of the interviews was critical to both creating a 
history of the nexus and its analysis. As previously discussed, access to policymakers 
involved in the nexus was excellent. Policymakers from all countries and international 
organizations were universally willing to discuss their experiences and insights on the 
links between HIV/AIDS and national security. Conducting interviews on a "not for 
attribution" basis facilitated interviews with personnel from the CIA, U. S. military, U. S. 
State and Executive Agencies who would otherwise be unable to discuss the subject. 
Phone interviews and email follow-ups were utilized to interview African and Asian 
policymakers when travel and in-person interviews were not feasible. Only the most 
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elite policymakers, such as Richard Holbrooke, Peter Piot and Colin Powell, were not 
available to be interviewed. In these cases, interviews with their deputies, examination 
of their public speeches and writings, and questions asked during public talks were used 
to compensate for the absence of in-person interviews. In no case was a substantial lack 
of access to policymakers encountered. Due to the relatively small number of events that 
comprise the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, most of the major policymakers 
involved were interviewed for this thesis. The combination of excellent access and a 
small number of necessary interviews greatly benefited the representativeness of the 
interviews, limiting the bias due to who was able to be interviewed. 
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Chapter 2: A conceptual framework for understanding the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a review of the two main subjects of this thesis: HIV/AIDS and 
national security. These reviews are each based in the literature and methods of their 
own fields. The HIV/AIDS section utilizes the public health literature to summarize the 
current state of the pandemic, and characteristics of the global response. Next, the 
section on national security utilizes international relations theories and literature to 
review the various definitions of security, and discuss the contested broadening of 
security studies since the early 1980s. Buzan et al. 's (1998) securitization theory is 
presented at the conclusion of the section on security, and provides a critical tool, 
utilized by this thesis, for understanding how an issue becomes securitized. 
The final section of this chapter is a bridge from this chapter's uni-disciplinary reviews 
of HIV/AIDS and national security, to the next chapter's interdisciplinary review of the 
literature on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. This section presents four 
conceptual frameworks which seek to explain the linkages and relationship between 
global health and national security. Each of these four frameworks illuminates different 
aspects of this complex nexus, and each framework will be discussed and tested against 
the historical case studies described in Chapters 4-6. 
2.2 The global epidemiology of HIV/AIDS 
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) causes Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS), which leads to the failure of the immune system and life-threatening 
opportunistic infections if untreated. First described in 1981, HIV/AIDS has become a 
global pandemic affecting virtually every country in the world (CDC 1981, UNAIDS 
2006). UNAIDS (2006) estimates that HIV/AIDS has infected 65 million people, 25 
million of whom have so far died of the disease. In 2007, new UNAIDS (2007) 
estimates 33.2 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. 2.5 million are estimated to 
have become newly infected in 2007, while 2.1 million died of AIDS (UNAIDS 2007). 
These estimates represent a significant reduction from 2006 estimates. UNAIDS 
attributes this reduction to improved methodology and available country-level data, 
23 
particularly in Angola, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zimbabwe (UNAIDS 
2007). However, some authors have argued that UNAIDS deliberately overstated global 
estimates and potential for transmission to non-high risk populations to increase political 
attention and funding for the pandemic (Chin 2007; McNeil 2007). 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region of the globe with 68% of global 
infections and 22.5 million persons infected (UNAIDS 2007). Seventeen countries in 
this region have adult prevalence rates above 5%. Botswana (24.1%), Lesotho (23.2%), 
Mozambique (16.1%), Namibia (19.6%), South Africa (18.8%), Swaziland (33.4%), 
Zambia (17%), and Zimbabwe (20.1%) have severe epidemics with adult prevalence 
rates estimated at over 15% (UNAIDS 2006). The epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa 
appears to be stabilizing at high levels of infection, with deaths from AIDS matching 
new infections, and declines in prevalence in some countries. Approximately 810,000 
people are on antiretroviral (ARV) therapy in the region (UNAIDS 2006). 
After Africa, the Caribbean is the second most affected region of the world by 
percentage of infected persons. An estimated 230,000 persons are estimated to be living 
with HIV/AIDS in the region, with epidemics driven by heterosexual transmission in the 
context of poverty and gender inequality (UNAIDS 2007). Rates of HIV/AIDS have 
stabilized in some areas of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and ARV therapy in 
Barbados and Bahamas has reduced deaths from AIDS. Despite these successes, AIDS 
remains the leading cause of death among adults in the region (UNAIDS 2006). Haiti 
and Bahamas have the highest adult prevalence rates in the region: 3.8% and 3.3% 
respectively (UNAIDS 2006). Barbados, Dominican Republic and Jamaica all have rates 
above 1%, while Trinidad and Tobago has an estimated adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
of 2.6%. 
Asia has an estimated 4.9 million people living with HIV/AIDS. 2.5 million of these live 
in India. India's large population results in a national HIV/AIDS prevalence of 0.36% 
(UNAIDS 2007). A similar situation exists in China, where 650,000 people are living 
with HIV/AIDS but only 0.1% of all adults are infected (UNAIDS 2006). Prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS among the countries of South-East Asia is between 0.1% - 1.5%. Epidemics 
in Thailand and Cambodia are declining because of successful prevention efforts. 
24 
Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, and Indonesia are experiencing fast growing epidemics. 
Approximately 180,000 people are on ARV therapy in Asia (UNAIDS 2006). 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have fast growing epidemics accounting for 1.6 million 
people living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2007). Russia and the Ukraine account for 
almost all of the infections in this region. Estimates of total HIV/AIDS infections in 
Russia and the Ukraine are 940,000 and 4100,000 respectively (UNAIDS 2006). 
Transmission in this region occurs predominantly through injection drug use or sex with 
injection drug users. High rates of HIV/AIDS among prison populations, who have little 
ability to learn about or prevent HIV/AIDS, are also contributing to these epidemics. 
Access to ARV therapy is low in the region, with only 13% receiving needed treatment 
(UNAIDS 2006). 
The situation in Latin America, home to 1.6 million people living with HIV/AIDS, is 
mixed. Successful interventions have limited prevalence of HIV/AIDS to under 1% in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
(UNAIDS 2006). Brazil in particular has been successful in offering widespread access 
to ARV therapy. 73% of persons in the region who need treatment are receiving ARV 
therapy, the majority of these in Brazil. However, intense epidemics are occurring in 
Belize, Guyana and Honduras with adult prevalence rates above 1.5% (UNAIDS 2006). 
Men who have sex with men are a driver of the epidemic that is under-addressed by 
governments because of stigma. Heterosexual transmission is also on the rise. 
2.1 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in North America, Western and Central 
Europe (UNAIDS 2007). Deaths from AIDS have been dramatically reduced in these 
regions because of widespread access to ARV therapy. However prevention of new 
infections has been less successful with continuing transmission from heterosexual and 
gay sex, as well as injection drug use. The United States, with 1.2 million people living 
with HIV/AIDS, faces particular problems reducing the rapid growth of the epidemic 
among women and racial minorities. In Western and Central Europe, with 720,000 
people living with HIV/AIDS, the primary transmission route is through heterosexual 
sex. The dramatic decrease in deaths from AIDS differentiates these regions from other 
areas of the globe. 
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Oceania has an estimated 75,000 infected persons, with Papua New Guinea accounting 
for over 70% of these infections (UNAIDS 2007). The national prevalence rate in Papua 
New Guinea is 1.8%, where the epidemic is continuing to grow through heterosexual 
transmission and insufficient government action (UNAIDS 2006). Australia accounts for 
16,000 of the other infections in Oceania (UNAIDS 2006). Australia's epidemic is 
driven primarily by unsafe sex between men. 
With the exception of Sudan, adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS is below 0.1% in North 
Africa and the Middle East (UNAIDS 2006). Sudan faces a serious epidemic with 
national adult prevalence estimated at 1.6% (UNAIDS 2006). Epidemics are growing in 
Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco. The main 
mode of transmission is unprotected sex, although injection drug use is a major factor in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. There is a lack of 
epidemiological and public knowledge about HIV/AIDS in the region (UNAIDS 2007). 
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Figure 2.1: Adults living with HIV/AIDS by region in 2005. Adapted from UNAIDS 
2006. 
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2.3 The global response to HITS/AIDS 
The global response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been insufficient to stop the spread 
of the disease. Barnett and Whiteside (2002: 5) describe the response of government and 
international institutions as "glacial, " while UNAIDS (2006: 4) states that "the response 
to the AIDS epidemic to date has been nowhere near adequate. " Prins (2004: 931) writes 
that the response to HIV/AIDS has been so insignificant that a visitor from Mars 
observing the pandemic "would conclude that humanity took a conscious decision in the 
early 1980s to allow the pandemic to run without interference... " In only 25 years, HIV 
has spread from localized "hot spots" of infection to nearly every country on the planet, 
infecting 65 million people and killing 25 million (UNAIDS 2006: 4). 
The causes of this slow response are mulitfactoral. Farmer (1992,1999,2003) argues 
that stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and structural violence against the poor have 
inhibited responses to the pandemic. Barnett and Whiteside (2002) argue that the long 
timeframe from HIV infection to the development of AIDS has made it easier to deny the 
epidemic until it is too late for effective control. Feachem (2003: para. 10) cites 
examples of people denying that their "culture" is susceptible to a HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Eberstadt (2002: 23) writes that the response to HIV/AIDS has been "muted" because the 
most affected region of Sub-Saharan Africa has minimal importance to global economics 
and politics and is therefore ignored. The fact that HIV/AIDS is a sexually transmitted 
disease that was initially discovered among socially stigmatized groups including gays 
and drug users, added to the stigma associated with the disease and reluctance to public 
address the epidemic (Valdiserri 2003; Putze! 2003). Economic modeling of the impact 
of HIV/AIDS in the early 1990s by the World Bank suggested that the epidemic would 
have benign, or even beneficial macroeconomic effects, which downplayed the threat of 
HIV/AIDS (Putzet 2003). A failure to comprehend the magnitude and complexity of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic also contributed to the slow response (Putzel 2003; Valdiserri 
2003). Epstein (2007), and Chin and Bennett (2007) argue that the global response has 
been held back by not correctly perceiving the critical role concurrent sexual networks 
play in driving the epidemic. These, and other factors at the global, national, and local 
levels, have contributed to the inadequate response to HIV/AIDS and the pandemic's 
continued growth. 
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Successes in reducing rates of HIV/AIDS at the national level are rare but do exist. 
Uganda has seen a stabilization of national HIV/AIDS prevalence since the mid-1990s 
(Okware et al. 2001; Green et al. 2006). However the extent of this success, and its 
causes, are subject to considerable debate (Parkhurst 2002; Allen 2005; Green et al. 
2006). Thailand also successfully reduced prevalence of HIV/AIDS during the 1990s by 
promoting condom usage during commercial sex, but is facing challenges maintaining 
this success (UNDP 2004; UNAIDS 2006; Ainsworth et at. 2003). Brazil's response to 
HIV/AIDS has offered universal access to ARVs, which has helped bring the epidemic 
under control (Piot and Coll Seck 2001; Galvao 2002; Oliveira-Cruz et al. 2004). 
Despite these successes, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has continued to grow in most 
countries. 
2.4 What is Security? 
Security is a contested concept. Scholars and practitioners of security studies have 
offered dozens of definitions over the last 60 years, with none achieving the widespread 
recognition of, for example, the WHO Constitution's definition of health. Disagreement 
covers all aspects of the term "security" save one: that security entails freedom from 
threats or danger. The focus of security, or whose security is important, from individuals 
to nation states to global society to levels in between, is the central question in this 
ongoing debate. Moreover, the nature of potential threats to security, from foreign 
militaries to infectious diseases, also remains contested. 
Buzan, Waver, and de Wilde (1998) describe security as the survival of a referent object. 
They use the concept of "levels of analysis" to site the referent object. Buzan's (1983) 
earlier work identified three "levels" of security: the individual, state and global, while 
Buzan et al. (1998: 5) cite five levels of analysis. Levels of analysis are not a theory of 
security or international relations; the concept provides a heuristic framework for 
understanding theories of security and whose security is to be protected. 
4 Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity. Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the 
International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered 
into force on 7 April 1948. 
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2.4.1 National Security 
The traditional and still dominant approach to security studies focuses on security at the 
level of the state, i. e. national security. The state is the referent object of national 
security. National security has traditionally been pursued as the number one priority of 
governments because, it is argued, without survival of the state, no other priorities or 
goals of government can be achieved. Referencing the neorealist assumption of an 
anarchic international system, Waltz (1979: 126) argues, "In anarchy, security is the 
highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as 
tranquility, profit, and power. " Governments seek to protect and promote their national 
security through their military, economic, domestic, and foreign policies. 
However, how states have defined their national security has undergone a contested 
broadening and narrowing over the last eighty years. For the great powers during the 
interwar period, diplomacy, international understanding, national self-determination and 
disarmament were viewed as the most important means to promoting security (Baldwin 
1995). Immediately following World War II until 1955, security was not seen as the 
primary goal of all states, but rather "as one of several values, the relative importance of 
which varied from one state to another... " (Baldwin 1995: 122). Furthermore, national 
security was to be pursued using both military and non-military approaches. 
After 1955, a significant narrowing of security studies occurred, due to the advent of 
nuclear weapons and onset of the Cold War. Calling the period between 1955-1965 the 
"golden age" of security studies, Walt stated that the "central question was 
straightforward: how could states use weapons of mass destruction as instruments of 
policy, given the risk of nuclear exchange" (Walt 1991: 214). Smith (1999: 72) recalls 
the sense of control that such a narrow definition of security offered: "I remember only 
too well the buzz that being a `master of the universe' of nuclear matters gave me... It 
was a world of clear parameters and established facts. " Walt (1991: 212) clearly 
expresses this narrow definition of security studies as "the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military force. " 
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This vision of national security, focused on the nuclear threat, deeply affected the 
security community's perspective of what constituted a security threat. Threats were 
defined as external and military in nature, such as that posed by the Soviet Union to the 
Western world during the Cold War. Elbe (2006b: 2) argues that during the Cold War, 
the "greatest threat to the West (and indeed mankind) was... deemed to emanate from 
the armed forces, especially nuclear capabilities, of other states. Twentieth century 
security policy evolved in a way that reflected these... historical conditions... " 
Furthermore, threats to national security were to be addressed by the build up of military 
power to create a balance of power. These ideas are deeply rooted in realist and neo- 
realist perspectives of international relations. Tickner (1995: 176) summarizes the realist 
perspective: "For realists, the meaning of security was subsumed under the rubric of 
power. Conceptually, it was synonymous with the security of the state against external 
dangers, which was to be achieved by increasing military capabilities. " Ayoob (1995) 
similarly summarizes the realist perspective: 
as it has been traditionally used in international relations literature, the term 
security is based upon two major assumptions: one, that most threats to a state's 
security arise from outside its borders, and, two, that these threats are primarily, if 
not exclusively, military in nature and usually require a military response if the 
security of the target state is to be preserved. (Ayoob 1995: 5) 
This vision of national security and desire for clarity in the field has persisted into the 
present day. 
2.4.2 Broadening of national security 
This narrow conceptualization of national security began to be challenged in the 1980s. 
Writing about U. S. administrations since the beginning of the Cold War, Ullman (1983: 
129) argues that "every administration in Washington has defined American national 
security in excessively narrow and excessively military terms. Politicians have found it 
easier to focus the attention of an inattentive public on military dangers, real or 
imagined, than on nonmilitary ones... " Ullman writes that pursuing national security in 
only military terms is dangerous for two reasons. First, this perspective causes states to 
focus only on military threats and ignore possibly harmful non-military threats. Second, 
he argues that this perspective causes a militarization of international relations that will 
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increase global insecurity in the long-term. Seeking to redress the narrow focus on 
external military threats, Ullman offers a new and broader definition of national security. 
He writes, 
a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens 
drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for 
the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threaten significantly to narrow the range of 
policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, 
nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. 
(Ullman 1983: 133) 
Mathews (1989: 162) similarly argues that a redefinition of security is required to 
"include resource, environmental and demographic issues. " Addressing transnational 
threats such as environmental disasters requires the dismissal of the close linkage 
between national sovereignty and national borders, and new diplomacy to "cope with the 
world's growing environmental interdependence" (Mathews 1989: 174). 
The concept of "common security, " first created by the 1982 Independent Commission 
on Disarmament and Security Issues, known as the Palme Commission, also sought to 
provide an alternative to traditional conceptions of national security. The Commission 
was heavily influenced by the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers. 
Instead of responding to this threat with the buildup of military power, they conceived of 
this mutual threat as creating interdependence in the international system. The 
Commission wrote "our interdependence reflects the crucial technological fact of the 
contemporary age: there are no effective defences against missiles armed with nuclear 
warheads... " (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982: 5). 
In such an environment, "military strength alone cannot provide real security" 
(Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982: 4). The 
Commission concluded that states must cooperate to reduce nuclear and other arms, and 
to isolate and manage conflict in international society when it occurred. 
Collective or common security does not differ from national security in that it still 
focuses on states as the main players in the international system, and the fundamental 
role of military power in affecting relationships between states. However, collective 
security departs from national security's belief that the buildup of military power is the 
only possibility defense in an anarchic international system. The collective security 
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perspective holds that states can build trust in the international system, and thus create 
collective security arrangements which maintain stability, prevent conflict, and stop 
aggression (Baylis 2001). 
The collective security perspective defines security threats more broadly than national 
security. While maintaining that states are the fundamental players in the international 
system, a collective security perspective suggests that threats can come both from state 
and non-state sources. The Palme Commission began this broadening of the definition 
of security to focus on people's well-being. It states, "common security requires that 
people live in dignity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work 
and live in a world without poverty and destitution" (Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues 1982: 172). Collective security challenges the national 
security perspective by advocating cooperative arrangements between states to manage 
conflict, and embracing a broader conception of threats to security. 
While collective security focused on a different way to achieve security between states, 
the "third world security school" examined national security from the perspective of the 
weaker and poorer states of the South (Smith 1999: 81). Ayoob (1995) argues that the 
traditional definition of security, focused on external military threats, is a Western 
concept and ill-suited to application in the third world. Specifically, security threats to 
third world states frequently emanate from inside the state and are often "domestic 
challenges to the legitimacy of political regimes frequently supported by outside 
intervention" (Tickner 1995: 179). Ball (1988) argues that economic security is closely 
tied to national security in the third world because conflicts can arise when elites cling to 
exploitative social, economic and political systems. Thomas (1987) argues for an 
expansive definition of threats to national security and that basic human needs should be 
considered a dimension of national security. A final and important aspect of third world 
security studies is the observation that the pursuit of security between the great powers 
has generated insecurity for the third world. Ayoob (1995: 7) observes that superpower 
competition turned "the Third World into a relatively low-cost, low-stakes arena in 
which the rivalries of the major powers could be played out without affecting those 
powers' vital interests or posing the threat of general war in the nuclear age. " The third 
world security school challenged the definition and breadth of traditional national 
security, while remaining focused on the level of the state. 
32 
The end of the Cold War provided further challenges to the traditional and narrow 
conception of national security. Smith (1999: 75) writes that "neorealism suffered 
massively because of its inability to cope with the end of the Cold War. Nor does it 
seem able to account for the patterns of international conflict that have replaced the Cold 
War. " Baldwin (1995: 132) also finds the field of security studies to be 
poorly equipped to deal with the post-cold war world, having emerged from the 
cold war with a narrow military conception of national security and a tendency to 
assert its primacy over other public policy goals. Its preoccupation with military 
statecraft limits its ability to address the many foreign and domestic problems that 
are not amenable to military solution. 
Both collective and third world security challenged the traditional conception of national 
security. However like national security, both theories remain firmly focused at the level 
of the state. After the end of the Cold War, a new conception of security was offered 
which sought to move the referent object of security from the state to the individual. 
This radical re-conceptualization of security, termed human security, places individuals 
as the primary referent object. 
While the earliest conceptions of human security date from discussions on the 
establishment of the UNSC in 1945, the United Nations Development Programme's 
(UNDP) seminal Human Development Report in 1994 reintroduced the concept as 
"freedom from fear, freedom from want" (UNDP 1994: 24). UNDP writes that human 
security has two main aspects that grow from this initial definition of freedom from fear 
and want. The report states that human security is "safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease, and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in 
communities" (UNDP 1994: 23). 
The focus on the security needs of individuals, over state militaries and their balance of 
power, represents a radical shift in perspective away from the state-based approaches 
outlined above. This shift in perspective is intentional. UNDP introduces the concept of 
human security by stating that "[t]he concept of security has for too long been interpreted 
narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national 
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It 
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has been related more to nation-states than to people" (UNDP 1994: 22). Human 
security is needed because although the "state remains the fundamental purveyor of 
security... it often fails to fulfill its security obligations - and at times has even become a 
source of threat to its own people" (Commission on Human Security 2003: 2). By 
viewing individuals as the referent object of security, human security seeks to protect 
people, not just borders from external military aggression. 
Accompanying this radical reconceputalization of the referent object of security is a 
broadening of what is considered a threat to security. UNDP (1994) categorizes the types 
of threats to human security into seven areas: economic, food, health, environmental, 
personal, community and political. The Canadian government, along with Japan and 
Norway, has incorporated human security into their security policies and defines the 
concept at "safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats" (King and 
Murray 2001/2002: 590). Other authors decline to enumerate a list of threats to human 
security, but write that human security seeks to protect people and communities from "a 
broad range of threats" that vary by society and individual (Commission on Human 
Security 2003: 2). Ingram (2005a: 524) finds the common theme across these diverse 
efforts to broaden the concept of national security, writing that "it is the sense of urgency 
and priority that proponents of these concepts wish to mobilize, while de-centering the 
state. " 
2.4.3 Backlash against expansive definitions of security 
While these attempts to incorporate different levels of security, and a broader range of 
issues, into the theory and practice of security found adherents, traditional conceptions of 
security that focus on the state and military threats remain prevalent among policymakers 
and in many academic circles (McInnes 2004b). A number of authors fought back 
against both attempts to incorporate new issues such as the environment or HIV/AIDS 
into the national security discourse, and human security's attempt to reorient the referent 
object of security towards individuals. The most common argument against the 
expansion of security studies is that a broader definition of security will be less able to 
prioritize threats and therefore destroy the very purpose of security studies. Walt (1991: 
212) argues that declaring issues such as "pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic 
recessions" to be threats to security excessively expands the field. "Defining the field in 
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this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise 
solutions to any of these important problems" (Walt 1991: 213). Others argue that a 
broad definition of security will make security studies inseparable from regular foreign 
policy (Baldwin 1995). The common refrain summarizing this argument is: if 
everything is a security issue, then nothing is. 
Deudney specifically attacks the linkage of environmental degradation to national 
security. 5 Echoing Walt's argument, Deudney (1990: 266) writes that "Disease, old age, 
crime and accidents routinely destroy life and property, but we do not think of them as 
`national security' threats or even threats to `security'... If everything that causes a 
decline in human well-being is labeled a `security' threat, the term loses any analytical 
usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of `bad'. " Deudeny also argues that the 
primary purpose of declaring environmental degradation to be a security threat is to 
simulate political action. However, he believes this appeal will backfire because the 
"'whole earth' sensibility at the core of environmental awareness" calls into question the 
privileging of states and their national security in world politics (Deudeny 1990: 268). 
Deudeny concludes that the linking of environmental problems to national security is 
both analytically inaccurate and unlikely to benefit the environmental cause. 
Efforts to move the referent object of security from states to individuals have been 
similarly criticized. Paris (2001: 102) describes the concept of human security as "so 
vague that it verges on meaninglessness - and consequently offers little practical 
guidance to academics... or to policymakers who must prioritize among competing 
policy goals. " Paris finds that proponents of human security have a vested interest in 
keeping the concept broad and ambiguous because this helps unite the coalition of states 
and organizations seeking to use human security to appropriate political and financial 
resources traditionally associated with national security. Khong (2001: 233) describes 
the results of securitizing every individual on the planet as "(total) paralysis of our ability 
to prioritize" and unlikely to aid the poor and destitute of the world. 
2.4.4 The enduring nature of national security 
S Deudney's article is used by Peterson (2002) as a template for her examination of the risks and benefits 
of securitizing HIV/AIDS. 
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Despite considerable debate about the definition of threats to security and what the 
legitimate referent object of security is, the powerful and influential nature of the 
national security perspective remains. Khong (2001: 231) explains that once an issue is 
securitized "its status in the policy hierarchy changes. It becomes an urgent issue, 
worthy of special attention, resources, and fast-track or immediate amelioration or 
resolution, perhaps even by military means. " Buzan et al. (1998: 29) write that 
securitization "means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it 
should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with 
decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. " Thus despite the conceptual debates, 
issues that are considered threats to the security of a state will rise to the highest levels of 
national and international politics. 
2.5 How do issues become securitized? 
To understand how issues come to be considered security threats, or are securitized, we 
turn to the work entitled Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al. (1998). 
Described by Elbe (2006a: 126) as the "locus classicus" for understanding securitization, 
Buzan et al. (1998) argue that security is not simply about the use of force, but about a 
particular type of politics. Security politics are an extreme version of politicization 
where rules may be broken and emergency measures adopted to address an issue. Thus 
Buzan et al. (1998) define securitization as when an issue is presented as an existential 
threat to a referent object (usually but not exclusively the state) that legitimizes 
emergency measures that would have been impossible before securitization. 
While traditional approaches to security define security and "then seek to ascertain 
empirically whether an issue genuinely represents a security threat, " Buzan et al. argue 
that objective measures of security do not exist (Elbe 2006a: 127). Security analysis is 
concerned with future threats and prioritization based on imperfect information which 
prevents objective measurement of threats to security. Furthermore, different referent 
objects will have different thresholds for threats, which also prevent objective 
measurement of what is or is not a security threat. Instead of seeking objective measures 
of security, Buzan et al. (1998: 25) argue that securitization can be understood as "the 
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects. " An issue is a security threat "not necessarily because a real 
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threat existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 24). The authors define "security" as a move "that takes politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as 
above politics... as a more extreme version of politicization" (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). 
To explain securitization as the presentation and acceptance of an existential threat to a 
referent object, Buzan et al. (1998) utilize speech act theory. Speech act theory holds 
that language can do more than simply convey information, language can perform 
actions (Elbe 2006a). They cite the examples of betting, making a promise, and naming 
a ship. These actions are performed by speaking, but "by saying the words, something is 
done" (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Securitization is a similar process. In securitization, an 
issue is presented as an existential threat to a referent object. This is a securitizing move, 
a linguistic claim that an issue should be addressed with the highest priority and 
emergency measures. If this securitizing move is accepted and emergency measures are 
legitimated, then the issue has become securitized. The speech act of presenting an issue 
as a security threat has generated action. 
Buzan et al. (1998) describe three units involved in analysis of securitization: referent 
objects, functional actors, and securitizing actors. Referent objects, as previously 
discussed, are things that are perceived to be existentially threatened and deserve 
protection. Functional actors are those who influence the dynamics of securitization, but 
who are neither the referent object nor securitizing actor. Securitizing actors are persons 
or a group of persons who perform the securitizing speech act. Not every actor can 
successfully argue for securitization. Certain actors, such as political leaders, 
governments, and pressure groups are more privileged in articulating a securitizing move 
because their arguments are more likely to be accepted. To what extent those in global 
health have been functional or securitizing actors in the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus is an important question this thesis will seek to address. 
Not all securitizing moves result in securitization. Only when a securitizing move is 
accepted and emergency actions are legitimated can an issue be considered securitized. 
Buzan et at. (1998: 31) write that securitization is "intersubjective and socially 
constructed: Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that should 
survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, 
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and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? " 
Elbe (2006a) summarizes the process of securitization as having four constituent 
components. The process begins with (1) securitizing actors who argue that a (2) 
referent object is (3) existentially threatened which justifies the use of (4) emergency 
measures to combat the threat. 
Because Buzan et al. (1998) find that security threats are not measurable by objective 
standards, and that securitization is a form of intersubjective politics, the securitization of 
issues is a political choice. Securitizing actors must chose to present an issue as a 
security threat, and an audience must choose to accept this argument and legitimize 
emergency measures. Buzan et al. (1998: 29) caution that the choice of "[n]ational 
security should not be idealized, " and that security should be seen as a failure to address 
issues through normal political processes. They argue that national security can provide 
opportunities to silence opposition, exploit threats for domestic purposes, address an 
issue with less democratic control and oversight. However these negatives must be 
weighted against the possible advantages of securitization, including "focus, attention 
and mobilization" (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). The implications of securitization theory for 
HIV/AIDS are considered in greater detail by Elbe (2006a) and are summarized in 
Chapter 3.6.2. 
This research argues that securitization theory provides a powerful tool for understanding 
how HIV/AIDS became a national security issue, and offers an outline of the possible 
risks and benefits that accompany securitization. This thesis will utilize Buzan et al. 's 
definition of security and securitization theory because, uniquely among security 
perspectives, it offers a method of analyzing the processes and impacts of securitization. 
2.6 Frameworks for understanding the HIV/AIDS- national security nexus 
The securitization of HIV/AIDS and other health issues represents a "revolution" in the 
treatment of global health issues (Fidler 2004: 45). Fidler (2004: 45) argues that 
"Nothing in the prior history of national and international efforts on public health 
compares to the political status public health has reached today. " A number of authors 
have examined this "revolution" seeking to understand the new relationship between 
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national security and global health. In three papers, (Feldbaum& Lee 2004; Feldbaum et 
al. 2006a, and Feldbaum et al. 2006b) Feldbaum et al. describe differences in values, 
referent objects and culture between national security and global health. These 
differences are discussed here under the framework of a communitarian - cosmopolitan 
dichotomy as described by Brown (1992). Lee and McInnes (2004) examine the 
influence and independence of global health when interacting with national security, and 
offer a prescriptive framework for how global health and national security should 
interrelate. Finally, Fidler (2005a and 2005b) seeks to explain the political rise of public 
health and what it means for the relationship between the global health and national 
security fields through two related frameworks. 
These four frameworks seek to explain and illuminate different aspects of the HIV/AIDS 
- national security nexus. Each author has mustered evidence to support their 
framework, but how well do these frameworks explain or apply to the historical events of 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus? After outlining each conceptual framework in 
this chapter, this thesis will `test' the frameworks for their explanatory power in the 
following historical chapters. The conceptual frameworks will be noted when they 
explain a particular event or action in the nexus. Aspects of the frameworks that are 
confirmed by the historical case studies will be noted and used to further illuminate the 
events. This thesis will also note when the four conceptual frameworks fail to explain an 
event, thus showing areas for further development of conceptual frameworks seeking to 
explain the links between global health and national security. 
2.6.1 Communitarianisin and cosmopolitanism in the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus 
The goals and values of national security, which seek to ensure the survival of a single 
state against threats which have traditionally been conceived as military and external to 
the state in nature, have been described above. Using Brown's (1992) survey of 
normative theory, the normative perspective of national security may be described as 
communitarianism, defined as placing the focus of world politics on the political 
community of the state (Smith 2001). This communitarian position bears resemblance in 
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practice to the realist theory of international relations. 6 However, Brown's normative 
perspectives are focused on moral and ethical values. This focus on values, as opposed 
to theories of international relations, is essential to enable comparisons with the field of 
global health. This is because the practice of global health is associated with no theory 
of international relations, but does carry strong values that often conflict with the 
communitarian position. An example of the communitarian position may be found in 
Condoleezza Rice's vision for U. S. national security expressed during the 2000 U. S. 
elections. Rice (2000: 47) opposes replacing the U. S. national interest with 
"'humanitarian interests' or the interests of `the international community. "' She argues 
the pursuit of U. S. national interests should be the primary objective to U. S. policy. Rice 
(2000: 47) opines that "there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all 
humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second order effect" to the pursuit of national 
interests. Thus Rice expresses a communitarian position, that the proper focus of politics 
is the state, in this case, the U. S. and its interests. 
Communitarianism is one of the two main normative positions on world politics (Brown 
1992). In contrast, cosmopolitanism, as defined by Smith (2001: 230) focuses not on 
states but on "humanity as a whole or on individuals. " The vision of global health as 
seeking "to improve the world's health, including that of the most vulnerable peoples" is 
a cosmopolitan one (Feldbaum et al. 2006b: 196). This cosmopolitan world view is 
deeply embedded in the global health community. Addressing a global health audience, 
Daulaire (2003: 1) writes: 
Most of us in health professions have a simple response to the question of why we 
engage in global health: because it is right to help those who are sick and in need, 
and because this is at the heart of our calling. It is an opportunity to give back for 
all we have been given. 
Fidler (2004: 50) traces the history of public health activities and finds that the 
cosmopolitan perspective of global health developed after public health successes in 
developed countries led to public health becoming "associated with improving health 
conditions and services in poor, developing countries. " Global health efforts eschewed 
national security considerations and were "predominantly matters of humanitarianism 
6 The realist theory of international relations is different from the commonly used term realpolitik, which 
refers to the "adoption of policies of limited objectives which had a reasonable chance of success" (Evans 
and Newnham 1998). 
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that did not directly affect the national interests of richer, more affluent countries" 
(Fidler 2004: 50). Beyond being separate from national security, Fidler writes that 
conceptions of global health outlined in the Preamble of the WHO Constitution were 
actually designed to be in opposition to the framework of national security and 
communitarianism, (what Fidler terms the "Westphalian" or "power paradigm. " Fidler 
(2004: 64-65) writes: 
The Preamble of the WHO Constitution expresses... a perspective on public 
health almost completely at odds with the premises and assumptions informing 
the power paradigm... the WHO Constitution turns its back on thinking about 
health and infectious disease threats through the Westphalian lenses of state- 
centrism, competitive national interests, and power. The Preamble instead 
expresses a vision of health and infectious disease threats in terms of individual 
rights, human solidarity, and universal justice. 
Fidler (2004: 68) finds that the WHO Constitution ushered in a post-World War II era of 
international health cooperation focused on health in developing countries, "the right to 
health, universal health solidarism in the international health community, and 
redistributive justice on a global scale. " Furthermore, public health shifted towards 
disease-specific health strategies, which bypassed notions of national sovereignty and 
non-intervention that formed the basis of the Westphalian framework and communitarian 
perspective, to focus on certain health needs of individuals and communities within 
states. The overall normative basis of global health is cosmopolitan in perspective, 
focused on health of individuals and communities, rather than the interests of states. 7 
Fidler's historical perspective demonstrates the contrast and conflict between global 
health's cosmopolitan position and the communitarian perspective of national security. 
The conclusion that the normative perspectives of global health and national security are 
different may be considered obvious to some in the global health community. However, 
this conclusion is not shared by all those involved in the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus. The 2002 U. S. National Security Strategy argues that U. S. values and national 
interests form a "union" that is the basis of U. S. national security (White House 2002: 1). 
In this statement, the Bush Administration is arguing that U. S. can pursue communitarian 
interests and cosmopolitan values without sacrificing either. In fact, the basis of the U. S. 
7 This has not prevented politically savvy global health actors, such as Richard Feachem, Peter Piot, and 
the U. S. Institute of Medicine from occasionally arguing that global health is in a state's communitarian 
interests to support. This is however, the exception to the generally humanitarian and cosmopolitan 
normative basis of global health. 
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National Security Strategy is the concurrent pursuit of both communitarian interests and 
cosmopolitan values. As an example, the Strategy cites disease, poverty and war in 
Africa. The Strategy argues that these threaten "both a core value of the United States - 
preserving human dignity - and our strategic priority - combating global terror" (White 
House 2002: 10). The 2003 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office International 
Priorities strategy paper also links improvements in global health to improvements in 
UK national security (Feldbaum et al. 2006b). Feldbaum et al. (2006b: 196) critique this 
linkage of communitarian interests and cosmopolitan values in U. S. and UK security 
strategies and conclude: 
the objectives of global health and national security are different. Global health is 
a humanitarian endeavor that seeks to improve the world's health, including that 
of the most vulnerable peoples, while national security works to protect the 
interests of people within a given state. Thus, while the interests and objectives of 
global health and national security may at times overlap, it is important to 
recognize that they can also come into direct conflict. 
Representing broadly accurate generalizations about the global health and national 
security communities, the communitarian - cosmopolitan dichotomy provides a useful 
framework for examining the interaction of these communities in relation to HIV/AIDS. 
This dichotomy helps illuminate three specific differences between national security and 
global health. First, national security and global health have different objectives. The 
objective of national security is the protection and pursuit of a state's national interests. 
It is a second order consideration whether this pursuit benefits persons in other countries. 
The objective of global health is to improve the health of all people within and across 
states, with a special focus on the health of the poorest and most vulnerable populations. 
Second, national security and global health have different referent objects. National 
security is focused on the state, while global health focuses on human communities 
(Feldbaum and Lee 2004). These human communities may overlap with national 
boundaries, but more often exist above or below the state level. For example, regional 
and global communities are addressed in UNAIDS yearly reports on the state of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. Transnational ethnic groups, such as Kurds living in Western 
Turkey and Northern Iraq, form communities that stretch across states, while subnational 
groups such as the Navajo Nation within the U. S. or inhabitants of cities form 
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communities below the state level that are the subject of public health efforts. Only 
rarely do the referent objects of national security and global health coincide. 
The different objectives and referent objects of national security and global health, 
embodied in the communitarian - cosmopolitan dichotomy, may undermine cooperation 
in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. The different normative perspectives of each 
field ensures that a complete harmony of interests is unlikely to occur while addressing 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Resolution of differences in favor of national interests may 
compromise global health activities, while privileging global health over national 
security may serve to reduce high-level state involvement in fighting HIV/AIDS. 
The third consequence of the communitarian - cosmopolitan divide between national 
security and global health is the resulting difference in the cultures of each field. These 
cultural differences may begin with the personalities, values, and politics of the people 
involved in each field. Persons for whom global health's humanitarian efforts resonate 
will be drawn to global health. Those who find the national security perspective and the 
pursuit of national interests compelling will migrate into the national security field. Ken 
Bernard (Interview) explains that people in national security are different from people in 
global health: "You find people who want to do security things, they just like it. They 
like thinking about nuclear weapon defense. They're not interested in immunizing 
children to protect against measles. If they were, they'd go into that. " The different 
normative perspectives of national security and global health may cause culture shock as 
people from each field reject the normative perspective of the other and therefore the 
linkages between the fields. These cultural differences may seriously inhibit 
understanding and cooperation in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus (see Figure 
2.2). 
Global Health National Security 
Normative perspective Cosmopolitan Communitarian 
Objective Improve health of all 
people 
Ensure survival of one 
state 
Referent Object Human communities State 
Culture Humanitarian Power Politics 
43 
Figure 2.2 Different perspectives of global health and national security 
2.6.2 Models of engagement forglobal health and national security 
Lee and McInnes (2004) offer a different framework for understanding the relationship 
between global health and national security. Instead of examining the normative 
perspectives of each field, Lee and McInnes examine the capacity of the global health 
community to maintain influence and independence in its interactions with the more 
powerful national security community. They describe models and examples of how the 
fields of global health and national security relate to each other. These models 
demonstrate the different interactions that take place between global health and national 
security. Lee and McInnes then evaluate the risks and benefits of these models for 
cooperation between global health and national security and suggest a course of action 
that maintains global health's independence and influence. 
The first model Lee and McInnes (2004: 16) present is that of global health as 
"supplicant" to the more powerful and influential national security community. As 
evidence, Lee and McInnes cite Feldbaum and Lee (2004: 26) who argue that a group of 
global health leaders have sought to increase attention and funding for global health 
"through appeals to the self-interest of wealthier countries. " These "politically-savvy 
public health leaders such as Kenneth Shine, Richard Feachem, Gro Harlem Brundtland 
and Peter Piot" describe global health problems such as HIV/AIDS as threats to national 
security and foreign policy interests to gain increased focus on these health problems at 
high levels of government (Feldbaum and Lee 2004: 26). Lee and McInnes (2004: 16) 
describe this relationship as "supplicant, " because global health is "a supplicant looking 
to other policy communities for assistance. " Garrett (2000) describes public health as 
being a supplicant to national security interests in cooperation in addressing the threat of 
bioterrorism. Garrett (2000a: 550) writes that in their interactions with the defense, 
intelligence and law enforcement communities, public health "was on board the train, but 
clearly not in the conductor's seat. " From a global health perspective, Lee and McInnes 
find this relationship unsatisfactory because the resulting policy will be driven by 
national security and foreign policy interests, not those of global health. They recognize 
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that some benefits may accrue from this type of relationship, but argue that in a 
supplicant relationship, the most pressing global health issues are unlikely to be 
addressed and that policies aimed at alleviating human suffering may be compromised 
by power politics. 
The second model for the relationship between global health and national security is that 
of the "Trojan horse. " In this model global health uses health issues that resonate with 
traditional national security concerns, such as bioterrorism and infectious disease 
epidemics, as a "Trojan horse" to gain a "place at the table" with national security (Lee 
and McInnes 2004: 16). Having secured a place in national security and foreign policy 
debates, global health can then attempt to influence the agenda to better address global 
health problems. Lee and McInnes (2004: 16) note that the risk of this model is that, 
having secured a place at the table, global health may "lack the political muscle" to 
shape debates in a way that gains genuine health gains. The narrow interests of national 
security may continue to define the terms of the debate and the global health 
community's participation. 
The third model is that of a "partnership, " where the tools and skills of each community 
are utilized for the greater good. This model would theoretically eliminate the problems 
of the "supplicant" and "Trojan horse" models because neither policy community's goals 
would be privileged. Lee and McInnes (2004: 16) cite the WHO's Health as a Bridge 
for Peace initiative, which seeks to use health interventions to improve health in post- 
conflict situations and bring warring parties together, as an example of this "partnership" 
model. 8 Lee and McInnes raise questions about the practical implementation of this 
model including: who brings the communities together and how are disputes between the 
communities resolved? However, a larger problem with the "partnership" model may be 
that it is difficult to imagine the national security community ceding any authority over 
issues it deems of grave national security importance. In cases such as these, the national 
security community may seek the scientific advice of the global health community, but 
decision-making on such an issue would likely remain firmly within a state's national 
security bureaucracy. 
8 Rushton and McInnes (2006) finds that the "Health as a Bridge for Peace" initiatives failed due to a lack 
of evidence supporting their efficacy. 
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The final model is that of global health as an "independent actor" (Lee and McInnes 
2004: 17). This model reverses the "supplicant" model to ask what the security 
community can do for the pursuit of global health. The Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control is an example of the "independent actor" model. To enact the 
Framework Convention, global health advocates initiated work with the foreign policy 
community, argued that it would be in their interests to participate, and provided advice 
on implementation (Lee and McInnes 2004). This model may be attractive to the foreign 
policy and security communities because of its clarity of purpose and clearly delineated 
scope of cooperation. Lee and McInnes also note that a benefit of this model is that it 
does not contest the identities of either field, or challenge them to think in new ways 
about the relationship between global health and national security. However the 
disadvantages of maintaining the traditional identities of global health and national 
security are that legitimate new linkages between the fields are left unaddressed, and that 
new cooperative approaches that may benefit global health are unrealized. 
Of the four models presented, Lee and McInnes (2004) conclude that "supplicant" and 
"Trojan horse" are unlikely to successfully achieve global health goals. They find that 
global health acting "as an independent actor" may be the most effective strategy for 
engagement with the national security and foreign policy communities. Their framework 
suggests that the maintenance of global health's influence and independence in 
interactions with the national security community is critical to determining the 
effectiveness of global health actions. 
2.6.3 The high politics of national security and the low politics of health 
Fidler (2005a, 2005b) offers a framework of "high and low politics" for understanding 
the relationship between health and national security. High politics are "issues of crucial 
importance" to states (Evans and Newnham 1998: 225). These crucial issues are 
predominately issues of national security, described by Fidler (2005b: 180) as "issues of 
war and peace, competition for power, the dilemma of national security, and the fight for 
survival in anarchy" that involve the material interests of states. National security is a 
high political issue handled with priority at the highest levels of government. In contrast, 
issues considered "low politics" are not fundamental to states interests and are handled 
"by the bureaucracy employing standard operating procedures" (Evans and Newnham 
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1998: 310). Here Evans and Newnham's definition of "low politics" overlaps with 
Buzan et al. (1998) securitization theory. Low political issues are handled with the 
routine procedures of government, not the emergency measures of a securitized issue. 
Issues of low politics often involve cooperation between states on non-essential aspects 
of economic, environmental, social and health policy. Low politics also include issues 
that involve state's pursuit of their normative values, such as the protection of human 
dignity (Fidler 2005a). 
Fidler then uses this framework to describe three models interpreting the meaning of 
health's rise in political priority. Fidler's analysis is based on an historical review of the 
political stature of global health issues. Fidler (2005b) acknowledges that health has 
been an issue for foreign policy and international relations since at least 1851 when the 
first International Sanitary Conference was held. Despite the sanitary conferences and 
some international cooperation to address health problems, health remained a low 
priority for governments. Fidler (2005b: 180) argues that this changed in the mid-1990s, 
when health experienced a "political revolution" which brought health issues into the 
realm of high politics. Evidence for this "revolution" includes the rise of bioterrorism, 
HIV/AIDS, and infectious diseases as threats to national security, findings on the large 
impact of poor health on macroeconomic development, impacts of epidemics on 
international trade and commerce, and greater focus on health issues by national and 
international aid organizations (Fidler 2005b). As discussed in the next section, this 
"revolution" is described in terms of health's rise from low to high politics, and is 
interpreted using the three models of "revolution, remediation and regression" (Fidler 
2005a). 
Global health has traditionally been considered an issue of low politics. Fidler (2005b: 
180) observes that even within the world of "low politics, " health issues have low 
priority, leading him to describe health as "really low politics. " The status of "really low 
politics" traditionally accorded to global health activities was due their technical, non- 
political, and humanitarian nature (Fidler 2005b: 180). 
The dichotomy of high and low politics overlaps with the communitarian - cosmopolitan 
divide. While the communitarian - cosmopolitan framework revealed the different 
values, referent objects and cultures of the two communities, the high and low politics 
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dichotomy creates a hierarchy of political issues. Communitarian issues such as national 
security exist at the top of this hierarchy, while cosmopolitan issues such as global health 
are at the bottom. This dichotomy also resonates with Lee and McInnes' (2004: 16) 
concern with the difference in "political muscle" between global health and national 
security. The low political priority of health issues may result in global health becoming 
a "supplicant" to the high politics of national security. The following figure, adapted 
from Fidler (2005a), illustrates the relationship between high and low politics, material 
interests and normative values, and places national security and health along this 
continuum. It demonstrates how national security is an issue of high politics, based in a 
communitarian perspective and focused on the material interests of states. Global health 
has traditionally been viewed as a low political issue, because of its concern with human 
dignity, health and cosmopolitan values. 
Figure 2.3 Traditional Hierarchy of Foreign Policy Functions 
Traditional Hierarchy of Foreign Policy Functions 
Communitarian / 
Material Interests 
National Security 
mit Interests 
Cosmopolitan / 
Humanitarian 
Values 
Adapted from Fidler 2005a. 
Development 
Human Dignity 
and Health 
2.6.4 The cause of the transformation: Revolution, remediation or regression 
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Having established the high and low politics framework for understanding the traditional 
relationship between health and national security, Fidler (2005b: 179) seeks to explain 
the "transformation" that has allowed health to rise in political importance since the mid- 
1990s. Fidler (2005a) uses three models to explicate the movement of health as an issue 
of "low politics" into the realm of "high politics. " These models are termed: revolution, 
remediation, and regression. 
The revolution model posits that a revolution in the relationship between health and 
foreign policy explains health's rise into high politics. This revolution has been caused 
by the emergence of a "global health ethic" in which health has become "a pre-eminent 
political value for 21st century humanity" (Fidler 2005a, 2005b: 184). Health is no 
longer a technical and non-political activity, but has become a political value that 
influences state behavior. This revolution has "collapsed the traditional dichotomies 
between low and high politics, and between material interests and normative values" and 
cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives (Fidler 2005a: 5). The revolution model 
argues that normative values are now considered part of the material interests of states'. 
In other words, health has become an issue of high politics because of the recognition by 
states of health's tremendous importance. 
The second model is termed remediation. This model posits the continued survival and 
relevance of the traditional foreign policy hierarchy, with national security as its most 
important issue. This directly contradicts the perspective of the revolution model. What 
has occurred, according to this model, is that select health issues have escaped low 
politics and are being addressed by the traditional foreign policy hierarchy (Fidler 
2005a). Only select health issues which have or threaten to have acute impacts on state 
interests have become issues of high politics. These include HIV/AIDS, SARS, 
bioterrorism, and a future influenza pandemic (Fidler 2005b). The remediation model 
argues that: 
health issues have become more prominent foreign policy issues because health- 
related threats to the material interests of states and capabilities of states have 
increased. When diseases threaten, or show the potential to threaten, national 
security, military capabilities, geopolitical or regional stability... foreign policy 
makers take notice. (Fidler 2005b: 184) 
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The remediation model posits that select health issues are now considered high politics 
only because they threaten the material interests of states. Other health issues remain 
low political issues because they do not threaten state interests and are therefore of low 
priority in the traditional foreign policy hierarchy. 
The third model is termed regression. This model posits that the cause of health's rise 
on political agendas is due to the worsening of global health problems. A "parade of 
public health horribles" have demonstrated to policymakers the need to intervene in the 
practice of global heath (Fidler 2005a: 6). These "horribles" include the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, emerging and reemerging diseases, growing burden of non-communicable 
diseases, bioterrorism and the proliferation of bioweapons, and decaying local and global 
public health capacity (Fidler 2005a). Far from being a public health success, the 
treatment of health as an issue of high politics signifies the failure of public health efforts 
and "regression. " 
In discussion of the three models, Fidler (2005b: 184) dismisses the revolution model for 
a lack of evidence supporting the proposition that health has become a "pre-eminent 
political value. " Fidler (2005b) cites the rapid progression of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
over the last decade as evidence that states have not behaved as if they placed the highest 
value on health. It is harder to dismiss the remediation and regression models. These 
models share the idea that worsening global health problems have contributed to health's 
emergence as an issue of high politics, however the remediation model concludes that 
these worsening health issues have become high political issues because they threaten 
state's material interests. Fidler (2005b: 189) concludes that the remediation model's 
retention of the traditional foreign policy hierarchy provides a "robust explanation" for 
the rise of select health issues to the level of high politics. 
Despite the remediation model's explanatory power, Fidler (2005b) notes a problem with 
using the traditional foreign policy hierarchy based on power politics to understand and 
address health issues. The problem is that public health produces scientific evidence that 
is valid irrespective of power politics. To successfully address health issues, states must 
rely on scientific principles to direct their action. As Fidler (2005b: 187) states: 
"jumping from anarchy to power politics without appreciating epidemiology causes 
foreign policy on health issues problems. " He also cautions that public health experts 
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underestimate the problem anarchy poses for inter-state cooperation. The new global 
health and national security nexus contains scientific principles that national security 
cannot ignore, as well as issues of anarchy and state power that global health cannot 
deny. Fidler (2005a) concludes that there has been some convergence of state's material 
interests and moral values that represents a new phase in the relationship between health 
and foreign policy. This convergence will require changes by both global health and 
foreign policy to manage power politics, scientific practice, and morality. 
Conceptual Model Components of the Conceptual Model 
Communitarian- Referent object Objective Culture 
Cosmopolitan Model 
Models of Engagement Supplicant Trojan Horse Partnership Independent 
(Lee and McInnes Actor 
2004) 
High - Low Politics High Politics: Issues Low 
Model (Fidler 2005b) of critical Politics: 
importance to states Non-critical 
issues 
Cause of the Revolution Remediation Regression 
Transformation Model 
(Fidler 2005a) 
Figure 2.4: Summary of conceptual Models for the HIV/AIDS - National Security 
Nexus and their components 
2.7 Conclusion 
The four frameworks each describe a different aspect of the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus. The communitarian - cosmopolitan dichotomy illustrates the different 
objectives, referent objects and cultures of global health and national security. 
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Supplicant, Trojan horse, partnership and independent actor models for the relationship 
between global health and national security focus on navigating the large gap in political 
power between global health and national security for the benefit of global health efforts. 
The high and low politics dichotomy is also rooted in the differences in political priority, 
and links these differences to the high politics focus on the material interests of states 
and the focus on humanitarian values common to low political issues. Finally, the 
revolution, remediation and regression models seek to understand the transformation of 
certain health issues into national security threats and what this transformation means for 
the relationship between global health and national security. These frameworks will be 
tested in the following historical chapters and used to illustrate the tensions within the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308 were "watershed" events that 
brought the idea that a disease could threaten national security into the public policy and 
academic discourse (Elbe 2006a: 123). Between 2000 - 2006, dozens of academic 
papers and think-tank reports sought to explore the links between HIV/AIDS and 
security and offer policy proscriptions for addressing these links. Taking the lead from 
U. S. leadership on linking HIV/AIDS and security at the UNSC, many of the academic 
and public policy papers are written by Americans or targeted at U. S. policyrnakers. 
This large group of publications both provides evidence and evaluates the relationship 
between HIV/AIDS and security, and offers policy recommendations for addressing the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. Here we will first examine how academic and 
think-tank publications conceptualize the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. This 
section will be based on Feldbaum et al. 's (2006a) review of the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS, and focus on the most rigorous and influential papers 
examining the nexus9. Next, critical perspectives on the securitization of HIV/AIDS will 
be examined. Finally, the two papers that specifically address the risks and benefits of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS, Peterson (2002) and Elbe (2006a), will be discussed in detail 
and linked to the aims of this thesis. 
In their review of the national security implications of HIV/AIDS, Feldbaum et al. 
(2006a) argue that three main issues form the predominant linkages between HIV/AIDS 
and national security. The first describes the impact of HIV/AIDS on individuals critical 
to the maintenance of state and international security: soldiers and peacekeepers. The 
second suggests that the epidemic in some sub-Saharan African nations may cause state 
instability and failure. The third focuses on the security effects of the worsening 
pandemic on the large, strategically important states of Russia, India, China, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia (see Figure 3.1). This framework will be used to organize the publications that 
9A number of papers on the nexus that were deemed overly polemical and/or not influential are not discussed in detail in this literature review. For example: Barnett and Prins (2005), Chemical and 
Biological Arms Control Institute, & Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000), Gow (2002), 
Kassalow (2001), and Price-Smith (2002a). 
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examine the links between HIV/AIDS and national security. 
HIV Prevalence Among: 
Strategically Important People Highly-Affected Regions Strategically Important States 
I 
Sub-Saharan Africa China, India flSokhors] Peacekeepers Caribbean Russia, Nigeria, Ethiopia 
"U nhealthy 
military 
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-Loss of trained 
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-Decreased 
military 
effectiveness 
-Peacekeepers 
spread HIV 
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Figure 3.1: Pathways for HIV/AIDS impact on national security, adopted from 
Feldbaum et al. 2006a: 774. 
3.2 Strategically Important Populations: Armed Forces 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on armed forces represents the most direct link or "primary 
connection" between the disease and national security (Singer 2002: 147). This is 
because armed forces and their operational capabilities are considered a primary element 
of a state's national security. Anything that affects the capabilities of armed forces, 
including HIV/AIDS, will rank as a serious threat to national security. There is also a 
long history of infectious diseases impacting on military operations (McNeill 1976; 
Curtin 1998). Smallman-Raynor and Cliff (2004: 4) write that "down the ages, war 
epidemics have decimated the fighting strength of armies, caused the suspension and 
cancellation of military operations, and brought havoc to the civilian populations of 
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belligerent and non-belligerent states alike. " Because of this direct linkage, and history 
of diseases effecting military performance, most authors examining the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus consider the impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries as central to their 
analyses (International Crisis Group 2001; Heinecken 2001 a; Heinecken 2001b; 
Schneider and Moodie 2002; Ostergard 2002; Singer 2002; Elbe 2002; Elbe 2003; 
Garrett 2005; Feldbaum et al. 2006a; McInnes 2006; Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre- 
Tensae 2006). 
1998-2004 Papers 
Before 2005, authors relied almost exclusively on only two publications for data on the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in military populations and reasoning for the assumption that 
prevalence was higher in military populations than among civilians. The reliance on 
these two papers, AIDS in the Military by UNAIDS (1998) and The Global Infectious 
Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States by the U. S. National 
Intelligence Council (2000) (here referred to as National Intelligence Estimate or NIE 
99-17), was due to a scarcity of other studies on rates of HIV/AIDS in military 
populations (both studies are examined in detail in Chapter 5, and the role of data on 
HIV/AIDS in military populations is examined in Chapter 6). In 2005, the data and 
reasoning of these two papers began to be questioned and estimates of HIV/AIDS in 
military populations revised downwards (Garrett 2005; Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre- 
Tensae 2006; Feldbaum ei al. 2006a). If this downward revision is correct, the papers 
published between 2001-2005 tend to overestimate the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among 
armed forces, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The UNAIDS (1998) study contributed two widely cited arguments to the literature on 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. First, UNAIDS (1998: 3) argued that "in peace 
time, STD infection rates among armed forces are generally 2 to 5 times higher than in 
civilian populations; in time of conflict the difference can be 50 times higher or more. " 
This statistic indicated that militaries were a high risk population for HIV infection and 
already had significantly higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS than civilian populations. The 
citation of this statistic in the literature on HIV/AIDS and national security is then 
ubiquitous from 2001-2005, including Elbe (2002,2003), Heinecken (2001b), 
International Crisis Group (2001), Schneider and Moodie (2002), and Tripodi and Patel 
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(2004). The second widely cited argument from AIDS in the Military is the explanation 
for why militaries have greater risk from, and a higher prevalence of, HIV/AIDS 
infection. UNAIDS (1998) asserts that five factors put military populations at higher 
risk: 
Lengthy tours of duty away from home result in the need to relieve stress and 
sexual tension. 
Risk taking ethos of the military may encourage risky sexual behavior. 
Most military personnel are in the 15-24 age group at highest risk for HIV 
infection. 
Military on peacekeeping missions are often better paid than local populations, 
giving them the ability to purchase sex. 
Military camps and bases often attract sex workers. 
UNAIDS (1998: 3) statistic of "2 to 5 times" higher rates of STDs among military 
populations and rationale for the military as a high risk group became accepted wisdom, 
or less charitably, "shibboleths, " to authors writing on the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus between 2001-2005 (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006: 201). 
Many authors writing between 2001-2005 also relied on NIE 99-17, the U. S. National 
Intelligence Council (2000) report on infectious diseases and national security. This 
report supported the assertion made by UNAIDS (1998) that the military was a 
particularly high risk group for HIV/AIDS and cited UNAIDS's rationale for why 
militaries were at greater risk than comparable civilian populations. NIE 99-17 added to 
the data on HIV/AIDS among military populations by asserting that HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in Sub-Saharan African militaries "ranges from 10 to 60 percent" (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 52). Supporting this assertion is a table of the rates of 
HIV/AIDS among seven Sub-Saharan African countries, with Angola and Democratic 
Republic of Congo estimated to have military prevalence rates between forty and sixty 
percent (this table is reproduced and discussed in detail in Chapter 5). This data is based 
on a classified 1999 study by the Defense Intelligence Agency and Armed Forces 
Medical Intelligence Center whose sources and methodology remain classified. This did 
not however prevent the frequent citation of NIE 99-17 to support the proposition that 
rates of HIV/AIDS among Sub-Saharan African militaries were extremely high. 
UNAIDS (1998) and the NIE 99-17 (National Intelligence Council 2000) accounted for 
almost all of the unclassified information on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among armed 
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forces available before 2005. Because of this, the literature on the link between 
militaries and HIV/AIDS between 2001-2005 builds from the same statistics in these two 
papers and differs only in their interpretation of the meaning of these high rates of 
HIV/AIDS among military populations. 
The general interpretation of data, suggesting higher rates of HIV/AIDS among military 
populations, is that the disease will decrease military effectiveness and, in turn, threaten 
national security. The NIE 99-17 suggests that, although it is difficult to directly connect 
HIV/AIDS prevalence and battle performance, the large number of officers and key 
military personnel dying of HIV/AIDS will decrease "combat readiness and capability" 
(National Intelligence Council 2000: 52). More specifically, the National Intelligence 
Council (2000) finds that the greatest impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries will be caused 
by the loss of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with specialized 
training on advanced weapons systems. This is due to the difficulty, cost and time 
needed to replace these soldiers who perform critical roles in modern militaries. 
Building from the data presented on HIV/AIDS prevalence in sub-Saharan African 
militaries, NIE 99-17 argues that this region will face the greatest military challenges 
from HIV/AIDS. However in the longer term, countries of the former Soviet Union and 
China may also face military challenges from HIV/AIDS (National Intelligence Council 
2000). 
Heinecken (2001b: 122) concurs with the analysis of the NIE 99-17, and writes that the 
loss of military leaders to HIV/AIDS will cause a "hollowing out" of militaries which 
will reduce morale, discipline, cohesion, and overall military effectiveness. More 
specifically, Heinecken (2001a) finds that high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among 
Southern African militaries will impact armed forces in four ways. First, force 
procurement will be impeded because the HIV/AIDS epidemic will reduce the number of 
healthy and qualified personnel available for military service. Second, HIV/AIDS will 
"hollow out' the middle management of militaries causing delays in the training, 
education and development needed for force preparation. Third, if militaries do not 
deploy HIV positive troops, they may be unable to deploy full contingents of troops or 
even troops that have trained together before. On the other hand, deployment of HIV 
Positive troops is problematic because of the adverse conditions faced by deployed 
soldiers and the need for extensive vaccinations that may be dangerous for those with 
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compromised immune systems. Fourth, militaries will face difficulties sustaining forces 
as funding is shifted from military budgets to address HIV/AIDS and militaries care for 
increasing numbers of HIV/AIDS affected soldiers and their families. These factors 
cause Heinecken (2001 a: Concluding Remarks para. 1) to describe HIV/AIDS as "a 
pending national disaster -a strategic priority. " 
Elbe (2002: 163) and Ostergard (2002) similarly conclude that HIV/AIDS will reduce 
"operational efficiency among Africa's armed forces. " In addition to the factors raised 
by Heinecken (2001 a), Elbe (2002) argues that the epidemic is creating new political and 
legal challenges for civil-military relations as militaries attempt to manage the issue of 
HIV positive soldiers. Elbe (2002: 170) also finds that the presence of the disease will 
raise the social costs of armed conflict in Africa by significantly increasing the total 
number of "eventual war-related casualties. " 
Other analysts argue that the impact of high HIV/AIDS prevalence among militaries will 
have even greater strategic implications. The International Crisis Group (2001: 20) 
writes that "weakened national militaries are per se a risk for increasing instability inside 
a nation, and with its neighbours. " Large numbers of military deaths from AIDS may 
lead to criminal behavior by militaries and less participation in peacemaking efforts 
(International Crisis Group 2001). Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2001: 
21) warns that the tactical advantages stemming for a neighbor's military suffering from 
HIV/AIDS "may trigger wars. " Governments that fail to successfully address 
HIV/AIDS may also be vulnerable to coups d'etats. Echoing these concerns, Singer 
(2002: 149) warns that AIDS-weakened militaries may lead to "domestic instability and 
may even invite foreign attack. " 
Elbe (2003) presents a more complex and convincing view of the strategic implications 
of HIV/AIDS. He begins by recognizing that there is no evidence that the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on armed forces has inspired or foreclosed an outbreak of armed conflict. 
Elbe (2003) then identifies six factors that will determine how severe the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on armed forces will become. These factors are: 
HIV/AIDS prevalence 
Number of soldiers with AIDS 
Type of armed force 
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Levels of specialization and technical proficiency 
Size of the armed forces compared to the civilian population 
Level of resources and leadership available to address HIV/AIDS 
These factors illustrate the complexity of anticipating the impact of HIV/AIDS on armed 
forces. The impact of HIV/AIDS will vary depending the on the characteristics of the 
specific military under study (Elbe 2003). 
Elbe (2003) specifically addresses the assertion by the International Crisis Group (2001) 
and Singer (2002) that high HIV/AIDS prevalence in militaries may indicate weakness 
and trigger attacks. Elbe (2003) notes that this would only occur if there is already 
existing animosity between two nations, and those nations faced starkly different 
prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS. Elbe (2003) notes that this scenario is unlikely to exist 
and generate wars. Further downplaying the strategic impact of HIV/AIDS, Elbe writes 
that in wealthy and stable regions the military impact of the epidemic may be negligible. 
He cites the example of Botswana, which has one of the world's highest prevalences of 
HIV/AIDS, and has not been engaged in significant armed conflict since the epidemic 
began. Also discussed is the possibility that high rates of HIV/AIDS in a military may 
constrain offensive military plans, resulting in a strategic benefit of decreased warfare. 
Elbe (2003) concludes that HIV/AIDS is unlikely to spark new wars or "hollow out" 
militaries, but will pose significant challenges for armed forces. Evaluating the impact 
of HIV/AIDS on militaries will remain a complex task dependent on assessing a number 
of factors that vary considerably from military to military. 
2005-2006 Papers 
The four papers published between 2005-2006 that discuss the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
armed forces contend that the estimates of HIV/AIDS prevalence in armed forces cited 
by UMAIDS (1998) and National Intelligence Council (2000) are overestimates (Garrett 
2005; Feldbaum et al. 2006a; McInnes 2006; Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 
2006). McInnes (2006: 320) cautions that previous estimates of HIV/AIDS among 
military populations need "to be treated carefully" and are "no longer so clear cut. " 
Garrett (2005: 25) writes that these earlier estimates "appear to be off target", while 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) call the idea, that militaries have higher 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS than civilian populations, a shibboleth. Garrett (2005) and 
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Feldbaum et al. (2006a: 775) argue that "HIV prevalence among armed forces is equal to 
or slightly greater than civilian rates from the same country. " Whiteside, De Waal and 
Gebre-Tensae (2006) provide the more nuanced view that young soldiers are likely to 
have lower prevalence of HIV/AIDS than civilian populations, while older soldiers may 
have higher prevalence. 
Despite agreement between these papers, that previous studies overestimated the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS among armed forces, available data on the subject remains 
extremely limited. Garrett (2005) bases her conclusions on government and military 
statements, as well as other unnamed sources. Feldbaum et al. (2006a) reach a similar 
conclusion through interviews with military officials in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
United States. McInnes (2006) cites comments by De Waal, while Whiteside, De Waal 
and Gebre-Tensae (2006: 203) write that their conclusions are based on "some limited 
data from the military, extrapolations from other data, and epidemiological logic. " States 
continue to view rates of HIV/AIDS in their militaries as national security secrets, 
resulting in a scarcity of rigorous published studies on this subject. 
Despite reduced estimates of HIV/AIDS prevalence among armed forces for data 
currently available, Garrett (2005) argues that the disease will continue to claim large 
numbers of military personnel, and may threaten the ability of militaries to maintain law 
and order. By 2005, availability of ARV therapy was greatly expanded due to the 
availability of cheaper generics and important recognition that treatment is essential for 
prevention activities. Garrett (2005) observes that the provision of ARV therapy may 
extend the lives of critical military personnel and therefore reduce the impact of the 
disease. However, she argues that provision of ARV drugs to only the upper echelons of 
a military could "undermine rank and file morale, and could even lead to rebellion" 
(Garrett 2005: 29). Furthermore, ARV therapy may only briefly postpone the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on militaries if drug resistant strains of the virus emerge. 
Feldbaum et al. (2006a) also find that the reduced estimates of military prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS are still sufficient to have an impact on affected militaries. This is because 
highly trained soldiers are "difficult and expensive to replace, and their absence 
interrupts the training of younger recruits" (Feldbaum et al. 2006a: 775). Both Garrett 
(2005) and Feldbaum et al. (2006a) cite unpublished work by Murray Feshbach that 
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suggests that the Russian HIV/AIDS epidemic is exacerbating an existing shortage of 
healthy recruits for the Russian military. The large populations of China and India 
provide insulation from these shortages. However, both countries are increasingly 
monitoring the growth of the epidemic among their armed forces. Feldbaum et al. 
(2006a) argue that the extent to which a military relies on conscription will alter the 
impact of HIV/AIDS because HIV positive conscripts may complete their service before 
developing AIDS. 
McInnes (2006) argues that evidence on rates of HIV/AIDS on military populations was 
drawn from limited experiences in the mid-1990s and is no longer accurate. The limited 
nature of the data from the 1990s, and the rising rates of HIV/AIDS among general 
populations, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, account for some of this discrepancy. In 
some states, such as Thailand, militaries have implemented successful prevention 
campaigns (McInnes 2006). Other states, such as South Africa, do not recruit or renew 
contracts for HIV positive military personnel (McInnes 2006). McInnes notes that both 
of these prevention policies can sharply reduce prevalence of HIV/AIDS in militaries 
and therefore the impact of the disease. McInnes (2006) further notes that militaries are 
well-prepared for the loss of personnel due to conflict, and that this preparation will 
serve to limit the impact of HIV/AIDS on affected militaries. 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006: 217) present a sustained critique of the 
pre-2005 "accepted wisdom" concerning the impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries and 
national security. Differentiating between new recruits and older military personnel, 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) argue that prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
among new military recruits is likely lower than that of comparable civilian populations. 
This is for two reasons. First, new recruits are in a demographic group of men between 
17-22 years of age who have lower prevalence of HIV/AIDS than women of the same 
age. Thus military recruits who are predominantly male will have lower rate of 
HIV/AIDS than a comparable civilian population which includes women. Second, 
militaries in Africa screen recruits for HIV/AIDS and reject those that are HIV positive. 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) note that this screening may not be 
publicly acknowledged, or even constitutionally legal, but does occur. The combination 
of demographics and military screening of recruits suggest that new military recruits 
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have lower prevalence of HIV/AIDS than previously assumed (Whiteside, De Waal and 
Gebre-Tensae 2006). 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) question the rationale expressed in 
UNAIDS (1998) for why military populations are at special risk of STDs and 
HIV/AIDS. They provide counter-examples to this rationale, arguing that "some 
military units are immobile for long periods of time, some... are located in their home 
communities, some are disciplined into conservative behaviour, and many are poorly and 
irregularly paid" (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006: 205). Despite 
questioning this rationale, Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) find that, in the 
absence of an efficacious prevention program, prevalence of HIV/AIDS among longer 
serving military personnel are likely to be higher than comparable civilian populations. 
Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) also seriously question the assumption 
that HIV/AIDS will undermine military effectiveness. They argue that some African 
military leaders were aware of the threat the disease posed at early stages of the 
pandemic, and took steps to limit the impact on their military. For example, the military 
in Senegal led the successful national response to HIV/AIDS. In Ethiopia, the military 
recognized the threat of HIV/AIDS and implemented prevention programs in advance of 
the national government. The South African military created HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment programs "in contradiction to government policies that did not prioritize AIDS 
at all" (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006: 209). The response of these 
militaries has greatly reduced the likelihood that HIV/AIDS will threaten their 
effectiveness. Even in militaries that do not implement successful HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs, Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae (2006) argue that the impact of the 
disease may be overestimated. Militaries have "built in" features that will allow them to 
minimize the impact of HIV/AIDS (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006: 211). 
These include redundancy of expertise to guard against loss of personnel due to conflict, 
and the ability to proactively manage their strategic personnel needs. Furthermore, the 
authoritarian nature of militaries has prevented challenges to military hierarchy related to 
the provision of ARV therapy, even in cases when favoritism and bias has influenced the 
provision of treatment (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006). 
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In summary, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the strategically important population of the 
armed forces represents the most direct link between the disease and traditional national 
security concerns. Authors writing about the impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries before 
2005 relied exclusively on the data and arguments in two publications: UNAIDS (1998) 
and National Intelligence Council (2000). These authors concluded that militaries are at 
high risk for HIV/AIDS, have prevalences of HIV/AIDS that are greater than civilian 
populations, and that the disease would have severe impacts on affected militaries. 
Authors writing after 2005 have questioned earlier estimates of HIV/AIDS in armed 
forces, and argued that the impact of the disease on militaries is dependent on a number 
of country-specific factors including the response of the military. Despite the downward 
revision of estimates, authors since 2005 still maintain that HIV/AIDS pose challenges to 
the functioning of armed forces, although of a less severe degree than previously 
assumed. Data on the prevalence and impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries remains scarce 
and is often classified as national security secrets. This continues to limit researchers' 
ability to accurately assess the true impact of HIV/AIDS on armed forces. 
3.3 Peacekeepers 
UN and regional peacekeepers are perceived as a second strategically important 
population that link HIV/AIDS to national security considerations. Concerns about the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations stem from two 
sources. First, reports exist of peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS on missions in 
Cambodia (Beyrer 1998; UNAIDS 1998; Tripodi and Patel 2002; Bazergan and 
Easterbrook 2003), Sierra Leone and Liberia (International Crisis Group 2001; Singer 
2002; Bazergan and Easterbrook 2003). These concerns have increased since allegations 
of sexual abuse perpetrated by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (Holt and Hughes 2005). Peacekeepers allegedly spreading the disease was the 
stated reason for the UNSC addressing the issue of HIV/AIDS in 2000, (although other 
motivating factors will be discussed in Chapter 5. ) Second, data on the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS presented in UNAIDS (1998) and the National Intelligence Council (2000) 
led to concerns that peacekeeping operations could be undermined by the disease. 
Articles published on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus often note the potential 
impact of the disease on peacekeeping operations. The NIE 99-17 argues that high rates 
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of HIV/AIDS among military populations will make peacekeepers vectors for spreading 
HIV/AIDS, and will limit the effectiveness of international and regional peacekeeping 
operations (National Intelligence Estimate 2000). The International Crisis Group (2001: 
21) describes the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeepers as an "international security 
issue, " and warns that the higher prevalence of the disease among militaries may prevent 
affected countries from contributing peacekeeping troops, therefore undermining 
peacekeeping operations. Singer (2002: 152) asserts that peacekeeping troops are 
"among the primary mechanisms of spreading the disease at a mass level to new areas. " 
However, there is little evidence to support this conclusion. Similar to previous studies, 
Singer (2002) and Tripodi and Patel (2002) conclude that high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
among militaries will make states less able and willing to contribute to peacekeeping 
operations. Garrett (2005: 33) describes the link between HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping 
as a "threat to global security" which will further spread the disease, and undermine the 
credibility and capacity of the UN to aid conflict-affected countries. These studies share 
a common basis in data on HIV/AIDS among armed forces, whose limitations are 
discussed above, and anecdotal reports of peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS from 
Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Elbe (2003) and Feldbaum et al. (2006a) provide a more robust framework for 
understanding how HIV/AIDS may undermine peacekeeping operations, although 
prevalence data on HIV/AIDS among peacekeeping troops remains limited. Elbe (2003) 
and Feldbaum et al. (2006a) argue that HIV/AIDS may undermine peacekeeping 
operations in four ways. First, limited evidence from Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Liberia 
and other peacekeeping operations indicates that some peacekeepers have spread 
HIV/AIDS while deployed. The allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo have reinforced these claims (Holt and Hughes 
2005). While these acts likely have limited impact on regional epidemics, they do 
significantly undermine trust in UN peacekeeping missions 10 (Feldbaum et al. 2006a). 
Second, as rates of HIV/AIDS increase in militaries, countries may be unable to spare 
troops for peacekeeping missions. This fear is closely related to early data on rates of 
HIV/AIDS among militaries, particularly in the peacekeeper donating countries of South 
10 The spread of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia after the UN peacekeeping operation UNTAC may be an 
exception. 
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Africa and Nigeria. Elbe (2003: 42) notes that the South African National Defense Force 
(SANDF) has "grave concerns" about its ability to supply enough troops to UN and 
regional peacekeeping missions. Feldbaum et al. (2006a) argue that African 
peacekeeping missions, such as in Sudan, could be imperiled if South Africa and Nigeria 
become unable to supply peacekeeping troops due to HIV/AIDS. This concern will 
extend beyond Africa if HIV/AIDS prevalence rises in the major troop contributing 
nations of South Asia, including India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, although this is 
increasingly unlikely (Chin and Bennett 2007). 
Third, if peacekeeping troops return home from missions infected with HIV/AIDS, 
countries may become less willing to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. While 
a country refusing to contribute troops because of fears of HIV/AIDS infection remains 
only a speculative possibility, there is strong evidence that peacekeepers have become 
infected while on missions. For example, peacekeeping troops from Uruguay, U. S., 
India, and Indonesia returned home from the UNTAC mission in Cambodia infected with 
HIV/AIDS (Soeprapto et al. 1995; Beyrer 1998). The Indonesian military's experience 
in the UNTAC mission is particularly illustrative of the threat HIV/AIDS poses to 
peacekeepers. Indonesian forces suffered eleven ultimately fatal HIV/AIDS infections, 
far exceeding the two nondisease-related deaths suffered by Indonesian peacekeepers 
(Soeprapto et al. 1995). In this case, HIV/AIDS posed the greatest threat to Indonesian 
peacekeepers serving in Cambodia. A further challenge to the commitment of 
peacekeeping troops is that the length of the tour of duty has been correlated with 
increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Evidence from the ECOMOG regional 
peacekeeping mission found that HIV/AIDS prevalence among Nigerian peacekeeping 
troops increased from 7% to 10% to 15% over the three years of deployment 11 
(Adefolalu 1999). If peacekeepers continue to face high risks of HIV/AIDS infection 
while deployed, countries may begin to limit their commitments to peacekeeping 
operations (Elbe 2003; Feldbaum et al. 2006a). 
Fourth, HIV/AIDS may impact on a country's willingness to host peacekeeping missions 
because they have been associated with the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2001, Eritrea 
11 ECOMOG is a regional peacekeeping mission, distinct from UN missions. Regional missions generally 
have longer tours of duty than UN missions, which results in longer time away from home for 
peacekeepers and, in this case, increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS. (Roxanne Bazergan, personal 
communication). 
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demanded that the UN ensure that no HIV positive peacekeepers be deployed in the 
UNMEE (UN Integrated Regional Information Network 2001). Similar requests have 
been voiced by Sudan (Agence France-Presse 2004), Sierra Leone and during the 
Balkans conflict (Elbe 2003). While these requests have been unsuccessful, they 
demonstrate concerns by conflict-affected countries with the risk of peacekeeping troops 
spreading HIV/AIDS while deployed. (These objections to hosting HIV positive 
peacekeepers also have a significant political dimension, see Chapter 6 for more 
information. ) Similar to HIV/AIDS data in military populations, data on HIV/AIDS 
among peacekeepers and during peacekeeping operations is scare and is subject to 
politicization. 
3.4 Impact of HIV/AIDS on state stability in highly-affected states 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on state stability is both the least understood, and most potent 
potential impact of the pandemic on national security. The fact that not a single state has 
ever collapsed or experienced political instability due to HIV/AIDS has not prevented 
this argument from being used extensively in literature on the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus. The political potency of the concept of failed states, particularly post- 
9/11, has ensured that this linkage has received widespread coverage. 
Concerns about the potentially destabilizing impacts of HIV/AIDS were first expressed 
in the National Intelligence Council (2000) estimate on infectious diseases. The estimate 
argued that infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS would "add to political instability 
and slow democratic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, and the former 
Soviet Union, while also increasing political tensions in and among some developed 
countries" (National Intelligence Council 2000: 50). In an influential report, the 
International Crisis Group (2001: 1) also argued that the overall impacts of the pandemic 
would undermine state stability in the following way: 
AIDS can be so pervasive that it destroys the very fibre of what constitutes a 
nation: individuals, families, communities; economic and political institutions; 
military and police forces.. . the impact of AIDS is profound enough to challenge fundamentally the security and stability of a growing number of states around the 
globe. 
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In similar analyses, Singer (2002) and Not (2005) also cite the negative impact of 
HIV/AIDS on numerous sectors that will endanger the continued functioning of 
governments: 
AIDS causes dangerous weaknesses in the pillars of an otherwise stable state: its 
military; governing institutions and economy. The disease is accordingly no 
longer just a symptom but a fundamental catalyst of state crisis. (Singer 2002: 
149-150) 
How can governments function, public services operate, agriculture and industry 
thrive, and law enforcement and militaries maintain security, when they are being 
stripped of able-bodied and skilled women and men? (Piot 2005a: 3) 
The main argument sustained in these, and other analyses including Price-Smith (2002) 
and Price-Smith and Daly (2004), Ostergard (2002), and Kassalow (2001), is that by 
decreasing life expectancy and economic growth, and diminishing the functional 
capacity of numerous government sectors, HIV/AIDS may destabilize states, particularly 
those most affected in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
A number of more sophisticated analyses also examine the potential impacts of 
HIV/AIDS on state and political stability, but conclude with less alarmist findings. Elbe 
(2003: 60) finds that HIV/AIDS may increase competition for resources and "exacerbate 
a variety of economic, political and social tensions" that contribute to processes 
traditionally associated with state failure. However Elbe (2003) cautions that there is 
strong variability in the ability of states to respond to these forces, and that the impact of 
the pandemic on political stability will change depending on the state. Analyses by de 
Waal (2003a, 2003b, 2006) outline the impacts of HIV/AIDS on African governance and 
economic development but ultimately conclude that the pandemic is a "manageable 
catastrophe" (de Waal 2006a: 1). Youde (2007) argues that HIV/AIDS will have an 
insidious but indirect impact on democratic stability in Africa by undermining the 
administration of elections through onerous voter registration requirements that 
disenfranchise those sick with AIDS and their caregivers, while allowing governments to 
manipulate election results by keeping those killed by AIDS on voter rolls. Whiteside, 
de Waal, and Gebre-Tensae (2006: 216) dismiss many of the arguments linking 
HIV/AIDS to state failure as shibboleths and conclude that the "case for AIDS 
contributing to national insecurity is best stated in its minimal form: there is no element 
in the HIV/AIDS epidemic that contributes positively to good governance... " 
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Literature suggesting that HIV/AIDS may destabilize Sub-Saharan African states has 
also focused on AIDS orphans as a potentially destabilizing threat. The National 
Intelligence Council (2000: 50) estimate describes AIDS orphans as a "lost orphaned 
generation... with little hope of educational or employment opportunities" who will be 
vulnerable to radicalization or exploitation by political groups. Both Singer (2002) and 
the International Crisis Group (2001) note the risk that AIDS orphans will be targeted for 
recruitment as child soldiers, furthering warfare and destabilization in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. On the subject of AIDS orphans, this literature from the study of international 
relations and national security departs considerably from the public health literature. A 
number of public health analyses of AIDS orphans have found that AIDS orphans are 
disadvantaged in their education opportunities, access to health services, and 
psychological distress, but are largely being cared for by extended families and not 
turning to crime (Monasch and Boerma 2004; Andrews, Skinner, and Zuma 2006; 
Culver, Gardner, and Operario 2007). 
3.5 Impact of HIV/AIDS in second wave states of Russia, India, China, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia 
The final main linkage between HIV/AIDS and national security discussed in the 
literature does not focus on highly affected states, but on strategically important states in 
the early stages of their HIV/AIDS epidemics. This analysis has largely emerged in 
response to U. S. national security concerns about potential political, economic or 
military instability in countries of particular strategic interest to the U. S. and global 
security. The main states discussed in this category are Russia, India and China, with 
Nigeria and Ethiopia included in some analyses. Russia, India and China are particular 
foci of this analysis because they represent three of the seven declared nuclear states, are 
economically and militarily powerful, play major roles in global security, and in the case 
of India and China account for over one-third of the world's people. Driven by national 
security interests and forecasting on the course of the pandemic, this "second wave" 
literature has been politically potent despite being based on limited data. 
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The U. S. National Intelligence Council (2002), in a follow-up to their 2000 estimate, 
published the first report in this area titled: "The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China. " They justify their focus on these countries by 
explaining that they are strategically important, among the world's most populous, in the 
early to middle stages of HIV/AIDS epidemics, and have yet to give efforts to fight the 
pandemic the "sustained high priority that has been key to stemming the tide of the 
disease in other countries" (National Intelligence Council 2002: 1). Using forecasting of 
the course of the epidemic, and judging the ability of these governments to respond 
effectively, the NIC (2002: 22) writes that Nigeria and Ethiopia will be the "hardest hit" 
among these countries by HIV/AIDS. In Russia, the NIC estimates that HIV/AIDS will 
exacerbate already severe health problems, hurt economic growth and may further 
worsen shortages of military personnel. The NIC concludes that India and China's larger 
populations will lessen the political and economic impacts of the epidemic, and that 
HIV/AIDS will not pose a "fundamental threat through 2010 to their status as major 
regional players... " (National Intelligence Council 2002: 25). While the NIC's "Next 
Wave" report does not suggest that these strategically important states will collapse, it 
does argue that the number of people with HIV in these populous countries will be 
greater than the number of infected persons in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that the disease 
will have "significant economic, social, political, and military implications" (National 
Intelligence Council 2002: 5). 
More alarmist is Eberstadt's (2002) article in the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs on 
the "Future of AIDS" in Russia, India and China. Eberstadt's (2002: 35) forecasting 
(which also contributed to the 2002 National Intelligence Council report) predicts that 
even mild epidemics in these three countries will "match or exceed that of the entire 
worldwide HIV crisis up to now. " Indeed, Eberstadt (2002: 24) argues that in terms of 
total numbers, the center of the epidemic "will shift from Africa to Eurasia in the coming 
generation. " Similar to the National Intelligence Council's "Next Wave" report, 
Eberstadt focuses on these countries because of their strategic and economic importance, 
population size, and lack of serious efforts to address the disease. Eberstadt 
acknowledges the difficulties and complexities of forecasting the future of the epidemic 
and, in fact, his estimates are viewed as of 2008 as vast overestimates of the situation 
(Chin and Bennett 2007). However Eberstadt's (2002: 22) main conclusion is stated 
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strikingly: "the coming Eurasian pandemic threats to derail the economic prospects of 
billions and alter the global military balance. " 
Eberstadt also provides a clear realist statement of why the world's powerful states, as of 
2002, had paid little attention to fighting the devastating epidemic in Africa. This 
statement implies that a major rationale for linking HIV/AIDS to national security 
interests is to ensure greater political support for action to fight the pandemic. 
Africa's AIDS catastrophe is a humanitarian disaster of world historic proportions, 
yet the economic and political reverberations from this crisis have been 
remarkably muted outside the continent itself. The explanation for this awful 
dissonance lies in the region's marginal status in global economics and 
politics. -The states of the region are thus not well positioned to influence events 
much beyond their own borders under any circumstances, good or ill -- and the 
cruel consequence is that the world pays them little attention. (Eberstadt 2002: 23) 
Publications warning of a "Next Wave" of HIV/AIDS in strategically important states 
have been used to pressure these states into action on HIV/AIDS, by linking the disease 
to their strategic interests, as well as to argue for increased donor funding to tackle the 
pandemic (Feldbaum et al. 2006a). 
Ingram (2007) observes that Nigeria has become a particular focus of this debate within 
the U. S. government and U. S. -based think-tanks. He argues that Nigeria is a location 
where U. S. geopolitical interests in stability and energy resources are overlapping with 
biopolitical interests in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS through PEPFAR. This has 
created a situation where "the US is directly implicated in... the current and future 
human rights and gender and sexual relations of Nigerian citizens as well as the 
country's governance as a strategic state in energy security and counter-terrorism" 
(Ingram 2007: 528). Ingram argues that the implications of this complex constellation of 
interests focused on Nigeria are yet to be determined, but that such mixed motives are 
reminiscent of the colonial era. 
Feldbaum el at. (2006a) observe that the linkages between HIV/AIDS and national 
security look different from the perspective of these next wave countries. From the 
perspective of Russia, India and China, HIV/AIDS raises internal security challenges to 
these states. Feldbaum el al. (2006a) agree that India and China's large populations will 
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likely largely shield these states from major political, social or economic impacts from 
the pandemic. However, they argue that the disease in these states is driven 
in significant part by injection drug users along heroin trafficking routes, and their 
interactions in turn with sex workers and the general population. High HIV 
infection rates among injection drug users and their sexual partners in Xinjiang 
and Yunnan in China, and Manipur in India, overlap areas of ethnic minorities, 
political insurgency, and separatist sentiment. Xinjiang and Manipur have large 
numbers of Chinese and Indian security forces, respectively, who are at elevated 
risk of HIV infection through commercial sex with local populations (Feldbaum 
et al.: 776-777). 
Feldbaum et al. (2006a) conclude that areas where HIV/AIDS overlaps with heroin 
trafficking routes, minority populations and insurgency will pose additional significant 
challenges to limiting the spread of the disease in these strategically important states. 
Sjöstedt (2008) further examines this second wave argument from the Russian 
perspective, arguing that the securitization of HIV/AIDS was an international norm that 
Russia was slow to accept. Tracing Russian government statements on HIV/AIDS from 
2000-2006, Sjöstedt argues that acceptance of the "HIV/AIDS as a security threat" norm 
was resisted because of Russian perceptions of itself as an international power that gave, 
not received, international aid and advice. Sjöstedt (2008: 22) argues that while the 
evidence "does not clearly indicate that AIDS is seen as a security threat, " the 
securitization norm likely played a role in increasing the politicization of the disease in 
Russia. 
3.6 Critical Perspectives on HIVIAIDS and National Security 
Both Elbe (2005) and Ingram (2005a, 2005b, 2007) critically engage with the links 
between HIV/AIDS and security beyond the epidemic's impact on strategically 
important populations and states, and highly-affected regions. Elbe (2005: 404) argues 
that framing HIV/AIDS as a threat to security is not just important politically, but is 
important because "it turns international security into a site for the global dissemination 
of a biopolitical economy of power. " Building from the work of Michel Foucault, Elbe 
(2005: 405) argues that linking HIV/AIDS to security turns the biological characteristics 
of populations into high political issues, sanctions the statistical surveillance and 
monitoring of high risk populations, and has involved a large number of political actors 
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in "optimizing the health of populations. " Recognizing that such biopolitical strategies 
have "historically been Janus-faced, " Elbe (2005: 408) warns that securitization brings 
attention to an issue, but does not specify the response. Terrible violations of human 
rights could theoretically be justified if HIV/AIDS was viewed solely within a security 
framework, including denial of treatment, quarantine, legal persecution. To avoid these 
dangers, Elbe suggests presenting the security dimensions of HIV/AIDS as only one 
aspect of the epidemic, using a human security framework, and insisting that policy 
responses to the disease do not violate human rights. 
Ingram (2005a, 2005b) analyzes the securitization of HIV/AIDS by mapping the 
discourses surrounding globalization, development and security. Ingram (2005b) notes 
the increasing use of security rationales for health and development initiatives in the 
U. S., and contrasts this with the rejection of such security rationales for health and 
development policy in the United Kingdom. He argues that dangers of using health to 
serve national security interests are that such actions will undermine the credibility of 
health professionals, threaten open governance systems that are need to response to 
global health challenges, and remove the human rights grounding that should drive most 
health and development initiatives (Ingram 2005a). 
3.7 Securitization of HIV/AIDS: Elbe and Peterson 
The explosion of literature since 2000 on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus has 
predominantly focused on the potential and empirical links between the disease and 
national security. Most of these publications argue that HIV/AIDS does threaten 
national security, and that the response to the disease should be upgraded to reflect this 
threat. Only two published papers known at the time of writing have critically engaged 
with the normative question of whether the disease should be securitized and, if so, what 
are the potential risks and benefits. The first, Peterson (2002), draws on the experience 
of the environmental sector to argue that the securitization of HIV/AIDS will not benefit 
the fight against the pandemic. In the second paper, Elbe (2006a) utilizes Buzan et al. 's 
(1998) securitization theory to elicit the risks and benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS. 
Elbe does not conclude that HIV/AIDS should or should not be treated as a security 
issue, but seeks to raise awareness of the issues and recommend actions for limiting the 
negative effects of portraying the disease as a threat to national security. These two 
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papers are reviewed here in depth as the basis of core debates about the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS that this thesis seeks to contribute to. The conclusions of these two papers 
will be contrasted with the findings and conclusions of this thesis. 
3.7.1 Susan Peterson: Epidemic Disease and National Security 
Peterson (2002: 44) begins by noting that, despite widespread and high-level attention to 
the threat of infectious diseases to security during 2000-2002, "systematic analysis of the 
link between [infectious diseases] and national security remains largely unfulfilled. " 
Peterson's (2002: 47) article aims to address this gap by examining the severity of 
infectious diseases globally, the differences between human and national security in their 
relation to diseases, the causal links between epidemic disease and national security, and 
finally asks the question, "why it matters whether we view AIDS and other [infectious 
diseases] as security threats or primarily as health and development challenges. " It is 
this final question which bears directly on the analytical focus of this thesis in terms of 
the broader impacts of securitizing HIV/AIDS. 
Peterson's first section introduces the readers in the security community to the scope and 
impact of infectious diseases globally. She notes that, despite progress against infectious 
diseases in developed countries, infectious diseases remain a "significant and growing 
threat" (Peterson 2002: 47). She makes this point clearly to her security audience by 
comparing the number of deaths from infectious disease to those from warfare. Peterson 
cites a WHO study that estimates that, between 1945 and 1993, HIV/AIDS, TB and 
malaria killed 150 million people, while 23 million died in wars. 
However, threats to security are not only measured by absolute numbers of people killed. 
Peterson explores the different conceptions of security and their relationship to disease. 
She writes that how security is defined will determine the scope of the relationship 
between disease and security. After outlining the history of the concept of human 
security, Peterson argues that the relationship between disease and the concept of human 
security is a simple one. Infectious diseases are serious threats to human security 
"because of the enormous loss of life they cause" (Peterson 2002: 50). Peterson (2002) 
cites former U. S. presidential candidate Al Gore's address to the first UNSC meeting on 
HIV/AIDS in 2000, where he argues that the heart of the human security agenda is 
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protecting lives, and that HIV/AIDS will kill more people than all the wars of the 
twentieth century. 
While attempts to link disease to human security are a means of gathering attention and 
resources to address infectious diseases, Peterson (2002: 51) suggests there are three 
"flaws" to such arguments based on previous attempts to link the environmental issues to 
security interests, particularly Deudney (1990). The first flaw is that linking disease and 
human security begs the question of whether all serious health problems are threats to 
security. This is a common criticism of human security, which is also emphasized by 
Paris (2001), Khong (2001) and others. Peterson argues that the concept of human 
security does not provide guidance on how to prioritize threats and therefore destroys the 
utility of the concept of security. Fein (2000) states the classic formulation of this 
criticism: "If everything is a national security problem, then nothing is. " The second 
flaw is that the link between disease and human security is likely to be of limited utility 
and impact within the security policy community. Peterson (2002: 51) writes that policy 
elites concerned with security remain "cool to the idea of human security" and will pay 
little attention to this linkage unless diseases can be demonstrated to impact on 
traditional national security concerns (i. e. core military and economic capacities). Third, 
Peterson argues that it is not clear that anything is gained by linking human security and 
disease that is not already achieved by the more traditional linkages between public 
health, and the development, human rights and humanitarian agendas. 
In addition to these three flaws, Peterson argues that appealing to human security may 
have unwanted effects. Appealing to the security community implies that human health 
is less important than security and that efforts to improve health can only be justified by 
measuring health's impact on security. These statements are clearly contrary to the 
intentions of those seeking greater action on infectious diseases by arguing that they 
represent a serious threat to human security. Peterson also argues that linking health and 
security may imply that a military response to global health issues is required, when 
global health may be better served by other approaches. Because of these flaws and 
unwanted effects, Peterson focuses the rest of her article on the relationship between 
disease and national security. 
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After dismissing attempts to link disease and human security, Peterson begins a critical 
examination of the causal relationships between disease and national security. Perhaps 
seeking greater credibility with security policy-makers, Peterson selects a traditional and 
conservative definition of national security as her basis for this examination. Peterson 
(2002: 52) defines national security as "the preservation of the state - its territorial 
integrity, political institutions, and national sovereignty - from physical threats. " This 
definition is based on Walt (1991) and Paris's (2001) description of "national security" 
and "redefined security. " Thus Peterson's (2002: 54) criterion for when a health issue 
becomes a security threat is when that issue threatens "the territory, institutions, or 
sovereignty of the state. " Her analysis concludes that epidemic diseases can contribute 
to the outbreak of violent conflict, or influence the outcome of conflicts. These effects 
will be most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, while only posing long-term and indirect 
threats to the U. S. (Peterson 2002). 
Peterson makes four arguments against linking diseases including HIV/AIDS to national 
security. Her first is based on the conclusion of the previous section, which stated that 
infectious diseases represent only a distant threat to the security of the U. S. and other 
developed countries. While epidemic diseases will have large impacts in sub-Saharan 
Africa, "a humanitarian and even a security threat to southern Africa does not necessarily 
threaten other states' security unless southern Africa is of vital interest to them" 
(Peterson 2002: 79). Peterson observes that the U. S. has not used such arguments in 
justifying its involvement in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. Due to this weak link 
between disease and the national security of developed nations, Peterson concludes that 
arguments that link disease to security will likely be unsuccessful in generating greater 
responses to HIV/AIDS in developing countries. 
Peterson is alone among analysts of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus in offering 
her second argument. Here Peterson (2002: 80) argues that "it is not clear... that 
anything is gained by adopting the rhetoric of national security to address [infectious 
diseases]. " Numerous authors, including Elbe (2006), Singer (2002), Feldbaum et al. 
(2006a), have argued that linking HIV/AIDS to national security agendas may result in 
"greater political commitment and funding" (Feldbaum et al. 2006a: 777). These 
benefits are often assumed to have at least as much importance as the actual implications 
of the disease on national security. Peterson, however, focuses on the relative strengths 
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of the arguments linking HIV/AIDS and security, compared to those linking HIV/AIDS 
and other areas. She argues that, while HIV/AIDS is a staggering threat to a multitude of 
areas of human activity, the security of states is not one of these. Peterson (2002: 79-80) 
writes: "From a national security perspective... AIDS poses a far smaller threat to most 
states than it does from almost any other viewpoint, including health, human rights, 
economic and political development, and social and economic justice. " With this 
argument, Peterson dismisses any benefits to the linking HIV/AIDS and other infectious 
diseases to national security. This precise question of whether the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS holds any benefits will be revisited throughout this thesis. 
After concluding that linking HIV/AIDS to national security offers no benefit, Peterson 
further undermines the case for linking the disease and national security by presenting 
two dangers of this approach. Both of these dangers are unintended consequences of 
seeking to address HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases by appealing to the national 
security interests of states. First, Peterson presents the danger that securitization will 
relieve developed states of a moral obligation to respond to health crises in developing 
countries. Developed countries will be relieved of their moral obligation because, as 
proponents of linking disease and national security imply by their arguments, "only 
national security concerns can justify significant expenditures on disease control" 
(Peterson 2002: 80). Peterson supports this argument by comparing the high-level 
international health cooperation achieved to address disease during the nineteenth 
century, when epidemics in Europe endangered trade between states, with the loss of 
interest in the health of developing countries by developed countries during the twentieth 
century because they were believed protected by new pharmaceuticals and public health 
interventions. Peterson (2002: 80) concludes from this example that appeals to narrow 
national interests were not successful in creating "a sustained commitment to 
international health cooperation" and are "no more likely to promote the sustained 
commitment that will be necessary to fight AIDS in Africa and elsewhere. " 
However, here Peterson recognizes that there may be benefits to health when states see 
improving health as in their strategic interests, in direct contradiction of her second 
conclusion. Despite this inconsistency, Peterson raises a serious question, which will be 
examined by the historical case studies in this thesis, about whether developed countries 
have been relieved of their moral responsibility to respond to health crises in the 
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developing world because of the argument that HIV/AIDS poses a threat to the national 
security of developed countries. 
Peterson argues that the second danger of linking disease to national security agendas is 
that this linkage may undermine trust in national disease control and biological weapons 
non-proliferation programs. While no evidence is provided to support this assertion, the 
argument is that, if disease control efforts become associated with the selfish national 
security interests of states, they will become increasingly distrusted and arouse suspicion 
in other states. This lack of trust and suspicion will then further undermine global health. 
An example of this type of situation may be the argued undermining of humanitarian aid 
in Afghanistan due to the U. S. military's conduct of both military and humanitarian 
operations concurrently (Ford 2001). Peterson (2002: 80) suggests "it may be more 
fruitful to view disease and health issues as concerns for U. S. foreign policy deserving of 
multilateral responses, rather than as narrow security threats requiring bilateral policy 
responses that may provoke suspicion. " This fear that linking disease control programs 
to national interests will undermine trust in public health is valid and will be investigated 
in this thesis. 
In addition to Peterson's argument about undermining trust, she also voices a commonly 
held assumption about securitization; specifically that securitization necessitates a 
particular type of policy response involving the traditional national security apparatus 
including military and police forces, and characterized by bilateral or unilateral 
approaches. Similarly, Csete (2007: 720) fears the "other side of the coin" of 
securitization is "the unfettered pursuit of a public security agenda, including 
counterterrorism measures, on the lives of people who are most affected by, or 
vulnerable to, HIV/AIDS. " This question of whether securitization of HIV/AIDS 
necessitates a security-driven response to the pandemic, or whether global health 
approaches can result from securitization, is another question this thesis will seek to 
answer through historical case studies. 
In short, Peterson's analysis finds no benefits to, and a number of risks arising from 
linking HIV/AIDS and other diseases to national security interests. These risks are that 
developed states will be relieved of their moral obligation to respond to health crises in 
developing countries, and that this linkage will generate distrust and undermine disease 
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control efforts. Because of these risks, Peterson (2002: 81) concludes that HIV/AIDS is 
an unprecedented health tragedy that calls for "humanitarian assistance, not for the 
garrisoning of states behind national boundaries and national security rhetoric. " For 
these reasons, Peterson (2002: 81) states that for those seeking to rally support "for anti- 
AIDS efforts Africa, portraying the disease as a security issue may be exactly the wrong 
strategy to employ. " Despite underestimating the benefits of the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus, Peterson's critique of this linkage generating distrust and reduced moral 
commitment to health crises in developing countries represent areas warranting further 
investigation in this thesis. 
3.7.2 Stefan Elbe: Should HIV/AIDS be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of 
Linking HIV/AIDS and Security 
In the literature to date, Elbe (2006a) grapples most directly with the normative question 
of whether HIV/AIDS should be securitized. While Elbe (2006a) recognizes the need 
for research into the empirical links between HIV/AIDS and security (and has published 
on these empirical links in Elbe (2002) and (2003)), he argues that this debate must be 
widened to encompass the normative questions of what are the benefits and drawbacks of 
addressing the disease through the framework of national security. 
To conduct this examination, Elbe uses the securitization theory of Buzan et al. (1998). 
After summarizing their framework and theory of securitization, Elbe (2006a: 126) 
concludes that securitization "is precisely what has happened to the issue of HIV/AIDS 
in recent years. " Elbe writes that the debate around HIV/AIDS meets Buzan et al. 's four 
criteria for the securitization of an issue: securitizing actors, a referent object, an 
existential threat, and calls for emergency measures. 
Buzan et at. (1998: 1) caution against securitizing issues, arguing that there are 
"intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security onto an ever wider 
range of issues". They warn that "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to 
deal with issues as normal politics" (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Elbe builds on this 
perspective to examine the two major dangers arising from securitization as applied to 
HIV/AIDS. The first danger is that securitization "processes usually lead to a greater 
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level of state mobilization, enabling the state to encroach on an increasing proportion of 
social life where it might not be desirable" (Elbe 2006a: 127). More specifically, Elbe 
summarizes Buzan et al. 's first concern in two parts. First, securitization can remove an 
issue from ordinary democratic debate into the higher echelons of power where 
transparency and democratic scrutiny can be more limited. Second, securitization and 
the term "security" may be used by governments to justify emergency measures which 
override the rule of law and civil liberties, and silence opposition to the state. 
Applying these concerns to the case of HIV/AIDS, Elbe (2006a: 128) finds that framing 
the disease "as a security issue pushes responses to the disease away from civil society 
toward the much less transparent working of military and intelligence organizations, 
which also possess the power to override human rights and civil liberties. " Elbe cites the 
U. S. CIA's increasing involvement in examining the national security implications of 
HIV/AIDS as evidence for this argument. Furthermore, there are numerous historical 
examples of states infringing on the civil rights of those with HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases (e. g. SARS). Elbe cites examples of Haitians in the U. S. being denied housing 
and employment during the early years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the UK 
government considering compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants in 2003. 
Elbe (2006a: 128) finds that this evidence 
undoubtedly justify the first normative concern... that the involvement of the state 
in the management of wider social issues can also have detrimental effects in 
terms of placing the management of such an issue behind closed doors, and by 
paving the way for civil liberties to be overridden if this is deemed necessary by 
the state. 
However within this statement is the assumption that states are only involved in wider 
social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, when such issues have become securitized. In fact, 
states already have significant power to override civil liberties to address public health 
problems and infectious disease epidemics separate from their implications for national 
security. The ability of public health authorities to override individual rights is codified 
in U. S. constitutional law beginning with the 1905 case of Jacobson v. Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, which established the power of the state to act against the individual 
for the benefit of the public's health (Joseph 2003). (For further discussion of public 
health and individual rights, see Feldbaum and Lee (2004)) Elbe's examples have little 
to do with securitization, but instead are examples of the use and misuse of public health 
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powers. Elbe's concern that the CIA has increased its study of HIV/AIDS does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the CIA is leading U. S. responses to the epidemic. 
Elbe's argument cannot be discarded however, because it is possible that the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS may potentially increase the use and misuse of these public 
health powers to the detriment of people living with HIV/AIDS. As in the above 
discussion of Peterson (2002), the fear here is whether securitization will result in 
security community-led responses to the pandemic. 
The second danger Elbe (2006a: 127) cites from his examination of securitization theory 
is that "the language of security attaches to issues a particular `threat-defense' logic that 
may not always be appropriate or beneficial for addressing these issues. " This threat- 
defense logic holds three dangers. First, Elbe argues that viewing HIV/AIDS as a 
security threat could remove efforts to fight the disease from a humanitarian and 
development framework, and place them in a state-centric framework focused on 
national security. Elbe warns that if securitization of HIV/AIDS is accepted, efforts to 
fight the disease may be limited to those instances where the disease is seen to threaten 
narrow national security interests. This concern echoes Peterson's (2002) argument that 
viewing HIV/AIDS as a national security threat will relieve countries of their moral and 
humanitarian commitment to address the disease. 
A second and related danger of securitizing HIV/AIDS is that the "threat-defense" logic 
will shift funding priorities from addressing the epidemic among civilian populations to a 
focus on the "core institutions of the state, including the armed forces" (Elbe 2006a: 
129). Elbe argues that low-income countries with scarce resources may prioritize 
treatment for armed forces and elites over civilian populations, or even divert ARVs 
from civilian to military treatment programs because of the portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a 
threat to national security. Elbe writes that, while no examples of the latter have been 
officially documented, many states have prioritized access to ARVs by elites and their 
armed forces. He argues that this has resulted in a situation where soldiers in Africa 
often have better access to health care and ARVs than civilians in the same country. 
Elbe therefore argues that the securitization of HIV/AIDS may help those who already 
have the greater chance of receiving ARVs, rather than providing treatment for 
HIV/AIDS based on need. This danger exists at the global level as well, where donor 
funding could be focused on countries of strategic importance over those in greatest 
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need. As Ingram (2005a: 539) rightly observes: "the landscape of political insecurity is 
not fully congruent with the landscape of need. " 
The third danger of the "threat-defense" logic is that it will undermine efforts to 
normalize societal attitudes towards people living with HIV/AIDS. Stigmatization of 
people living with HIV/AIDS and the perception of HIV/AIDS as a disease of outsiders 
has inhibited attempts to prevent the spread of the disease since the beginning of the 
pandemic (Valdiserri 2003; Putzel 2003). Elbe (2006a: 130) fears that presenting the 
disease as a "destructive and debilitating threat" will undermine the advances made in 
destigmatizing the disease and acceptance of those living with HIV/AIDS. However, 
this argument confuses the virus of HIV/AIDS, and people living with HIV/AIDS, as the 
source of the security threat, as Elbe acknowledges later in his article. The argument that 
people living with HIV/AIDS are a threat to national security is both inaccurate and 
objectionable. But this argument is rarely made, and is not to be found in any of the 
published works on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. It is the securitization of 
the HIV/AIDS virus, not people with HIV/AIDS, which is at issue in publications on the 
nexus. While securitization may provide some nefarious governments with a 
justification for violating the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, this would be more 
directly linked to the government's character and not to the securitization of the disease. 
Thus, this danger of securitizing HIV/AIDS may be overstated. 
Unlike Peterson (2002), Elbe (2006a) finds that the securitization of HIV/AIDS could 
bring benefits to the fight against the disease and for persons living with HIV/AIDS. 
Citing Buzan et al. (1998: 29), who argue that the dangers of securitization must be 
weighed against "the possible advantages of focus, attention and mobilization, " Elbe 
seeks to explore the benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS. 
"Excessive state mobilization" forms the basis of Elbe's (2006a: 130) first set of risks in 
securitizing HIV/AIDS. At the same time, however, the mobilization of states to fight 
HIV/AIDS also represents a potent advantage to securitizing the epidemic. As Elbe 
(2006a: 131) observes, in "countries most seriously affected by the AIDS pandemic, it is 
not excessive state mobilization that poses the main problem, but, on the contrary, the 
utter absence of a meaningful state response to the disease. " Because the global response 
to HIV/AIDS has been characterized by insufficient mobilization to stem the pandemic, 
81 
the increased mobilization of states could represent a particularly strong benefit of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS. Elbe writes that the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC 
worked toward this goal of increasing state action in fighting HIV/AIDS. In other 
words, the intent of beneficial securitization would be to shift the issue of HIV/AIDS 
from a non-politicized issue that generates little state action, to a politicized issue that 
states seek to address at a high level. 
Elbe finds that removing HIV/AIDS from general debate, and into the higher echelons of 
power, previously cited as a danger of securitization, also offers potential benefits for 
mobilizing efforts to fight the disease. Securitizing the disease has broken the silence 
surrounding HIV/AIDS in these policy circles, resulting in meetings at the UNSC and 
the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious 
Diseases. In both these cases, securitization pushed politicians and state leaders to 
discuss the disease and move it higher on their agendas. Elbe also argues that 
securitization has shifted the response to HIV/AIDS, from often under-resourced 
ministries of health, to those with greater political and financial clout. This shift may 
benefit those with HIV/AIDS if this clout is used to expand treatment and prevention 
programs. 
While Elbe cites Buzan et al. 's warning that securitization can allow the overrule of the 
rule of law, Elbe also finds that the ability of states to overrule patent protections 
outlined in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) is a potential advantage of securitization. Securitization may aid highly affected 
states seeking a "security exception" from the TRIPS agreement allowing them to import 
ARVs at lower costs than would be available if the provisions of TRIPS were honored 
(Elbe 2006a: 133). Even if the security exception to TRIPS is not used, the potential for 
this exception is an important bargaining tool in negotiations between countries and 
pharmaceutical companies over the price of AIDS medications. Elbe observes that this 
benefit of securitization has a unique economic benefit to highly affected states, beyond 
increased resources and attention, which was only achievable by arguing that HIV/AIDS 
represents a threat to national security. 
The "threat-defense" logic that securitization brings to HIV/AIDS may also have benefits 
in fighting the disease. Both Elbe (2006a) and Peterson (2002) cite the state-centric and 
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self-interested nature of security as a potential drawback to linking HIV/AIDS to 
national security. Elbe (2006a) however also argues that previous appeals to altruism 
and humanitarianism have so far failed to generate sufficient political will and resources 
to successfully fight HIV/AIDS. In this situation, "the appeal to the naked self-interest 
of states is the only strategy left in light of the pressing daily humanitarian implications 
of the pandemic" (Elbe 2006a: 134). Appealing to the self-interest of states may help 
justify significantly expanding funding for HIV/AIDS by donor governments. Elbe cites 
the US$15 billion PEPFAR program as an example of the financial benefits that can 
accrue from securitization. Linking HIV/AIDS to national security may also benefit 
highly affected countries by provoking governments in Africa to prioritize the disease in 
political agendas and budgets. Elbe writes that the highlighting of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on armed forces has been a critical part of the strong political leadership on 
HIV/AIDS in Uganda, Ethiopia and Malawi. In these cases, a security framework has 
succeeded in generating state action on HIV/AIDS where humanitarian and altruistic 
frameworks failed. 
The "threat-defense" logic of security may also be beneficial to fighting HIV/AIDS by 
increasing the involvement of armed forces in fighting the disease. Elbe cites the 
increasing funding for the U. S. Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, 
which assists countries to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS in their armed forces, as an 
example of a benefit from securitization. This program also supports the dependents of 
soldiers with treatment and prevention, reaching both military and civilian populations. 
Elbe notes that here, securitization has generated new resources from military budgets to 
fight the disease. Furthermore it is argued that militaries represent an important group in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS, because they may be at elevated risk for the disease, have 
sexual relations with civilian populations, and are more easily targeted by prevention and 
treatment programs. Thus securitization may benefit the fight against HIV/AIDS by 
increasing military involvement. Elbe notes however that privileged access to ARVs for 
military personnel would likely be opposed. 
Elbe concludes that securitization theory does not seek to answer the question of whether 
HIV/AIDS should be securitized, but to cultivate a deeper understanding of the risks and 
benefits of securitization. On this basis, Elbe suggests three recommendations for 
minimizing the dangers of securitization. First, those seeking to link HIV/AIDS to 
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national security should present the security impacts of the disease as only one 
dimension of the disease. They should note that HIV/AIDS is also an issue of health, 
development, gender, and other areas. This will help insure that the security dimensions 
of the disease complement, rather than replace, the humanitarian and altruistic 
frameworks that have traditionally governed responses to the disease. Second, Elbe 
suggests describing HIV/AIDS as a security issue, rather than a dangerous security 
threat. He argues that this will preserve the political benefits of the term security, while 
reducing excessive fear of HIV/AIDS or increasing stigmatization of people living with 
HIV/AIDS. Third, those framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue should be clear that the 
virus, and not people living with the disease, is the source of the security problem. 
Effect of 
securitization 
Negative impact on HIV/AIDS (Risks) Positive impact on III [/AIDS 
(Benefits) 
Greater state " Reduced democratic scrutiny and " Greater state mobilization on 
mobilization transparency HIV/AIDS is needed 
" Justifies emergency measures that " Aids security exception 
may override civil liberties argument under TRIPs 
Threat-defense " Moves HIV/AIDS from " Humanitarian justifications 
logic humanitarian and development unsuccessful in raising 
framework to state-centric sufficient political and 
framework of national security financial support 
" May shift funding priorities from " Armed forces must be further 
civilians to elites and armed forces involved in fighting 
" May restigmatize people living with HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS " May avoid stigmatization by 
saying the virus is the 
security threat 
Figure 3.2: Summary of Elbe (2006a) 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Most authors writing about the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus have provided 
descriptions of the linkages between the disease and security, while appealing for greater 
action to fight HIV/AIDS. Other authors have commented on the strategy of appealing 
to national security interests, or using the UNSC, to address HIV/AIDS. Most relevant 
to the aims of this thesis are Peterson's (2002) and Elbe's (2006a) efforts to grapple with 
the question of whether HIV/AIDS should be securitized, and the risks and benefits that 
arise from securitization of the pandemic. With the goal of adding a third perspective to 
the work of Peterson and Elbe, the next three chapters create a history of cases in the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, concurrently evaluating conceptual frameworks 
and the conclusions of both authors. Chapters 4,5 and 6 trace the ways in which 
consideration of HIV/AIDS as a national security issue has impacted the fight against 
HIV/AIDS since the mid 1980s. This history begins with events in Uganda, Thailand, 
Cambodia and the U. S. that linked HIV/AIDS and national security between 1985-1995, 
but which occurred before securitizations in the U. S. and at the UNSC, and widespread 
debate about the national security implications of HIV/AIDS. Chapter 5 sets out the 
events that cumulated in the securitization of HIV/AIDS by the U. S. government and the 
UNSC. Chapter 6 examines the consequences of securitization on policies and efforts to 
fight HIV/AIDS. The final chapter will then build on the evidence presented to draw the 
conclusions of this thesis, and address the questions raised by the conceptual framework 
chapter and the literature review. 
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Chapter 4: The early history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus: 1985-1995 
This chapter traces the HIV/AIDS-national security nexus from 1985-1995. This 
timeframe roughly overlaps with the explosive spread of HIV during the first decade of 
the pandemic, and is well before HIV/AIDS was widely discussed as a security threat 
after the UNSC meetings in 2000 and concurrent U. S. intelligence reports on the 
pandemic. Because this time period predates the official securitization of the pandemic, 
to date linkages between HIV/AIDS and national security during this period have rarely 
been incorporated into analysis. This chapter aims to remedy this deficit, and 
demonstrate the relevance and lessons of this early period in understanding more fully 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
This lack of analysis is not because linking the disease to national security was 
uncommon or unimportant during this earlier period. In fact, the pandemic was linked to 
the national security interests of two early success stories in fighting HIV/AIDS, Uganda 
and Thailand. This thesis argues that there is strong evidence that consideration of the 
national security implications of HIV/AIDS was a critical component of these countries' 
mobilization and successes in limiting the spread of the disease. 
Also during this time, the U. S. and Soviet intelligence agencies considered the emerging 
pandemic through the lens of superpower competition. The Soviet Committee for State 
Security's (KGB) efforts created an enduring conspiracy theory suggesting the U. S. 
developed the disease as a biological weapon. The CIA's declassified studies of HIV 
illuminate a Cold War perspective on the disease, as well as strong biases within the U. S. 
intelligence community against incorporating infectious diseases into national security 
calculations. Both cases illustrate risks of the nexus, and difficulties in bridging the 
fields of global health and national security. 
The final case described in this chapter focuses on the role peacekeepers played in 
igniting Cambodia's HIV/AIDS epidemic. These events illuminate, not only the role of 
security forces in spreading the disease, but the UN's lack of interest in addressing this 
problem and, more broadly, the barriers to securitization of HIV even when the disease 
represented a serious threat to the lives of peacekeepers. The UN's inaction in Cambodia 
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is particularly important to understand, because it was the issue of peacekeepers 
spreading the disease that would later vault HIV/AIDS into the considerations of the 
UNSC in 2000. 
Thus the period 1985-1995 is critical to understanding the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus, and a full history of the nexus remains incomplete without these four cases. As 
discussed in this chapter, many of the current tensions within the nexus, as well as its 
potential benefits and hazards, are revealed through this early history. 
4.1 Early recognition in Uganda 
A historical examination of the linkages between HIV/AIDS and national security must 
begin with a widely circulated story about the first known time the disease was perceived 
to be a threat to national security. This occurred in an exchange between Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni and Cuban President Fidel Castro in 1986 about the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence of Ugandan troops. This exchange seemed to spur Museveni's 
government into greater action on HIV/AIDS, which would later result in a degree of 
success in reducing national prevalence of the disease. This exchange is difficult to 
characterize because the perception of HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security is said 
to have occurred, not in policy documents or government statements, but in the mind of 
President Museveni. Despite the unusual nature of this linkage, evidence does exist, 
including from Museveni himself, that this exchange contributed to motivating Uganda's 
early, and eventually successful response to HIV/AIDS. Therefore, the first time 
HIV/AIDS was perceived as a threat to national security, it helped spur successful 
government action to fight the disease. 
By 1986, when Museveni became President of Uganda, the country was facing one of 
the earliest and worst epidemics of HIV/AIDS in Africa. Before taking power, he had 
learned that HIV/AIDS could be transmitted through heterosexual sex and warned his 
commanders that "they could be killed by promiscuous sexual relations" (Putzel 2003: 
20). After taking power, Museveni continued to address HIV/AIDS by sending his 
Minister of Health to announce to the World Health Assembly that Uganda faced an 
epidemic of HIV/AIDS (Putzel 2003). Publicly discussing the disease was unusual 
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among African leaders at the time. Putzei (2003) credits Museveni's openness about 
HIV/AIDS to the fact that the country had little foreign investment or tourism to lose, 
and that the international community had offered funding to help Uganda fight the 
disease. 
The critical event occurred in 1986 when President Museveni sent sixty of his generals to 
Cuba for further military training. Cuba's military, which had fought in Angola in the 
mid 1970s, had experience with its soldiers being infected with HIV/AIDS. As a result, 
Cuba tested the Ugandan soldiers for HIV/AIDS. Of the 60 soldiers, 18 tested positive 
for HIV, a prevalence rate of 30%. At a conference of non-aligned states in Zimbabwe 
in 1986, Castro reported these results to Museveni, saying "Brother, you have a 
problem" (Garrett 2000: para. 21; Allen 2002; Betty King Interview). 
After this exchange, Museveni became personally involved in the response to HIV/AIDS 
and treated the disease as an issue of the highest political priority. Within a month of 
this exchange, Uganda's National AIDS Control Program was established (Tumushabe 
2005). President Museveni became highly engaged in the response to HIV/AIDS, 
personally arguing to Ugandans that "fighting AIDS was a `patriotic duty' requiring 
openness, communication and strong leadership" (Green et al. 2006: 338). Using 
military metaphors to describe Uganda's efforts against HIV/AIDS, Museveni 
securitized the epidemic and encouraged Ugandans to "fight HIV like we fought Amin" 
(Justin Parkhurst Interview). Museveni's "charismatic directness in addressing the threat 
placed HIV/AIDS on the development agenda and encouraged constant and candid 
national media coverage of all aspects of the epidemic" (Green et al. 2006: 338). This 
early and high level involvement by President Museveni is cited as the beginning 
Ugandan government's active response to HIV/AIDS (Putzel 2004; Elbe 2006; Green et 
al. 2006). 
It appears from the above that Uganda's expanded efforts to fight HIV/AIDS in 1986 
were triggered by Museveni's exchange with Castro. Museveni himself stated that his 
early actions on HIV/AIDS grew from his exchange with Castro about HIV/AIDS 
Prevalence among the Ugandan military (Tumushabe 2005; Elbe 2006). Putzel (2003: 
20) also cites this exchange as the beginning of Museveni's taking "a personal interest 
and a direct role in stepping up government efforts to fight the epidemic. " Putzel (2003) 
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notes the ubiquitous presence of this exchange in policymaker's explanations of 
Museveni's early response to HIV/AIDS. 
Authors have offered two rationales for why his exchange with Castro caused Museveni 
to act on HIV/AIDS. The first is that Museveni knew many of the soldiers who had been 
diagnosed as HIV positive. David Kihumuro Apuuli, head of the Ugandan AIDS 
Commission said that Museveni was upset "because these were comrades who had 
fought with him in the bush" (Garrett 2000: para. 21). A second rationale for beginning 
Uganda's major national efforts to control HIV/AIDS was the perception that HIV/AIDS 
posed national security challenges for the Ugandan state. Tumushabe (2005: 8) writes 
that "it would not be far fetched to conclude that the potential threat AIDS posed to the 
army, which was President Museveni's primary power base, led to the pragmatic steps 
such as creation of the AIDS Control Program... and the openness of Government 
towards HIV/AIDS. " Princeton Lyman (Interview), former U. S. Ambassador to South 
Africa and Nigeria, says Castro's warning about high rates of HIV/AIDS in the top tier 
of his military "did alarm Museveni and was one of the reasons that he was so 
outspoken, so aggressive" on HIV/AIDS. These perspectives suggest that Museveni 
acted out of security concerns for his nation's military and his own powerbase. Because 
of this, Tumushabe (2005: 9) calls the exchange between Museveni and Castro the 
moment "the strategic and political importance of HIV/AIDS was... born. " 
The national security implications of HIV/AIDS for Uganda cannot be credited alone for 
Uganda's widely described and debated success in lowering national prevalence of the 
disease. A wide variety of factors unrelated to national security must be considered as 
contributing to Uganda's success (Green et al. 2006), including questioning the degree of 
Uganda's achievement (Parkhurst 2002; Allen 2006). However, this thesis argues that 
the threat HIV/AIDS posed to the Ugandan military and Museveni's powerbase caused 
the President to begin government efforts to fight the disease. In this Ugandan example, 
it was the strategic implications of HIV/AIDS which led to the disease's political 
prioritization. 
The Ugandan experience suggests that perceiving HIV/AIDS as a threat to national 
security can elevate the disease into high politics, and generate increased governmental 
(and in this case beneficial) action to fight the disease among civilian and military 
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populations. The high - low politics model is clearly relevant here, neatly illustrating the 
movement of the disease from a largely unknown entity into the highest levels of 
Ugandan politics. These events also support the application of Fidler's (2005a) 
remediation model to describe the factors causing the transformation of the disease into 
an issue of high politics. Museveni addressed HIV/AIDS not because health was a 
politically transcendent value (the revolution model) or because public health efforts had 
failed (the regression model), but because the disease threatened to impact on the 
concerns of the traditional foreign policy sphere. 
The Ugandan experience clearly contradicts Peterson's (2002) finding that there are no 
benefits to linking HIV/AIDS to national security. Clear beneficial action did result by 
Museveni's linking of HIV/AIDS to national security concerns. This event does confirm 
her finding that there is a threat to Africa from infectious diseases, but there is no 
evidence from this example to support her further conclusion that the nexus will generate 
distrust in global health efforts. This may be because the link between HIV/AIDS and 
national security generated political will, but actions to address the disease were broadly 
focused on both military and civilian populations. In other words, securitization only 
requires that emergency measures be enacted, not specifically military or police 
measures. The Ugandan case demonstrates that public health responses to HIV/AIDS 
can result from securitization. Similarly, there is no evidence that the linkage of 
HIV/AIDS to Ugandan national security generated the negative impacts of securitization 
outlined by Elbe. Conversely, greater state mobilization and the strong involvement of 
the armed forces were major benefits of securitizing HIV/AIDS at this early stage in 
Uganda's epidemic. 
It should be noted that other African governments have responded differently to similar 
data about HIV/AIDS prevalence in their militaries. Both the Ethiopian and South 
African militaries discovered a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among their armed forces, 
viewed the disease as a threat, and worked to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS among their 
armed forces (Whiteside, De Waal, and Gebre-Tensae 2006). However in Ethiopia, 
these military-based efforts occurred well before comparable efforts to address 
HIV/AIDS in civilian populations. In South Africa, military efforts to fight the disease 
developed "in contradiction to government policies that did not prioritize AIDS at all" 
(Whiteside, De Waal, and Gebre-Tensae 2006: 209). In both cases, the national security 
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implications of HIV/AIDS generated only military-focused responses to the disease and 
did not impact broader civilian policies. Thus in neither case was the disease securitized. 
In Zimbabwe, the presence of HIV/AIDS in the military since the 1980s generated 
almost no action by President Mugabe or the Zimbabwean government. Only in 2004, 
when China expelled Zimbabwean National Army officers for being HIV positive, did 
Zimbabwe begin to address HIV/AIDS among its armed forces (Garrett 2005). These 
states serve as counter-examples to the Ugandan experience, demonstrating that a 
multitude of factors are involved in determining a national response to HIV/AIDS, even 
when the disease is perceived as a threat to the military. 
These counter examples demonstrate that perceiving HIV/AIDS as a threat to national 
security is not a sufficient condition to elicit a strong governmental response to the 
disease. However these events in Uganda do demonstrate the powerful potential benefit 
of linking HIV/AIDS to national security where responsible leadership and other 
enabling political factors are present. 
4.2 Intelligence Services and HIV/AIDS: Cases of CIA and KGB Involvement 
In 1987 and 1991, the U. S. intelligence community produced the first known intelligence 
community studies on the impact of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and globally. The 
first CIA study was completed only six years after the first published report of the 
existence of HIV/AIDS, demonstrating an early interest in the disease that is 
unanticipated by the conceptual frameworks reviewed in Chapter 3 (CDC 1981). The 
two studies describe devastating humanitarian, economic and military impacts of 
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, but these are not cosmopolitan or humanitarian 
analyses, but are clearly based in the communitarian perspective of national security. 
Despite predicting enormous devastation from HIV/AIDS, both studies conclude that the 
pandemic has limited implications for U. S. national security interests. The response to 
the 1991 Estimate reveals strong biases within the U. S. intelligence community against 
considering HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security. The response also revealed the 
low political status of HIV/AIDS at that time, and an assumption that the security 
implications of HIV/AIDS would be benign in highly affected states. These studies are 
an essential part of the early history of the nexus, illuminating the security community's 
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initial perspective on HIV/AIDS and a stark communitarian - cosmopolitan divide 
between the global health and national security communities as a major hazard of the 
nexus. 
The CIA was not the only intelligence agency thinking about HIV/AIDS during this 
early period. Around 1986, the Soviet KGB (U. S. S. R. Committee for State Security) 
launched a disinformation campaign to seemingly take advantage of confusion about the 
origins of HIV/AIDS and its disproportionate impact on Africa. This disinformation 
campaign alleged that the disease was actually a product of U. S. research into biological 
weapons. The campaign was widely disseminated and, as argued by this thesis, likely 
impeded public health efforts to fight HIV/AIDS through the present day. The KGB's 
efforts represent a uniquely egregious case of using the disease in pursuit of a country's 
national security objectives, and illustrate another risk from the nexus that is 
unanticipated by existing conceptual frameworks. 
4.2.1 The 1987 U. S. National Security Estimate: Sub-Saharan Africa, Implications 
of the AIDS Pandemic 
On June 1,1987, the CIA issued National Security Estimate 70/1-87 on the implications 
of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. Made public in 2001 under the Freedom of 
Information Act, this is the earliest known evaluation of HIV/AIDS by any state 
intelligence agency. Written with the goal of informing U. S. national security policy, 
this document exhibits a communitarian perspective on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Despite forecasting "devastating" humanitarian, economic and military 
consequences for Africa, the Estimate concludes that the epidemic's strategic impact on 
the U. S. will be limited (National Intelligence Council 1987: 4). This communitarian 
rationale for studying HIV/AIDS will prove to be a constant feature of U. S. intelligence 
reports on the pandemic. 
The Estimate was initiated because by 1987, the National Intelligence Council believed 
that HIV/AIDS was a "deadly epidemic... spreading out of control in Sub-Saharan 
Africa" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 1). The goal of the Estimate was to 
examine "the serious implications of the AIDS pandemic for African, Soviet Bloc, 
Western, and U. S. interests" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 1). It paints a 
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devastating picture of the spread of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has largely been 
confirmed by actual events. The estimate states that: "the long-range impact of AIDS 
will be devastating. Heavily infected countries will suffer irreplaceable population 
losses in those groups most essential to their future development: midlevel economic and 
political managers, agrarian and urban workers, and military personnel" (National 
Intelligence Council 1987: 4-5). In addition to the huge human cost of the disease, the 
estimate states that AIDS will adversely affect the mining industry and agricultural 
production in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This Estimate argues that HIV also has important security implications for affected 
African countries. These include the loss of highly trained and experienced officers, low 
morale, and a decreasing pool of young men available for military service due to 
HIV/AIDS. Tension within and between states could also be caused by the epidemic. 
The Estimate worries that travel restrictions, border closings and quarantines could 
inflame political tensions and engender military responses. However, the potential 
implications of HIV/AIDS for African security are not the focus of the Estimate. 
The central intent of the analysis is to understand how HIV/AIDS could impact upon 
U. S. strategic interests and standing in the Cold War. The impacts of the pandemic on 
both the Soviet bloc and U. S. are described in terms of the potential impact on the 
military, development aid programmes, and public image. For the Soviet bloc, the 
estimate suggests that the HIV pandemic "could raise the cost for Havana and Moscow, 
and could eventually weaken their resolve to maintain current levels of troops and 
advisers in Africa... Military and civilian personnel will face rigorous testing upon 
return from Africa" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 5). As to impacts on the U. S., 
the Estimate argues that AIDS in Africa will pose problems for relationships with 
affected African states. These problems will stem from increasing African demands for 
assistance and aid to stop HIV/AIDS. The Estimate argues: "the United States and 
Western countries appear to offer only the future hope for a vaccine or cure, while 
currently denying the massive assistance that would be needed to care for the victims and 
raise health services to developed-world standards" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 
15). The Estimate argues, from its focus on U. S. interests, that poor relations with 
African states may impact on basing agreements, aircraft landings and military port calls 
for the U. S. military. 
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This 1987 Estimate represents the first analysis of HIV/AIDS from a national security 
perspective. The Estimate clearly demonstrates the communitarian perspective of 
national security focused on national interests, particularly the difference in referent 
objects between the global health and national security communities. The Estimate 
concludes that HIV/AIDS will have enormous humanitarian, economic and military 
impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa, but that these impacts will be of little importance to U. S. 
national security. This analysis is based on the referent object of national security being 
the state, and is not primarily concerned with humanitarian suffering or strategic impacts 
of HIV/AIDS outside of the U. S. and Soviet Union. In contrast, a global health and 
cosmopolitan approach to HIV/AIDS would focus on the most affected human 
communities and their humanitarian needs as the referent object, regardless of their 
location in a nation state. 
While the communitarian - cosmopolitan dichotomy has clear relevance here, the CIA 
study of HIV/AIDS challenges the starting perspective of the models of engagement 
identified by Lee and McInnes (2004). In this case it was not the global health 
community acting as a supplicant to the national security community, but the national 
security community independently seeking out HIV/AIDS as a subject of intelligence. 
This foreshadows the increasing U. S. intelligence community focus through the 1990s on 
transnational threats. This change in focus was largely due to the end of the Cold War 
and collapse of the Soviet Union, which removed the key subject of U. S. intelligence 
efforts, and led to policymakers and analysts attempting to anticipate possible new 
threats to U. S. national security. Thus the change in the geopolitical landscape after the 
end of the Cold War pushed the national security community to study new types of 
potential threats including infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. This, and further U. S. 
intelligence studies of HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases, suggests that the models of 
engagement fail to fully account for an independently initiated national security 
community interest in global health issues. 
The Estimate does support Elbe's contention that the threat-defense logic of security will 
push HIV/AIDS into the state-centric framework of national security. However this 
study's lack of impact on policymaking makes it difficult to assess in light of Peterson 
and Elbe's conclusions on the risks and benefits of securitization. 
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Nothing about the response to this Estimate is known, although the response was likely 
similar to the dismissal and "indifference" that characterized the response to a similar 
1991 Estimate on HIV/AIDS discussed next (Gellman 2000a: para. 5). Despite the 
disease's potential to cause devastation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the U. S. intelligence 
community concluded that HIV/AIDS posed only limited challenges to U. S. interests. 
This conclusion did not call for further urgent investigation. It would be four years 
before the U. S. intelligence community revisited the issue of HIV/AIDS. 
4.2.2 1991 Intelligence Memorandum "The Global AIDS Disaster" 
In 1991, the CIA produced another classified study on HIV/AIDS entitled The Global 
AIDS Disaster. This study is not available publicly and a Freedom of Information 
request by the author has not yielded access to the study at the time of writing. Because 
of this, this research must rely on Barton Gellman's (2000a) report of the study in the 
Washington Post. Gellman briefly describes the content of the study and describes in 
detail the response to the study by the U. S. intelligence community. This response 
suggests strong bias within the U. S. intelligence community against considering 
HIV/AIDS as a subject of national security analysis, and again demonstrates the strongly 
communitarian perspective of the U. S. national security community in 1991. 
The Global AIDS Disaster, also known as Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 91- 
10005, broadened the CIA's inquiry into HIV/AIDS from its impact on sub-Saharan 
Africa, as described in the 1987 study, to the entire globe. The 1991 memorandum also 
extended its projections to the year 2000, predicting 45 million total infections, decreases 
in life expectancy by 15 years, and 10%-30% infection rates in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Gellman (2000a: para. 3) writes that, at the time these numbers "beggared comparison. 
There were not that many combatants killed in World War I, World War II, Korea and 
Vietnam combined. " Despite these sobering projections, which proved slight 
underestimates of actual figures in 2000, the report appears to have had little effect on 
awareness of the pandemic or policymaking within the U. S. national security 
community. Gellman (2000a: para. 5) reports that the document 
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landed near the top of the pile of incoming intelligence at the White House and 
Cabinet agencies... The authors prepared for the flurry of briefings that 
accompanies release of a major intelligence product. Save for then-Surgeon 
General C. Everett Koop and a Pentagon medical unit, no one asked. 
The principle author of the report, Kenneth Brown, describes the reaction to the 
Memorandum as "indifference"(Gellman 2000a: para. 5). 
It is argued here that at least three factors contributed to the indifferent response to The 
Global AIDS Disaster. First, the idea that a disease would have major global and 
national security consequences, on par with two World Wars, was new and unfamiliar to 
the intelligence community. Fritz Ermarth, then Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council, stated, "You've got to have a critical mass of people that are primed to see a 
problem like this in strategic terms... Just to put the words under their noses... doesn't 
get their attention. It's kind of remote, it's distant, it's not obvious what you do about it 
anyway. And here you're talking 1991, and that critical mass didn't exist" (Gellman 
2000a: para. 23). The CIA was reluctant to even study HIV/AIDS, partially because of 
lingering fears of association with the KBG disinformation campaign (discussed in the 
next section, ) but also because many in the intelligence community did not think that a 
disease should be considered a threat to national security. The authors "could not obtain 
CIA approval for use of personnel and computer modeling resources" while "internal 
critics declared global AIDS an unfit subject of intelligence" (Gellman 2000a: para. 16). 
The U. S. intelligence community, in short, was highly reluctant to broaden their scope of 
inquiry beyond traditional national security threats to examine the issue of HIV/AIDS, 
even when the disease was forecast to cause deaths on such a major scale. 
Second, the scope of the disaster outlined in the Memorandum demanded massive 
government expenditure to address, expenditure so large that it was easier to deny the 
problem than to act upon it. William Foege (former director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC)) says, with regard to the first reaction to the disease's 
estimates, that it would take US$3 billion per year to fund global prevention programs: 
"That's impossible. We could never spend those kinds of resources" (Gellman 2000a: 
para. 9). Because HIV/AIDS was an issue of low political priority, it was inconceivable 
that the disease would receive funding commensurate with that of a "high politics" issue. 
The relatively low political status accorded HIV/AIDS is confirmed by comparing the 
US$3 billion considered "inconceivable" to fight the disease with the 1991 U. S. 
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Department of Defense budget of approximately $280 billion (U. S. Department of 
Defense 1997). 
The third factor that inhibited action, in the wake of the publication of The Global AIDS 
Disaster, was the perception that the security implications of HIV/AIDS would be 
benign, and might ultimately even be beneficial for highly-affected states. The authors 
of the Memorandum describe frequent conversations with colleagues on the National 
Intelligence Council who were skeptical that the HIV/AIDS pandemic would have any 
negative effects on national security. One argued that the epidemic "will be good, 
because Africa is overpopulated anyway" (Gellman 2000a: para. 15). Others thought 
that officers dying of AIDS in allied militaries "boosts morale, because there's more 
room for advancement" (Gellman 2000a: para. 15). Some intelligence analysts thought 
that the loss of young soldiers within African militaries to AIDS would not present 
problems because of the large numbers of unemployed men that could serve as 
replacements. They argued: "If you have one 18-year-old with a Kalashnikov [rifle] and 
he dies, you find another 18-year-old" (Gellman 2000a: para. 16). 
A callousness to the predicted extreme suffering and death that would be caused by 
HIV/AIDS permeates these statements, and strongly illustrates the security community's 
communitarian values that place state interests above humanitarian concerns. The 
strength of the objection to considering HIV/AIDS a subject of national security analysis 
suggests a deep resistance within the U. S. intelligence community to thinking seriously 
about a non-traditional threat to security. 
Overall these two early CIA studies on HIV/AIDS, considered for the first time by the 
public health field by this thesis, provide the starting point for examining the historical 
background to U. S. intelligence and national security community perceptions of the 
pandemic. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, these perceptions were a major barrier to 
securitization of the pandemic, and exemplify the communitarian - cosmopolitan divide 
within the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. As discussed in Chapter 5, within a 
decade these perceptions would undergo a transformation. 
4.2.3 The KGB Disinformation Campaign 
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While the CIA was studying the national security implications of HIV/AIDS for the 
U. S., the Soviet KGB was actively pursuing a global disinformation campaign centered 
on the pandemic. The Soviet campaign, implemented by the KGB, originated and spread 
the rumour that HIV/AIDS had been purposely developed as a biological weapon by the 
Pentagon at its medical research laboratories in Fort Detrick, Maryland12. This nefarious 
and largely successful disinformation campaign by the USSR used the emerging 
pandemic in pursuit of Soviet propaganda and national security objectives in the cold 
war. In addition to spreading disinformation, this thesis argues that the campaign may 
have had lasting negative impact on HIV prevention efforts, particularly among African 
Americans. The disinformation campaign also provides a novel example of one danger 
of linking HIV/AIDS to national security interests. 
The first instance of the disinformation campaign is thought to have taken place in 1983 
in the Indian newspaper Patriot. Widely considered a "vehicle for Soviet 
disinformation, " Patriot is purported to have published a letter to the editor from an 
anonymous but "well-known American scientist and anthropologist" (United States 
Department of State 1987: 2). The letter, whose actual existence is in dispute, is 
purported to have claimed that HIV/AIDS was the "result of the Pentagon's experiments 
to develop new and dangerous biological weapons" which had been analyzed at the CDC 
and Fort Detrick (United States Department of State 1987: 2). 
Two years later in October 1985, the disinformation campaign was fully launched with 
the publication of "Panic in the West or What is Hidden Behind the Sensation About 
AIDS" in Literaturnaya Gazeta, an elite Soviet weekly (United States Department of 
State 1987: 3). This article quoted extensively from the Patriot letter, describing the 
newspaper as a "well-respected Indian newspaper" while omitting the fact that the source 
of the story was an anonymous letter to the editor (United States Department of State 
1987: 3). From this article, the disinformation campaign grew, with further stories 
appearing in 13 countries in 1985, and 49 countries by 1986 (United States Department 
12 A convincing body of genetic sequencing research has dated and placed the emergence of the 111V 
virus to between 1902-1921 in southeastern Cameroon (Gilbert et al. 2007). The earliest sample of the 
HIV virus on record is from 1959, from a Bantu male living in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo (now Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, ) considerably before the KGB disinformation campaign 
suggested the virus was produced by the Pentagon (Zhu et al. 1998). Other scientific findings on the 
origins of HIV/AIDS are Chitnis et al. (2000), Korber et al. (2000), Marx et al. (2001), and Moore (2004). 
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of State 1987). From January through July 1987 alone, the United States Department of 
State (1987) counted 91 appearances of the campaign across the globe. 
The centerpiece of the disinformation campaign was the publication of a 
"pseudoscientific study" by East German scientists Jakob and Lilli Segal, and Ronald 
Dehmlow titled "AIDS - Its Nature and Origin" (United States Department of State 
1987: 4) The study claimed that HIV/AIDS could not have originated in Africa, but was 
actually manufactured by American biological weapons scientists at Fort Detrick 
(National Intelligence Council 1987). HIV/AIDS was, the Segal's and Dehmlow 
claimed, the engineered result of purposely recombining two other retroviruses, VISNA 
and HTLV-I. In a later book, Jakob Segal summarized this argument: 
The first occurrence of AIDS corresponds to the opening of a high security 
laboratory in the Pentagon-owned biological research center at Fort Detrick, 
taking into account the incubation period. It is documented that the Pentagon was 
awarded the task and the means by the U. S. Congress to genetically manufacture 
a virus similar to the characteristics of AIDS. It also fits that AIDS occurred for 
the first time in New York, not very distant from Fort Detrick. We may thus 
rightly claim: AIDS resulted from a first attempt to manufacture new biological 
weapons through genetic engineering. 13 (Segal 1990: 218) 
The Segal's study was released to coincide with the 1986 Non-Aligned Movement 
Summit where Cuban President Fidel Castro told Museveni that his military forces had a 
30% prevalence of HIV/AIDS (National Intelligence Council 1987). Described by the 
CIA as the "most enduring contribution" to the disinformation campaign, this study was 
"made available to a large Third World audience in Harare", and "appeared in dozens of 
countries worldwide and been serialized for weeks in Tanzanian, Ghanaian, and other 
African newspapers... " (National Intelligence Council 1987: 17). The campaign was 
disseminated through multiple channels, often citing previous disinformation 
publications as authoritative sources. The KGB also used English language Moscow 
Radio broadcasts in 1986-1987 into Southern Africa to spread the HIV/AIDS 
disinformation. For example, on 11 November 1986, the Moscow World Service (1986: 
para. 2) broadcast: "scientists in a number of countries working independently have 
come to the conclusions that the deadly AIDS virus is man-made. One of them, the 
French professor Jakob Segal, is certain that the virus was produced in secret laboratories 
maintained by the Pentagon at Fort Detrick in Maryland. " The 1987 Estimate also 
13 Thank you to Alexander Schratz for translating this passage from the original German. 
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describes a number of "letters to the editor" which appeared in newspapers in Kenya, 
Senegal, and Uganda, reporting that HIV had been created at Fort Detrick, and that a 
Ghanaian newspaper reported early in 1987 that the "United States intended to use 
Africans as guinea pigs to test AIDS vaccines" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 14). 
The following cartoon, which appeared in Pravda, illustrates another iteration of the 
disinformation campaign. 
Pravda, daily paper of the CPSU Central Committee, 
October 31,1986 
Caption above cartoon states: "The AIDS virus, a terrible disease for 
which up to now no known cure has been found, was, in the opinion of 
some Western researchers, created in the laboratories of the Pen- 
tagon. " The words on the flag emanating from the beaker state: Virus 
"AIDS. " Caption below the cartoon reads: "Pentagon (AIDS) 
specialists. " 
Figure 4.1: Source: United States Department of State 1987: 1. 
A spokesman for the U. S. Pentagon described the campaign and U. S. frustrations in 
countering it in the New York Times: "The technique used has been to plant the story in 
friendly newspapers outside the Soviet Union and then to quote those newspapers as 
100 
authoritative in the Soviet news organs... It's obviously a systematic campaign... What's 
really troublesome is that this stuff tends to be believed in Third World countries" 
(Associated Press 1987: para. 8). Andrew and Mitrokhin (1999: 244-245) describe the 
campaign as "probably the most successful anti-American active measure of the 
Gorbachev era" and observe that: 
the AIDS fabrication not merely swept through the Third World, but took in some 
of the Western media as well. In October of 1986 the conservative British 
[tabloid] Sunday Express made it its main front-page story. During the first six 
months of 1987 alone, the story received major news coverage in over forty Third 
World countries. 
The AIDS disinformation campaign made it to the U. S. as well. On one of the three 
major evening news shows, news presenter Dan Rather reported "that a Soviet 
publication had charged that an American military laboratory had developed the virus 
that caused the AIDS epidemic" (Accuracy in Media 2005: para. 1). 
After vigorous American protests, the disinformation campaign was discontinued in 
August 1987. In 1992 then Russian Intelligence Chief Yevgeni Primakov admitted to 
the Russian newspaper Izvestiya that the information had been "fabricated in KGB 
offices" (United States State Department 2005: para. 6). Confirming the KGB office 
origins of the campaign is the appearance of the campaign in the notes of Vasili 
Mitrokhin, a defector who worked in the KGB's foreign intelligence archives and hid 
notes of classified files under the floor of his dacha (Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999). 
This disinformation campaign illustrates a clear risk of linking of HIV/AIDS and 
national security: the nefarious use of the disease to pursue national security aims. The 
communitarian objective of the KGB was to pursue Soviet strategic interests by 
implicating the U. S. military in the recent appearance and spread of HIV/AIDS. There 
are strong indications that this campaign worked and had multiple impacts on both the 
intended target of the U. S., as well as unintended impacts on public health efforts to fight 
the disease. 
The Estimate worries that the KGB campaign could impact the U. S. by contributing to 
an "African backlash" against the country, as well as accusations of racism (National 
Intelligence Council 1987: 17). The campaign is described as "exploiting black African 
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sensitivities to racism and so-called Western imperialism, Moscow has taken full 
advantage of regional fears, ignorance, and some careless Western statements in its 
efforts to provoke anti-U. S. sentiment" (National Intelligence Council 1987: 17). The 
campaign was also felt directly by the CIA. Some at the CIA, including Director 
William Webster in 1991, worried that studying the disease would create "propaganda 
liabilities" because the KGB campaign had associated the U. S. with the disease (Gellman 
2000a: para. 18). The liability that studying HIV/AIDS at the CIA might create was that 
"somebody would try to imply that we're only monitoring our own dastardly deeds" 
(Gellman 2000a: para. 18). 
Despite the correction issued and the revealing of the original source of the 
disinformation reports, the analysis undertaken in this thesis suggests that this campaign 
has had long-lasting and unintended consequences that continue to hinder public health 
activities related to HIV/AIDS today. Specifically, the current views of African 
Americans on the origins of HIV/AIDS suggest that the KGB campaign has had a lasting 
impact on public perceptions and, in turn, efforts to fight the pandemic. For example, a 
2005 study among African American men revealed worrying percentages that agreed 
with the following statements that were part of the KGB disinformation campaign: 
HIV is a man-made virus. 48.3% 
AIDS was produced in a government laboratory. 30.5% 
AIDS is a form of genocide against blacks. 20.7% 
HIV was created and spread by the CIA. 16.1% (Bogard and Thorburn 2005) 
These results have been replicated by Klonoff (1999), Bogard and Thorburn (2006), and 
Ross, Essien and Torres (2006). Reinforcing the current and widespread nature of these 
conspiracy beliefs was the announcement by 2004 Noble Peace Prize recipient Wangari 
Muta Maathai that HIV/AIDS was created as a biological weapon by the West to kill 
black people: "In fact it (the HIV virus) is created by a scientist for biological warfare" 
(ABC News 2004: para. 6). 14 
It is not known, and will likely impossible to accurately ascertain, whether these beliefs 
among African Americans in the U. S. and expressed by Maathai actually originated from 
the release of KGB disinformation in Africa. No studies to date have sought to address 
14 Maathai has since played down these comments. 
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this question. However, the close similarity between these conspiracy beliefs and the 
earlier KGB disinformation campaign suggests that there is likely to be a linkage. This 
is supported by the fact that there was widespread global coverage of the disinformation 
campaign by the mass media. Thus it would seem conceivable, perhaps even likely, that 
some of the widely held conspiracy theories about the origins of HIV/AIDS originate 
with the KGB campaign. 
The linkage between the KGB campaign and currently held conspiracy theories about 
HIV/AIDS is important, from a public health perspective, because belief in such theories 
have had a negative impact on public health practice. Bogart and Thorburn (2005: 217) 
find that "endorsement of conspiracy beliefs was associated with more negative attitudes 
toward using condoms and less consistent condom use... " In other words, belief in these 
conspiracy theories about the origins of HIV/AIDS puts people at greater risk of 
becoming infected with the disease. If the KBG disinformation campaign contributed to 
the HIV/AIDS conspiracy beliefs held by African Americans, the use of HIV/AIDS to 
pursue Soviet national security interests will have created a lasting barrier to fighting the 
pandemic. 
Interestingly, neither Bogard and Thorbum nor other researchers draw a link between 
HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories and the KGB disinformation campaign. Bogard and 
Thorburn (2005: 213) hypothesize that conspiracy theories "stem from historical and 
current racial discrimination in the U. S. health care system, the most well-publicized 
example of which is the Tuskegee syphilis study. " Thomas and Quinn (1991) attribute 
the source of the conspiracy theories to the social context of inequality facing African 
Americans and the Tuskegee study. A Lancet editorial (2005) states that African 
Americans have many reasons to mistrust the U. S. government including slavery, Jim 
Crow, the Tuskegee study, health care disparities, and discrimination. In Africa, Niehaus 
and Jonsson (2005: 182) argue that HIV/AIDS conspiracy beliefs among South African 
men are actually articulations of their "adverse experiences of deindustrialization" in the 
global labor market, although they report that some South African men reportedly linked 
the work of Dr. Wouter Basson and South African biological weapons research to 
HIV/AIDS and the U. S. military. These varied hypotheses offer explanations for a 
person's susceptibility to believing conspiracy theories, and the persistence of these 
theories among certain groups over time. However, these hypotheses fail to account for 
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the similarity between the specific content of the conspiracy theories put forth (i. e. that 
HIV/AIDS was developed by U. S. intelligence services as a biological weapon) and the 
KGB disinformation campaign. 
In relation to this thesis, the failure of previous analyses to attribute the KGB campaign 
as the source of HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories suggests a disconnect between those 
examining global health and national security literature. While not conclusive, this 
disconnect may be due to differences in culture between those working in global health 
and national security, suggesting a communitarian - cosmopolitan divide. Interestingly, 
none of the conceptual frameworks anticipates the nefarious and offensive use of 
HIV/AIDS to pursue national security objectives. Peterson does suggest that linking 
HIV/AIDS and national security may generate distrust, but does not anticipate that this 
would be an intended impact of state efforts. 
In summary, the KGB disinformation campaign represents a uniquely nefarious case of 
HIV/AIDS being used to pursue a country's national security aims. While lying outside 
the scope of conceptual frameworks, and Peterson and Elbe's studies of the securitization 
of HIV/AIDS, this campaign may have had a lasting impact on efforts to fight the 
disease. Furthermore, the absence of discussion of the KGB campaign in the global 
health literature on HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories suggests a gap between the public 
health and national security literatures. This campaign should be an instructive example 
of the potential negative health consequences when public health is used in pursuit of 
national security efforts. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
Between 1987 and 1991, two CIA studies evaluated the scale of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, accurately predicted the evolution of the epidemic, and argued that the disease 
would devastate Sub-Saharan Africa while causing death on the scale of the World Wars 
globally. While the Estimates predicted massive humanitarian consequences of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, the implications for U. S. national security were deemed to be 
limited. Both Estimates illustrate the communitarian perspective embedded within the 
national security analysis. The negative response to the 1991 Estimate revealed a bias 
among the U. S. national security community against studying health issues, the low 
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political status of HIV/AIDS, and the perception that the deaths caused by HIV/AIDS 
would have benign, or even beneficial, implications for national security. The 
intelligence community response to the 1991 Estimate demonstrates the communitarian 
perspective of national security analysis and clearly shows that the objective of their 
analysis is to pursue the interests of the state. 
The 1987 and 1991 U. S. intelligence assessments of HIV/AIDS were "securitizing 
moves" (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). In these studies, a securitizing actor (the analysts) 
argued that HIV/AIDS posed an existential threat to "generations of Africans" which 
demanded emergency measures ($3 billion in funding) (National Intelligence Council 
1987: 3). Largely because the referent objects of this securitizing move were individuals 
in Africa and African countries, and not the United States of America, this securitizing 
move was rejected by the U. S. intelligence community. The strong bias against studying 
a low political issue like HIV/AIDS also contributed to the rejection of this attempt to 
securitize the disease. 
These years also demonstrated the use of HIV/AIDS for the purposes of propaganda and 
political manipulation by the KGB. The KGB disinformation campaign exploited the 
recent emergence and stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS to fight a propaganda war against 
the U. S. in Africa and globally'5. This nefarious campaign demonstrates that the pursuit 
of national interests can compromise public health information. This campaign may also 
have inadvertently created lasting barriers to HIV/AIDS prevention activities by creating 
or spreading a conspiracy theory on the origins of HIV/AIDS that has been linked to 
decreased use of condoms by at-risk populations. 
The national security community's independent interest and action on HIV/AIDS is not 
accounted for by Lee and McInnes' (2004) models of engagement. This is an important 
omission because, in the 1980s, the intelligence agencies of both superpowers studied 
HIV/AIDS, and in the case of the Soviet Union, incorporated the disease into so-called 
"active measures" against the U. S. (Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999: 245). The 
communitarian - cosmopolitan model is better able to describe the security community's 
engagement with HIV/AIDS, while the security community's focus on the impacts of the 
Is In a related example, Garrett (2005: 35) recounts how Libya accused and imprisoned five Bulgarian 
nurses and a Palestinian doctor for "deliberately infecting 426 children with HIV. " Moammar Quaddafi 
argued that the nurses were acting on orders from the CIA and Israeli intelligence. 
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disease on state interests confirms Fidler's remediation model. Because the NIC 
Estimates represent a failed attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, the negative impacts of 
securitization outlined by Peterson and Elbe did not occur. None of the conceptual 
frameworks specifically anticipates the nefarious engagement of national security actors 
using HIV/AIDS in pursuit of state interests. Peterson (2002) does caution that the 
linking of the disease to national security will generate distrust. However, it is Elbe's 
(2006a) list of negative impacts of securitization, including reduced transparency, 
overriding of civil liberties, and addressing of HIV/AIDS through a state-centric 
framework, that best accounts for the KGB disinformation campaign. 
4.3 The role of national security concerns in Thailand's HIV success 
While Uganda represented the securitization of HIV/AIDS from the perspective of a 
political leader, and the CIA studies of HIV/AIDS framed the disease from within a U. S. 
national security perspective, the Thai response to HIV/AIDS securitized the epidemic as 
a national security threat to the entire nation. Viewing HIV/AIDS as a security threat 
allowed the mobilization of the highest levels of the Thai government, including the 
Ministry of Defense, in response to the pandemic. This thesis argues that this 
securitization transformed the disease into an issue of high politics in Thailand and was 
critical to beginning the country's successful efforts to lower national prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS. This example provides the clearest case to date of how securitization of the 
pandemic can bring important benefits to the fight against the disease. 
In 1989, the first round of national epidemiological surveillance in Thailand found rates 
of HIV among female commercial sex workers (CSW) in Chiang Mai of 44% 
(Ainsworth et al. 2003). While previous waves of HIV in Thailand, among gay men and 
IDUs, had generated limited public response, this epidemiological finding "startled the 
nation" (UNDP 2004: 9). Also in 1989, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) began biannual 
testing of the approximately 60,000 21-year old males conscripted into military service 
each year. These young conscripts were a nationally representative sample of sexually- 
active young Thai men. The testing found that 0.5% were infected, a relatively high rate 
for a young age group with only a few years of sexual activity (UNDP 2004). By 1993, 
4% of conscripts nationally tested HIV positive, with the rate in Northern Thailand 
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closer to 14% (Ainsworth et al. 2003). These findings demonstrated to the government 
and public that HIV was no longer confined to certain margins of society and stigmatized 
populations where the disease had existed since the 1980s. In fact through CSWs, their 
male clients, and the client's wives and families, HIV had the potential to affect the 
majority of people in Thailand. As Beyrer (1998: 23) writes, the potential sexual 
network affected "was Thailand. " 
The RTA responded forcefully by prohibiting soldiers from visiting brothels and 
punishing soldiers for becoming infected with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 
(Beyrer 1998). However, these policies failed to reduce the spread of HIV, and rates 
among conscripts continued to rise. The punitive nature of these policies were mirrored 
in the civilian sphere by a unsuccessful AIDS bill that would have required mandatory 
testing of people in high-risk groups (UNDP 2004). 
In 1991, a failed military coup brought in a new Thai government lead by Khun Anand 
Panyarachun. Under this government, the response to HIV/AIDS flourished. Khun 
Anand promoted Khun Mechai Viravaidya, a family planning activist, to run the 
government's response to HIV/AIDS. Khun Mechai convinced the Prime Minister to 
chair the National Committee on AIDS Prevention and Control himself. Making the 
Prime Minister directly responsible for Thailand's response to the epidemic transformed 
the disease into a high politics issue and was a critical step in creating the country's 
successful, multisector response. UNDP (2004: 13) observes that "Positioning the 
programme in the Office of the Prime Minister was more than a symbolic demonstration 
that AIDS was a government priority. It gave the response political clout. It sent a 
signal to all government sectors that everyone had to contribute to the response. " The 
participation of the Thai Ministry of Defense (MOD) in the AIDS Committee also 
demonstrated the disease's new status as an issue of high politics. The MOD 
participation also provided "a good opportunity for the military sector to take part in the 
development of national HIV/AIDS policy, as well as providing advice on appropriate 
HIV/AIDS approaches in the military... " (UNAIDS 2004: 16). 
In 1991, the first studies of HIV/AIDS risk in Thailand began to be published (Weniger 
1991, Beyrer 1998). These studies found that unprotected commercial sex was the 
driving force behind the rapid growth of the Thai epidemic. Equipped with broad 
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political support, the government created a national program to promote safer sex called 
"The 100% Condom Campaign. " The Campaign's aim was to have 100% condom usage 
in commercial sex establishments throughout the country. The campaign was composed 
of three parts. First, the Ministry of Health distributed 60 million condoms annually to 
sex workers and soldiers, and in health centers, workplaces and hotels (UNDP 2004). 
Second, sanctions and police action were threatened against commercial sex 
establishments where condoms were not being used. Although it appears that police 
action was rarely taken, the threat of closure was used to ensure compliance with the 
100% Condom Campaign (Ainsworth et al. 2003). Finally, a major radio and television 
campaign "bluntly advised men to use condoms with prostitutes" (Hanenberg et al. 1994: 
243). This was a particularly Thai approach, in that prostitution was illegal, but tacitly 
accepted and practically addressed by the police and government. 
The military's participation on the National Committee on AIDS Prevention and Control 
was matched by programs on the ground. The MOD "promoted condom use and 
provided AIDS education to new conscripts, " who numbered approximately 60,000 per 
year of high risk young men (UNDP 2004: 17, Saengdidtha and Rangsin 2005). The 
RTA provided counseling and treatment for HIV-positive soldiers who were not infected 
through drug use beginning in 1991. The military also developed a wide array of 
research partnerships that "strengthened the knowledge base for interventions, gave 
focus to public health measures, and, importantly, measured their effectiveness" (Beyrer 
1998: 33). These research partnerships between the RTA and international public health 
institutions made the Thai HIV/AIDS epidemic one of the most extensively studied and 
best understood epidemics in the world. 
It was these research collaborations that first indicated that "The 100% Condom 
Campaign" was working. In 1993, interviews with military conscripts showed that fewer 
men were visiting commercial sex workers, and those that did were more often using 
condoms, although rates of HIV consistently increased in each new cohort of conscripts 
(Beyrer 1998). Then among the second intake of conscripts in 1993, the prevalence of 
HIV declined for the first time (UNDP 2004). The first intake of 1994 and subsequent 
cohorts of conscripts confirmed that Thailand had begun to reduce the incidence of HIV 
infection. These events marked the beginnings of the Thai government's successful 
efforts to limit the spread of HIV/AIDS. This reduction in national HIV prevalence is a 
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rare achievement globally. While Thailand still faces challenges in maintaining and 
extending the successes of the early 1990s, Thailand's response to the epidemic is 
estimated to have saved eight million lives by 2004 (UNDP 2004). 
Published reviews of Thailand's success in reducing the incidence of HIV infection are 
unanimous in recognizing the important role of national security concerns in generating 
political support and momentum for action against the epidemic. UNDP (2004: 13) 
writes that in 1991, "Fighting AIDS was placed on par with safeguarding the nation. " 
UNAIDS (2004: 33) concludes: "Seeing HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security was 
the key to Thailand's success in fighting the epidemic. It ensured decision-makers' 
prompt decision-making and instilled a commitment to fight HIV/AIDS. " 
The specific national security concerns raised by the fast growing epidemic were 
outlined by the RTA, and focused on the risk of decreasing military effectiveness, 
increased financial burdens due to prevention and care efforts, and the psychological 
impact of the disease on soldiers and their families. The impacts as described by the 
RTA were: 
The military preparedness of the RTA has suffered as a result of HIV/AIDS, 
which has caused illness and death among RTA personnel. The RTA is now faced 
with the challenge of needing to recruit HIV-negative personnel while avoiding 
human rights violations. 
There is a psychological effect, due to the anxiety and discrimination associated 
with HIV, both from inside the RTA and from the families of army personnel in 
their own communities. 
There are additional burdens for the medical and social services in the RTA, 
including the cost of campaigns to prevent new infections, counselling services 
for groups at risk and for those infected, care for people living with HIV/AIDS, 
and social support measures for them and their families. 
Field medical services personnel are at risk of contamination from HIV-positive 
patient's blood and body fluids, and must screen all blood for field use. 
Screening for deployment for overseas missions, such as the UN peacekeeping 
force, is more complicated and time-consuming for groups at risk of contracting 
HIV. (UMAIDS 2004: 11-12) 
These direct impacts of HIV/AIDS on the Thai military and the disease's broader 
implications for Thai society came to be viewed as a threat to Thai national security. 
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Within the military, HIV/AIDS was treated as a military threat to the country, akin to an 
invading army. Chris Beyrer (Interview) says that "the message from the top was that 
HIV prevention was a patriotic duty for soldiers, and that protecting your buddies by 
making sure they had condoms was the same thing as protecting them from enemy 
bullets. These kinds of military metaphors were used all the time and did appear to be 
motivating. " The perception of HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security drove the 
RTA's active response to the disease and the MOD's participation on the National AIDS 
Committee. 
However, the high incidence of HIV among conscripts was not the only concern for the 
military and policymakers. Ram Rangsin was an army physician working in a Chiang 
Mai military camp during 1990-1993 and is currently Assistant Professor at the 
Department of Military and Community Medicine, in Phramongkutklao College of 
Medicine in Bangkok. Rangsin suggests that it was not just high infection rates among 
military conscripts that caused alarm. More broadly, it was viewed as a threat to an 
entire generation of Thai men of whom military conscripts were representative. Rangsin 
states: 
There were a lot of concerns during that time since the epidemic was so large and 
spread quickly. The Royal Thai Army at that time might view the HIV prevalence 
information among military conscripts a proxy indicator for young Thai men 
rather than its own threat because of the long incubation period of the disease and 
the conscripts usually stay in the military service only for 2 years. (Ram Rangsin 
Interview) 
Beyrer agrees with Rangsin. Beyrer argues that "the military data in North played a 
major role in getting the Government to respond to HIV prevention. This was to some 
extent due to national security concerns, and to some extent due to use of conscripts as a 
good proxy for young men in the Kingdom in general" (Beyrer Interview). Because 
military conscripts represented young Thai men, high rates of HIV in conscripts was 
viewed as both a threat to the Thai military and as a broader threat to Thai society as a 
whole. 
Rangsin also notes that only the conscripts were tested for HIV/AIDS. He states that the 
"RTA did not have the HIV information on the other active military officials during that 
time" (Rangsin Interview). Beyrer (Interview) elaborates on this point. He says, 
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It is important to note that the actual military (career, officers corps, etc, everyone 
who would not fit into conscripts) did not participate in the HIV screening, and 
did not ever agree to testing or to outside prevention programs. I can't say what 
happened behind closed doors, but I do know that over time, many of the officers 
we worked with wanted the JHU [Johns Hopkins University] collaboration to test 
them, since they heard the messages about risks (sex worker visits, mostly) and 
knew they had risks. 
Beyrer's elaboration suggests another explanation for the Thai military viewing 
HIV/AIDS as a serious national security threat - officers and high-ranking military 
officials felt themselves threatened by the disease. This possibility adds a personal 
dimension to the strong and active response of Thai military officials, and may therefore 
bear some similarity to the rationale for Museveni's action against HIV/AIDS in Uganda. 
The threat HIV/AIDS posed to Thailand was even broader than the disease's impact on 
the military and young men. HIV/AIDS also represented a threat to Thailand's national 
security through its potential economic impact. When Rangsin (Interview) raised the 
issue of economic loss due to HIV/AIDS, he was asked "Was the economic loss that 
could be due to AIDS viewed as a security threat? " He replied: "Yes, it was, I think. 
This might be one of the main reasons that the government allocated a lot of fiscal 
budget to fight against HIV especially from sexually transmission. " Khun Mechai, the 
famous family planning activist who ran the Thai government HIV/AIDS efforts, also 
viewed HIV/AIDS as a threat to Thai national security because of its potential economic 
and demographic impact. He writes: 
We did a study to determine probable scenarios from 1990 to 2000 if nothing was 
done about HIV in Thailand. The projections indicated that we would have 
almost four million HIV-infected people by the year 2000. We would lose about 
25 years of productive work from each person, and 20 percent of our GDP 
annually. That would be far greater than any economic downturn that Thailand 
has ever experienced or anticipated. This became very, very important. The 
people who ran our country were not convinced that a `health issue' could be a 
major threat to national security. But when you talked about money, then they 
began to realize how many people we would lose and how many we would need 
to retrain. (UNDP 2004: 16) 
This thesis argues that the perceived threat that HIV/AIDS posed to Thailand's military, 
general population, and economic development caused the country's leadership to 
securitize the epidemic and respond to the disease as a threat to national security. The 
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successful campaign carried out as a consequence of securitization is believed to have 
saved an estimated eight million lives, and is viewed as a rare success story in the global 
HIV/AIDS pandemic (UNDP 2004). 
At least four factors are unique to this case of securitization and Thailand's resulting 
success in reducing the national prevalence of HIV/AIDS. First, Thailand embraced a 
broad understanding of national security that included human, demographic and 
economic well-being, in addition to traditional military and security considerations. This 
broad view of national security enabled HIV/AIDS to be quickly accepted as a high 
politics issue once evidence of its potential impacts was mustered. As later chapters will 
demonstrate, conceptions of national security that embraced HIV/AIDS were rare before 
2000. Second, the Thai military has a broad mission that goes beyond national security 
to include development and aid to the Thai people. UNAIDS (2004: 4) writes: "Aside 
from its traditional defense duties, the RTA has always been actively involved in the 
development of the country and in providing aid to the Thai people. " This broad remit 
may have helped the military enact major efforts to fight a disease that was not a 
traditional military threat to security. Third, Beyrer (1998: 17) argues that a practical 
mentality, an ability "to adapt, and to make amazingly rapid social changes" is part of 
Thai culture. The 100% Condom Campaign was implemented between the government 
and commercial sex establishments, despite prostitution being illegal. This pragmatic 
outlook seems to have aided Thailand to overcome the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS 
and enact effective measures to fight the disease. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
is that the epidemic in Thailand had a discernable "hub" of transmission that could be 
addressed: commercial sex workers. This situation differs from sub-Saharan Africa 
where the main source of transmission is concurrent heterosexual relationships. 
Targeting the hub of transmission allowed Thailand to strategically focus its efforts on 
curbing HIV transmission among those people most likely to acquire and transmit 
the virus... Sex work did not account for all HIV infections, but it was, at the 
time, the hub of Thailand's epidemic - and the intensified response zeroed in on 
it. The response therefore could be marshaled against a compact target: reducing 
the spread of HIV through commercial sex... (UNDP 2004: 30) 
In summary, while a number of factors contributed to Thailand's successful reduction of 
national prevalence of HIV/AIDS, treating the epidemic as a threat to Thailand's security 
was a critical step in generating early political support and leadership on HIV/AIDS 
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prevention and control. The potential military and economic impact of the epidemic, as 
well as epidemiological data on military conscripts, helped HIV/AIDS rise to the top of 
the political agenda in the 1990s more rapidly than in other countries. As an issue of 
high politics, the response to HIV/AIDS mobilized non-health ministries including the 
MOD and the Prime Minister's office. National security considerations also drove the 
military to make unique contributions to Thailand's multi-sectoral response through 
surveillance and education of military conscripts. Thailand's relatively successful fight 
against HIV/AIDS began with the securitization of the epidemic, but then subsequently 
succeeded through implementation of a pragmatic and widespread public health 
campaign. 
Thailand's securitization of HIV/AIDS strongly supports Fidler's remediation model. 
The reason HIV/AIDS rose to the level of high politics in Thailand was that the disease 
threatened aspects of Thailand's broad conception of national security. There is no 
evidence from this case to support either the revolution or regression models. Thailand's 
strong response to HIV/AIDS is also an example of Lee and McInnes' (2004) partnership 
model. The partnership between public health actors and Thailand's national security 
apparatus, and indeed between many elements of the Thai government, was facilitated by 
Thailand's broad concept of national security, the progressive government of Khun 
Anand Panyarachun, and the clear threat HIV/AIDS posed to the Kingdom's economic 
and military interests. 
The Thailand experience also supports Elbe's outline of the positive benefits of 
securitization. By securitizing the epidemic, greater state mobilization was achieved but 
was not accompanied with large-scale decreases in civil liberties or democratic scrutiny. 
Neither did securitization's threat-defense logic remove the disease from a humanitarian 
framework, shift funding towards elites or the military, or further stigmatize people 
living the disease. In fact, soldiers and police were both targets of prevention efforts and 
helpful in ensuring the cooperation of commercial sex establishments with the 100% 
Condom Campaign. 
The threat-defense logic of securitization benefited Thailand's efforts to fight the disease 
by demonstrating the multiple impacts of the epidemic across sectors which increased 
political support for addressing the disease, and by justifying military participation in 
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anti-HIV efforts. This is a critical lesson about the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus 
that to date is not widely understood. Many authors, Peterson included, assume that 
securitization will automatically result in a securitized or militarized response to the 
disease, which they critique. However, as the Thai case demonstrates, securitization 
involves invoking emergency measures to address a threat, but does not specify which 
type of measures must be adopted. Securitization theory is essentially agnostic on the 
substance of the response to a threat, as long as the response involves "emergency 
measures. " Therefore, it should not be assumed that a strong public health driven 
response to HIV/AIDS is necessarily incompatible with securitization. In fact, a strong 
public health driven response is exactly what resulted from Thailand's securitization of 
HIV/AIDS. 
4.4 Peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS in Cambodia 
The experience of peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS in Cambodia extends the early 
linkages drawn between HIV/AIDS and national security beyond threats to national 
military forces, as discussed in Uganda and Thailand as well as U. S. intelligence studies, 
to peacekeeping troops and operations. There is evidence from Cambodia that 
peacekeepers, while deployed to assist in stabilizing the country and organizing 
democratic elections, spread HIV/AIDS. While the spread of HIV/AIDS by 
peacekeepers in Cambodia generated little political response at the time, the issue would 
later be central to addressing the disease in the UNSC in 2000. The indifferent response 
to evidence of peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS, by both public health and 
international security communities, is an important case where the disease was not 
securitized despite evidence that HIV/AIDS seriously threatened peacekeeping troops 
and would have major public health consequences in Cambodia. Without a securitizing 
actor to argue for securitizing the epidemic in Cambodia, the United Nations Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was left to implement half-hearted efforts designed 
more to limit bad publicity than to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. These events are 
important to examine for two reasons. First, the issue of peacekeepers spreading 
HIV/AIDS would later be used as an essential rationale for the UNSC meetings on 
HIV/AIDS discussed in Chapter 5. Understanding why this issue catapulted HIV/AIDS 
into the UNSC in 2000, but failed to generate any substantive action in 1992 when 
114 
peacekeepers seemed to play a critical role in igniting the Cambodian epidemic, is 
critical. Second, this case demonstrates the risks to both civilians and peacekeepers of 
failing to act on tangible linkages between HIV/AIDS and national security. 
In 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was 
established to supervise the end of armed conflict and organize national elections for the 
next year. The 1993 elections were successful, with 90% of voters participating. 
However, there is evidence that UNTAC contributed to the beginning of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Cambodia. UNTAC was composed of approximately 20,000 military and 
police personnel from 45 different countries. Beyrer (1998: 64) describes the interaction 
between the peacekeepers and Cambodians: 
The great majority [of peacekeepers] were young men, often of limited education. 
They walked into a country long closed to the outside world, starved for cash, and 
full of people eager to take their dollars... The infusion of cash from these forces 
into local economies after years of poverty and isolation was undoubtedly too 
great an attraction for many women (and brothel owners, managers, and 
traffickers) to resist. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the presence of peacekeeping forces "dramatically 
increased the demand for sex services" and that sex workers doubled the number of 
customers seen each night during the UNTAC mission (Beyrer 1998: 64). Peacekeepers 
also took leave in neighboring Thailand, where prevalence of HIV/AIDS among sex 
workers was high (see previous section), and brought back HIV to Cambodia 
(Ledgerwood 1994). Evidence from returning peacekeepers provides corroborating 
evidence that the UNTAC mission helped spread HIV in Cambodia. Forty-five percent 
of Dutch marines and sailors participating in UNTAC reported "having sexual contact 
with sex workers or other members of the local population during a five-month tour" 
(UNAIDS 1998: 2). Returning soldiers from the U. S. and Uruguay were infected with 
subtype E of HIV, suggesting they became infected during their tour in Cambodia or in a 
neighboring country where subtype E is prevalent (Artenstein 1995; Beyrer 1998). 
Fifteen percent of Indian soldiers participating in UNTAC returned home HIV positive 
(Beyrer 1998). Eleven of the 3627 Indonesian soldiers participating in UNTAC became 
HIV positive during their deployment (Soeprapto 1995). These eleven "ultimately fatal" 
infections "far exceeded" the two non-disease-related deaths among Indonesian 
peacekeepers (Soeprapto 1995: 1305). Across the entire UNTAC mission, 21 
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peacekeeping personnel were killed in hostile action in Cambodia, while 47 were 
officially diagnosed as HIV positive, with the true number "probably as high as 150" 
people (Ledgerwood 1994: 7). Thus peacekeeping deaths from AIDS far exceeded 
combat deaths during the UNTAC mission, and the disease posed the most serious threat 
to the lives of deployed peacekeeping forces. 
The presence of UNTAC coincided with the explosive spread of HIV in Cambodia 
(UNAIDS 2004). The relationship between UNTAC and the HIV epidemic in 
Cambodia remains only an association (as opposed to a causal relationship), as no 
research has successfully quantified the epidemiological impact of the UNTAC forces. 
Further research is unlikely to clarify this situation because HIV/AIDS surveillance data 
was not collected before the arrival of the UNTAC mission. Cambodia's first sentinel 
surveillance survey was conducted in 1995, after the end of the UNTAC mission 
(Bazergan 2004). Despite this evidentiary uncertainty, the prevalence of HIV in 
peacekeepers returning from the UNTAC mission indicates that peacekeepers did 
transmit and become infected with the disease while deployed. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the presence of UNTAC troops made some contribution to the growth of 
the HIV epidemic in Cambodia in the early 1990s. Officials in Cambodia routinely 
blame UNTAC for the spread of HIV and prostitution (Beyrer 1998). Asked what would 
be the legacy of the UNTAC mission which held the first free and fair elections in 
Cambodia's history, Prime Minister Hun Sen answered: "AIDS" (Richburg 1998: para. 
11). 
Despite Cambodia's objections to these events, peacekeepers returning from the mission 
infected with HIV/AIDS, and descriptions of the peacekeepers spreading HIV in 
newspapers and public health journals, these events had almost no impact on policies for 
future peacekeeping operations. The UN was concerned with the impact of these 
accusations on the reputation of peacekeepers, but addressing HIV/AIDS was "beyond 
the remit and comfort zone" of the UN DPKO (Roxanne Bazergan Interview). 
Ledgerwood (1994: 7) writes that a DPKO community relations office did distribute 
condoms and information on sexually transmitted diseases, but that these efforts were 
"clearly too little too late. " The message from the UN Secretary General's Special 
Representative in charge of the mission was "boys will be boys " (Ledgerwood 1994: 7). 
The only other UN response to peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS in Cambodia was to 
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callously minimize the potential for bad publicity by instructing UNTAC personnel "not 
to park UN vehicles in front of brothels" (Ledgerwood 1994: 8). This instruction 
strongly suggests that the DPKO's concern with their political reputation was greater 
than their concern about spreading HIV/AIDS. With no securitizing actor to bring 
attention to these issues, the likely spreading of HIV/AIDS by the UNTAC mission 
generated little substantive response. 
Similarly, these events did not cause greater examination of the links between HIV/AIDS 
and security in either the public health or national security literature. 16 Although it 
cannot be known with certainty, the indifferent response to evidence of peacekeepers 
spreading HIV/AIDS by both public health and international security communities may 
indicate discomfort in addressing areas where public health and national security issues 
overlap. 
Arguably, the greatest political effect of UNTAC's potential role in the beginnings of the 
HIV epidemic in Cambodia were to make Richard Holbrooke, then a private U. S. citizen 
visiting Cambodia, aware of the link between peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS. His later 
efforts as a securitizing actor would be pivotal to recognizing the links between 
HIV/AIDS and national security. Eight years after UNTAC's mission at the second 
UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping, Holbrooke was U. S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations and described his first encounter with the issue. 
On a personal note, I first encountered this issue in 1992 when as a private citizen 
I visited Cambodia and visited the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in Phnonm Penh and talked... [with] the United Nations 
team. I was deeply impressed by their efforts, but I was disturbed by the fact that 
the United Nations forces were already spreading AIDS. I was so disturbed, in 
fact, that on 27 July 1992, as a private citizen, I wrote a letter... raising this issue. 
(United Nations Security Council 2000b: 6) 
Holbrooke later described the contents of the letter in greater detail, saying "I don't 
understand this, you're trying to keep peace in Cambodia and your forces spend each 
night spreading AIDS in the streets" (Ambassador Richard Holbrooke 2000a: para. 2). 
16 Beyrer (1998) is the exception for the public health community. 
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It is important to note that the Cambodian experience is not a unique case of 
peacekeepers being implicated in the spread of HIV/AIDS. While reports are scarcer 
than that available from Cambodia, peacekeepers may have also spread HIV/AIDS while 
deployed in Sierra Leone (Astill 2001). Suggestive evidence for this comes from the 
U. S. General Accounting Office (2001) which found that 32% of peacekeepers deployed 
in Sierra Leone came from countries where national prevalence of HIV/AIDS is greater 
than 5%. Richard Holbrook (2000b) suggested that UN peacekeepers may have spread 
HIV/AIDS while deployed in East Timor, and the allegations of sexual abuse by 
peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo raises the possibility of HIV 
transmission (Holt and Hughes 2005). The response to these events will be discussed in 
more depth in Chapter 5. 
In summary, peacekeepers deployed in the UNTAC mission spread and became infected 
with HIV/AIDS. The UNTAC mission coincided with an explosive growth of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia, and evidence suggests that peacekeepers contributed 
to the worsening of the Cambodian epidemic. Although reports of these events were 
widespread, they generated little response from the UN, which generally ignored or 
sought to minimize the issue during the mission. Nor was there significant study of these 
events in the public health or international relations literature. This is surprising because 
the spread of HIV/AIDS by peacekeeping forces would later generate outrage and be the 
central reason for bringing the disease to the attention of the UNSC in 2000. However 
no such securitizing actor existed during the UNTAC mission to call attention to this 
issue, despite evidence that HIV/AIDS posed a deadlier threat to peacekeepers than any 
other cause, and evidence of a growing Cambodian epidemic of HIV/AIDS. Neither 
DPKO nor the Cambodian government, which was weak and in a transitional phase, 
argued to securitize the issue of peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS. Because of the lack 
of a securitizing actor, this issue received little public attention. 
The case of the UNTAC mission being implicated in the beginnings of the Cambodian 
HIV/AIDS epidemic also suggests that there are dangers in not addressing the links 
between national security and HIV/AIDS. A failure of the security community to 
understand the impact of deploying peacekeepers in Cambodia, within the context of a 
growing regional HIV/AIDS epidemic, likely led to the rapid growth of Cambodia's 
epidemic. This undercut the UNTAC's mission to aid the Cambodian people and their 
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eventual success in holding elections. Furthermore, failure to understand the risk 
HIV/AIDS posed to the UNTAC personnel made the disease the greatest threat to the 
lives of the peacekeepers during the mission. Although implied by Elbe's (2006a) work, 
nowhere in the literature on the nexus is there an examination of the negative impacts 
that occur when tangible links between the disease and national security are left 
unaddressed. The UNTAC mission suggests that the absence of a securitizing actor to 
address tangible links between the disease and national security can harm efforts to fight 
HIV/AIDS. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The above analysis describes how, between 1985-1995, well before widespread debate 
about the national security implications of HIV/AIDS in the scholarly literature, the 
disease was already being strongly linked to national security considerations in at least 
four countries. The cases of Thailand and Uganda demonstrate potential benefits from 
securitizing HIV/AIDS. In Thailand, and to a lesser extent in Uganda, perception of the 
disease as a threat to national security pushed the response to HIV/AIDS up the political 
agenda, involved heads of state and mobilized critical levels of resources. Securitization 
transformed HIV/AIDS, from a low politics to high politics issue in these countries, and 
the public health response to the disease in both countries benefited from this 
prioritization. 
Concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS in the militaries of Thailand and Uganda were a 
major reason for securitizing the disease, and the militaries in both countries were 
heavily involved in the response to HIV/AIDS. However viewing the disease as a threat 
to national security in Thailand and Uganda did not result in the garrisoning of states 
behind national borders as Peterson (2002) feared, or the movement of the response to 
HIV/AIDS away from civil society and toward the "less transparent workings of military 
and intelligence organizations" (Elbe 2006a: 128). In fact, the Thai police and armed 
forces made valuable contributions to the Thai public health efforts that successfully 
responded to the epidemic. This research finds that the securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
Thailand and Uganda led to strong government responses being mobilized, based on 
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public health principles, to limit the spread of the disease among both civilian and 
military populations. 
Similarly, no evidence was found that the securitization of HIV/AIDS resulted in 
increased stigmatization of those living with the disease. In fact, the open discussion of 
the disease by heads of state appears to have contributed to a de-stigmatizing of the 
disease which "encouraged political actors to break the silence surrounding HIV/AIDS" 
(Elbe 2006a: 132). In Thailand and Uganda, securitization of HIV/AIDS contributed to 
the development of strong public health programs that achieved successes in reducing 
national prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In these two countries, securitization of HIV/AIDS 
demonstrated powerful benefits for the fight against HIV/AIDS and no significant 
negative impacts. 
The CIA studies of HIV/AIDS in 1987 and 1991 represent failed attempts to securitize 
HIV/AIDS in the U. S. While these studies accurately predicted the devastating impact 
of the epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, the security implications of HIV/AIDS for the 
U. S. were deemed to be limited. Further undermining these securitization moves was the 
view by some, within the U. S. intelligence community, that the epidemic would have 
benign or even beneficial impacts on the national security of affected states. That the 
referent objects of these threats to national security were African people and states, and 
not the interests of the U. S., led to rejection of these attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS. A 
strong resistance against considering HIV/AIDS as a national security issue also 
contributed to the failure of these securitizing moves. The failure of these early U. S. 
intelligence reports to generate increased action on HIV/AIDS confirms Peterson's 
(2002: 46) view that appealing to the national interests of the U. S. will "likely fail, 
because the true security implications of IDs for the United States remain limited and 
indirect. " 
The KGB disinformation campaign represents the use of HIV/AIDS in pursuit of Soviet 
national security objectives. This situation is not specifically anticipated by any of the 
conceptual frameworks. Nor is this campaign understood to be a cause of HIV/AIDS 
conspiracy theories which undermine prevention efforts today, although this thesis 
argues that this is a strong possibility. The disinformation campaign provides an 
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example of the negative impacts of nefariously linking HIV/AIDS to national security 
objectives. 
The case of deployed UNTAC peacekeepers spreading and becoming infected with 
HIV/AIDS demonstrates two links between the disease and peacekeeping operations. 
First, peacekeepers do seem to have contributed to the rapid growth of HIV/AIDS in a 
country they were assigned to help. Second, HIV/AIDS emerged as the greatest threat to 
the lives of peacekeepers deployed in Cambodia. Despite these links, the issue of 
peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS generated little response from the security or public health 
communities and remained unsecuritized. DPKO and staff in Cambodia seemed unable 
and unwilling to address the issue. Similarly, there were no challenges to DPKO from 
public health leaders concerned about peacekeepers' impact on HIV/AIDS epidemics. 
The absence of a securitizing actor to recognize and address these links between 
HIV/AIDS and national security undermined the success of the UNTAC mission, was a 
likely accelerator of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia, and put peacekeepers at 
greater risk of HIV infection. 
This research finds that the role of global health actors throughout these cases is largely 
limited to the production of epidemiological data on HIV/AIDS. This data played a key 
role in generating responses to HIV/AIDS in Thailand and Uganda, and was the basis of 
the U. S. intelligence assessments of the pandemic. However the production of data was 
the extent of public health action in these cases. Global health leaders did not advocate 
for viewing the disease as a threat to national security or play major political roles. They 
were functional actors in the background of these events, supplying critical 
epidemiological information into the policymaking process. This situation bears the 
closest resemblance to the independent actor model described by Lee and McInnes 
(2004). There is no evidence of global health being a "supplicant" to national security 
interests during this period. In fact, it was the U. S. and Soviet intelligence communities 
that sought to address the issue of HIV/AIDS, a reversal of the supplicant model that is 
not provided for by the models of engagement. 
The U. S. intelligence studies and UNTAC mission experience reveal major differences 
in perspective between public health and national security, and difficulty bridging areas 
where the two fields overlap. The greatest difference between the benefits of 
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securitization found in Thailand and Uganda, and the indifferent response to the UNTAC 
experience and the U. S. intelligence studies, seems tobe the direct nature of the security 
threat to Thailand and Uganda. The perception of a clear national security threat to the 
state resulted in beneficial action against HIV/AIDS in Thailand and Uganda. However, 
a threat to foreign persons or states, or UN peacekeepers, was insufficient to cause 
increased action by others in fighting HIV/AIDS. The importance of the securitizing 
actor is also clearly demonstrated by the Cambodian UNTAC mission case, where such 
an actor was missing. This finding supports the utility of the communitarian - 
cosmopolitan model, particularly its focus on the different referent objects of the national 
security and global health fields, which provides a salient explanation for these cases 
where the disease was not securitized. 
Overall, the cases of Thailand and Uganda demonstrate clear benefits in fighting 
HIV/AIDS when a country views the disease as a threat to its own national security. 
However U. S. intelligence studies of HIV/AIDS epidemics in Africa and globally, and 
the spread of the disease by deployed peacekeepers, were not cases of securitization due 
to the referent object and absence of securitizing actor respectively. In both cases, 
greater action against HIV/AIDS would likely have saved lives, but was not 
forthcoming. Finally, the KGB disinformation campaign provides a stark example of the 
risks of linking HIV/AIDS to a national security agenda. 
The years between 1985 and 1995, before HIV/AIDS was widely discussed as a national 
security issue, demonstrate much of the complexity of the current day HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus. This chapter has endeavored to reintroduce this early history of 
the nexus into the current debate on the risks and benefits of securitization. Chapter 5 
will move from the diverse national histories described above into the story of how and 
why HIV/AIDS was securitized at the global level by the UNSC and U. S. The tensions 
in the nexus will remain relevant, as will the critical role played by individuals in 
shaping events. However the events will take place on a global stage, with its greater 
complexity and array of competing political interests. 
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Chapter 5: The Global Securitization of HIV/AIDS 
While Chapter 4 presents four countries where HIV/AIDS was linked to national security 
concerns, this chapter seeks to present the history of events in the U. S. and at the UNSC 
which securitized HIV/AIDS on the global stage during 1999-2000. As Elbe (2006a: 
126) observes, securitization 
is precisely what has happened to the issue of HIV/AIDS in recent years, where 
arguments have shifted from humanitarian and public health ones to officials in 
international organizations, governments, and non-governmental organizations 
(securitizing actors) increasingly arguing that beyond these humanitarian 
considerations, the survival of communities, states, and militaries (referent 
objects) is now being undermined (existentially threatened), unless drastic 
measures (emergency measures) are undertaken by national and international 
actors to better address the global pandemic. 
This chapter will examine these arguments, and the history of the global securitization of 
HIV/AIDS. The chapter begins by examining the intellectual antecedents to 
securitization, which include the U. S. Institute of Medicine's conceptualization of 
emerging infectious diseases, and UNAIDS efforts to produce improved epidemiological 
estimates of the pandemic globally and among armed forces. The chapter then proceeds 
to examine in detail the events that led to the publication of a U. S. national intelligence 
estimate on infectious diseases and the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS, which together 
securitized HIV/AIDS on the world stage. 
As important as the processes of securitization are the broader lessons on the nexus that 
emerge from a history of this time period. This chapter provides a critical contribution to 
this thesis because, while it is clear that HIV/AIDS was securitized, the events of 
securitization were complex. Securitization took place at a time when the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic was exploding in sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia, and global health actors 
may assume that epidemiological findings drove HIV/AIDS into the highest levels of 
international politics. However this thesis finds that political interests having little to do 
with global health, and the actions of key policymakers often played fundamental but 
under recognized roles in enabling securitization to proceed. Without these political 
interests and their interaction with key individuals, it is doubtful that securitization of 
HIV/AIDS would have occurred. 
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The role global health actors played in the events of securitization, which this thesis 
argues contributed to a major transformation in the political treatment of the disease, is 
also examined in this chapter. Major differences in culture and perspective between the 
global health and national security communities, which shape events in this history, are 
also apparent. Examining the complexity of the events of securitization, particularly the 
role of ulterior political interests, key individuals, and the communitarian - cosmopolitan 
divide provides important insights into the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, and 
serves to enhance understanding of the implications of the securitization of HIV/AIDS. 
5.1 The Introduction of Emerging Diseases into U. S. National Security 
Emerging diseases such as HIV/AIDS did not always have high political priority. The 
development of effective vaccines for most childhood illnesses, and widespread use of 
antibiotics for bacterial infections led the U. S. Surgeon General to declare in 1967 that 
"the war against infectious diseases has been won" (Fauci 2004: 1887). However, during 
the last forty years, new diseases have emerged alongside the resurgence of known 
diseases, some increasingly resistant to antimicrobials and drug treatment. At least thirty 
new diseases have been identified since 1973, a rate of almost one per year. Among them 
are HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, Ebola, Hantavirus, SARS and Nipah virus. Previously known 
diseases such as cholera, yellow fever and dengue have re-emerged dramatically, and 
some like tuberculosis, have re-emerged in multi-drug resistant forms. Disease vectors 
have also become resistant to insecticides and increased their geographic range, bringing 
malaria, African sleeping sickness, West Nile virus, Rift Valley fever, yellow fever and 
dengue into new territories and even hitherto unaffected continents. Collectively, these 
diseases have been termed "emerging diseases" (Henig 1994: x, King 2004). 
The concept of emerging viruses (and later emerging diseases) was coined at a 
conference on emerging viral agents in 1989 by virologist Stephen Morse (Henig 1994). 
The conference spurred significant interest in the concept of emerging diseases, resulting 
in a major study by the U. S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) on the causes and possible 
responses to emerging diseases. Published in 1992, the IOM report was entitled 
Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States. The preface to 
the report describes the decision to limit the study to "emerging microbial threats to U. S. 
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public health" as a way of narrowing a broad topic (Institute of Medicine 1992: vi). 
However, King (2002: 767-768) accurately describes the IOM report as the "centerpiece 
of a major public health campaign" to link infectious diseases with U. S. economic and 
security interests, and define an "emerging diseases worldview. " 
The first sentence of the IOM (1992: v) report clearly frames the threat of infectious 
diseases in what was becoming an increasingly popular notion of post Cold War 
interdependence: "[I]n the context of infectious diseases, there is nowhere in the world 
from which we are remote and no one from whom we are disconnected. " Viewed from 
the perspective of U. S. national security in 1992, this represented a dramatic departure 
from Cold War conceptualizations of national security. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
had removed the perceived preponderant security threat to the U. S., and by its absence 
had created space for such new security threats to be considered. Furthermore, the 
processes of globalization had undermined the traditional protection afforded by 
geography, borders and military strength that had defined the pursuit of national security 
in the twentieth century. The combination of these factors, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the processes of globalization, would enable the IOM's framing of emerging 
infectious diseases to become a powerful argument for securitization. 
In 1995, this concept of a new kind of threat to the U. S., against which Americans 
believed they had limited defense, was also embraced by popular and somewhat alarmist 
culture. Published that year, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Disease in a World 
Out of Balance by medical journalist Laurie Garrett, and The Hot Zone: A Terrifying 
True Story by Richard Preston describe the emergence of Marburg, HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases, and an Ebola outbreak among monkeys in Virginia respectively. The same 
year, the film "Outbreak", starring Dustin Hoffman as a military scientist, depicted an 
outbreak of a deadly African virus in the U. S. Accentuating growing fears of acute 
epidemic diseases was an actual outbreak of Ebola in Kikwit, Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) that killed 81 % of the 315 people infected. 
Partially in response to this Ebola outbreak, and partly due to high levels of public 
attention to the threat of emerging diseases, U. S. President Clinton issued a Presidential 
Review Directive (PRD) in 1995 directing the U. S. National Security Council (NIC) to 
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study American vulnerability to bioterrorism. 17 R. P. Eddy ran the PRD in 1995 and 
describes the process as follows: 
I ran this interagency process with the CIA, OED and all the other agencies to try 
and get them to help us understand what the President, basically what the threat 
was. So the PRD is first, it lets us just see what we are doing and what assets we 
have and what your options are. And the PDD, Presidential Decision Directive, is 
the President then saying, `Well based on what we've done, here's what we're 
gonna do. '(R. P. Eddy Interview) 
Eddy confirms that the origins of the PRD lay with the Kikwit outbreak and increasing 
public concern about emerging diseases. The PRD 
was basically initiated because of the Ebola outbreak in Kikwit, Zaire, but also a 
feeling, there was a movie called "Outbreak" with Dustin Hoffman - and a book 
called "The Hot Zone" - so there was this, sort of, awareness that potentially 
microbes could be a potential security issue" (Eddy Interview). 
During the PRD, Eddy had a prescient conversation about the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS. Eddy remembers a State Department staff member saying: 
`You're talking about Ebola, you're talking about anthrax, a little bit in terms of 
smallpox and other diseases and the risk to national security. Have you 
considered HIV/AIDS? ' And I almost laughed! AIDS and national security, it's 
ridiculous and I immediately shut him up and moved on... (Eddy Interview) 
Eddy says his skepticism about the potential for HIV/AIDS to have an impact on 
national security was widespread at the time and "continues today" (Eddy Interview). 
Despite Eddy's skepticism, his PRD became a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 
released on 12 June 1996. The PDD mentions Ebola, drug-resistant tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS as posing "one of the most significant health and security challenges facing 
the global community" (White House 1996). Despite describing a threat to the "global 
community, " the PDD focuses on the national security interests of the U. S.: 
Addressing this challenge requires a global strategy as most cities in the United 
States are within a 36 hour commercial flight of any area of the world -- less time 
'7 A PRD was the Clinton Administration's mechanism to direct reviews and studies by U. S. government 
agencies. A Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) was the Clinton Administration's mechanism to 
declare Presidential decisions on national security matters. 
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than the incubation period of many infectious diseases. Furthermore, the United 
States is vulnerable to a release of biological agents by rogue nations or terrorists, 
which could result in the spread of infectious diseases. (White House 1996: para. 
1) 
While the PDD focused on all emerging diseases, especially exotic and gruesome killers 
like Ebola, this is the first time that HIV/AIDS was officially described as a threat to 
U. S. national security. The idea that diseases "over there" could come "over here" 
clearly references the IOM's conceptualization of emerging diseases and changed the 
national security calculus from the early U. S. intelligence reports on the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic where few risks to U. S. national security were found. The IOM's approach is 
that of the supplicant model, described by Lee and McInnes (2004), whereby the public 
health community appealed to the state-based interests of national security in order to 
increase attention and funding to address infectious diseases. In this case, their efforts 
successfully introduced infectious diseases into U. S. national security analysis as a 
recognized threat. It is important to also consider that, concurrently, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and recognition of the processes of globalization, had created a policy 
space for new threats to national security to be addressed. While this was not a case of 
securitization, because no emergency measures resulted from the PDD, these events 
provided an initial framework for understanding how diseases could be considered a 
threat to national security. While the securitization of HIV/AIDS did not follow this 
model exactly, the concept of emerging diseases successfully introduced public health 
issues into national security analysis, and provided a foundation for the later 
securitization of HIV/AIDS. 
5.2 The role of global health actors: Providing the evidence base on the III VU IDS 
pandemic 
The role of global health actors in securitizing HIV/AIDS can be understood by 
examining the actions and motivations of the main international agency charged with 
fighting HIV/AIDS. Between 1987 and 1995, WHO's Global Programme on AIDS 
(GPA) was the lead institution in the UN's response to HIV/AIDS. As the international 
response grew, the GPA faced difficulties coordinating other UN organizations, as well 
as donor governments which also channeled resources bilaterally (Collinson and Lee 
1996). The leadership style of then WHO Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima, and 
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differences in opinion over the relative emphasis to place on biomedical or human rights- 
based approaches to the disease, led to the departure of the inspiring GPA head Jonathan 
Mann in 1990. This alienated leading donor governments, already disenamoured with 
WHO, during Nakajima's tenure. Merson (2006: 2415), who assumed the head of GPA 
between 1990-1995, writes that the organization 
was unable to muster the necessary political will in donor and affected countries, 
and its effectiveness was compromised by rivalries with other United Nations 
(U. N. ) organizations, concern about the senior leadership of the WHO, and an 
increasing preference of wealthy governments for bilateral aid programs. 
These pressures led to WHO resolution WHA46.37 in 1993 which called for "a study of 
the feasibility of setting up a new AIDS programme" (Collinson and Lee 1996: 4). Two 
years later, on 1 January 1996, UNAIDS was launched. The difficulties at GPA, and the 
years spent establishing UNAIDS, had hampered the UN's ability to organize an 
effective global response to HIV/AIDS. As one GPA staff member commented on the 
transition from GPA to UNAIDS, "We have lost two years in this changeover. Two 
years that we could have used to fight the disease" (Collinson and Lee 1996: 5). 
The formation of UNAIDS improved the UN's interagency ability to contribute to the 
fight against HIV/AIDS. Among the early actions of the new head of UNAIDS, Peter 
Piot, was investing in the epidemiological resources to track and investigate the epidemic 
(Behrman 2004). Poku (2004: 100) writes that, with the formation of UNAIDS, came 
significant progress on "the reliability of information regarding the nature, intensity and 
direction of the virus not only across the globe, but also within individual countries. " 
This investment in epidemiology resulted in a vast improvement in estimates of 
HIV/AIDS incidence and prevalence. 
Steven Morrison (Interview), Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies HIV/AIDS Task Force, singles out the formation of UNAIDS, and 
its provision of rigorous data on HIV/AIDS, as a turning point that brought the epidemic 
greater political attention. Morrison (2001: 201) writes that UNAIDS data "brought 
across starkly the enormity and complexity of the HIV/AIDS crisis" which "ultimately 
prompted the administration and congress to move beyond business as usual. " Princeton 
Lyman (Interview), who served as U. S. Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria, also 
notes the importance of "a reliable set of single statistics" by UNAIDS in drawing more 
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political attention to the disease. UNAIDS statistics were influential because they were 
viewed as rigorous and conveyed the enormity of the pandemic. While this was not the 
first time global estimates of the pandemic had been issued, it was the first time rigorous 
estimates were widely viewed and accepted among U. S. policymakers. UNAIDS 
estimates of the global HIV/AIDS situation, revised yearly since 1998, were a major 
contribution to high-level political awareness of HIV/AIDS, and therefore the 
transformation of the disease into a high politics and national security issue. 
Also published by UNAIDS in 1998 was AIDS in the military. This report was later 
widely cited by authors writing about the national security implications of HIV/AIDS, 
with two of its main arguments becoming "accepted wisdoms" to those examining 
HIV/AIDS in military populations (Whiteside, De Waal, Gebre-Tensae 2006: 201). The 
first of these arguments is that military populations are at higher risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. UNAIDS (1998: 3) writes that "In peace 
time, STD infection rates among armed forces are generally 2 to 5 times higher than in 
civilian populations; in time of conflict the difference can be 50 times higher or more. " 
This statistic was based on "conventional wisdom" drawn from the U. S. military 
experience during World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, as well as on 
estimates of HIV/AIDS in the Zimbabwean and other armies from a 1995 Civil-Military 
Alliance (CMA) survey (Stewart Kingma Interview). 
The second widely-cited argument were the five explanations offered by UNAIDS 
(1998) for these high rates of STDs in military populations. First, lengthy military 
service away from home causes emotional stress and encourages commercial sex. 
Second, the risk-taking ethos of armed forces may inure soldiers to risky sexual 
practices. Third, armed forces are comprised of the 15-24 year olds who are the 
demographic group at highest risk for HIV infection. Fourth, soldiers and peacekeepers 
stationed abroad are often wealthier than local populations, which give them the financial 
ability to purchase sex. Finally, military and peacekeeping camps often attract sex 
workers, facilitating commercial sex and risky sexual practices. The report continues to 
argue that HIV/AIDS may affect military preparedness and presents challenges in 
preventing transmission between military and civilian populations. 
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While this report concerns the affects of HIV/AIDS on militaries, it did not explicitly 
attempt to securitize the epidemic. Stuart Kingma (Interview), medical advisor to GPA, 
UNAIDS and the CMA, and author of the AIDS in the military report, recalls that the 
potential political benefits of addressing the national security implications of HIV/AIDS 
were "noted at the time, but were not a driving factor. " Public health concern about the 
spread of HIV/AIDS among military populations was the main rational for two reasons. 
First, as noted in AIDS in the military, UNAIDS believed that rates of STDs were two to 
five times higher in military populations, which put them at significant risk of infection 
with HIV/AIDS. Second, UNAIDS noted that militaries were poorly integrated with 
civilian HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Militaries maintained separate hospital 
systems and were generally felt to be able to maintain the health of their personnel 
without recourse to international aid. Furthermore, militaries were not viewed as 
"legitimate recipients of international aid" (Kingma Interview). The combination of 
these factors made the armed forces a high risk and underserved population that 
UNAIDS sought to address. Kingma (Interview) emphasized that UNAIDS focus on 
militaries was not driven by an attempt to securitize the epidemic. He supported this 
view by recounting how UNAIDS rapidly broadened their campaign from militaries to 
include all uniformed services including customs officials, police forces, and other 
groups not related to national security (Kingma Interview). 
By 1999 however, Not was arguing that "There are African countries where it is said 
that more than 50 percent of all the military are H. I. V. infected, and that is a problem of 
national security" (Altman 1999: para. 28). Ingram (2007) and Behrman (2004: 175- 
176) similarly recount how Piot and the UNAIDS staff sought to put the disease onto a 
high political agenda, and increasingly used a "political strategy" to link the epidemic to 
"economic and security considerations. " Piot (2005: para. 86) argued in 2005 that 
putting "AIDS on the political agenda" was his primary objective upon taking charge of 
UNAIDS in 1996, and that redefining the disease as a security issue was part of this 
objective. Thus, by 1999, the reluctance of UNAIDS to using securitizing language 
seemed to have been overcome, and Not was making securitizing arguments. 
While the production by UNAIDS of rigorous global, country and military estimates of 
rates of HIV/AIDS in 1998 contributed to recognition of the disease as a threat to 
national security, these events did not represent an attempt to securitize the epidemic. In 
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1998, UNAIDS was largely motivated by a desire to produce comprehensive 
epidemiological data on the epidemic and a specific concern that military populations 
were at high risk of HIV/AIDS and underrepresented in civilian health programs. 
UNAIDS specifically chose not to link the disease to communitarian and national 
security interests at this time, but instead chose to continue to pursue the organization's 
cosmopolitan objectives. The AIDS in the Military report was a cosmopolitan 
examination of the spread of HIV/AIDS among the armed forces because it focused on 
this population as a vulnerable and underserved group in relation to HIV/AIDS. 
However by 1999, Piot began linking HIV/AIDS to national security agendas using the 
data they had gathered, with the intent to move HIV/AIDS onto higher-level political 
agendas. UNAIDS data on the global epidemic and among armed forces played a key 
role in informing and framing much of the later debate on how HIV/AIDS may have an 
impact on traditional national security considerations. Plot's securitizing arguments, 
while not directly accepted by a public or national security audience, provided further 
basis for the successful securitizations in the U. S. and at the UNSC. 
5.3 Injecting health issues into U. S. national security 
With this groundwork laid by the IOM's conceptualization of emerging diseases, and 
UNAIDS epidemiological evidence that the pandemic was exploding globally and 
among armed forces, a public health doctor with foreign policy experience sought to 
securitize HIV/AIDS within the U. S. government. His efforts would be pivotal in 
creating a major U. S. national intelligence estimate on infectious diseases that focused 
on HIV/AIDS and had a strong impact on U. S. policy towards the pandemic. 
Ken Bernard is a physician with public health training who had overseen the U. S. Peace 
Corps program in Africa and engaged with the WHO from the U. S. Mission in Geneva. 
In 1998, Bernard approached his boss and the head of the U. S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) Donna Shalala. He wanted Shalala to lobby then U. S. National 
Security Advisor Sandy Berger to create a new position on the U. S. National Security 
Council (NSC) for Bernard. '8 Bernard was to have the unprecedented title of "Senior 
18 The National Security Council is the U. S. president's primary forum for debating national security and 
foreign policy issues. National security advisors and cabinet officials are the usual attendees. For more 
information, see: httl2: //www. whitehouse. i! ov/nsc/. 
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Advisor for International Health" at the NSC, the first position at the NSC to be 
dedicated to health issues (Behrman 2004: 228). 
Bernard had recognized the potential links between health and national security while 
working to keep Peace Corps volunteers healthy. He recalls that 
there's more applicability to these issues than just the health of volunteers. You 
know, it's like, wait a minute, how does health fit into the overall context of 
development? And how does development fit into the overall context of security? 
And then you start looking at militaries that are continually being dragged down 
because their soldiers have malaria all the time. So I would say, the first time I 
really started thinking about [health and national security] was probably in the 
mid 80s, in dealing with the peace core volunteers. (Bernard Interview) 
Bernard thought that health issues, especially bioterrorism and some infectious diseases 
including HIV/AIDS, had to be considered as national security issues. The unchecked 
spread of disease had political consequences that were not being recognized by U. S. 
policymakers. Bernard wanted to get the NSC to begin to examine the national security 
implications of infectious diseases and bioterrorism. Bernard thought that: 
the line between health and security seemed to be arbitrary and it seemed to be 
based, primarily, on what the security people and the health people wanted their 
jobs to be. So, security people like by and large, bi-national confrontational 
politics, the East versus the West, the Germans versus the French, the French 
versus the English, the United States versus the Japanese, the United States versus 
Russia, Poland versus Germany, you know, it's like this is real national security, 
that's what they do - not soft under-belly stuff. Soft fuzzy stuff like, social stuff, 
health stuff, that's not real national security. Well, the health people, of course, 
public health people especially, have no interest or had no interest in any hard 
security issues. It was, we have babies dying here and you're telling me that 
you're trying ... you're arguing over whether 
it's a legal or an illegal landmine. 
What absurdity is this? These people are crazy, you know, and what happened 
was, the two communities were not only running in parallel and not talking to 
each other, but actually at odds with each other and I think it was really, kind of, 
inappropriate. (Bernard Interview) 
Beginning at the NSC in 1998, Bernard encountered great resistance to the concept of 
linking health and national security. Bernard describes the experience of starting the 
health and national security office: 
Nobody was here, I didn't have anything to do for six months. No one could 
figure out why I was here. They'd come up the hallway and say, I understand 
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you're a doctor and you're working for Sandy Berger [the U. S. national security 
advisor], are you like, you know, going on trips and taking care of the health 
issues that come up, you know when people get sick... Speaking of which, you 
know, I've been running and my knees have been hurting, do you mind taking a 
look at it? And there was just no sense in the public, in the national security 
community that health had a seat. (Bernard Interview) 
Bernard found that his background as a physician and in public health actually hindered 
his interactions with other policymakers in the White House and NSC. After being asked 
to examine a colleague's knee and being treated as Sandy Berger's personal physician on 
trips, Bernard decided to hide his health background. Bernard "actually had his secretary 
take the "MD" off of his White House business card, finding that he was taken more 
seriously as a traditional policy maker than as "a health guy" (Behrman 2004: 229). 
Bernard's descriptions of his experiences as a public health doctor in the U. S. national 
security community are humorous illustrations of the communitarian -cosmopolitan 
divide, specifically the differences in culture between the global heath and national 
security communities. This theme will be revisited throughout this chapter as HIV/AIDS 
is increasingly discussed within the U. S. national security community. 
Despite resistance to the idea of health issues having any effect on national security, 
Bernard kept pushing for a seat at the national security table for public health issues. He 
had dual goals. First, he wanted to get the national security policy community engaging 
with the real risks of infectious diseases. Second, he sought to get the U. S. government 
to bring its huge resources to addressing major global health problems. Behrman (2004: 
229) writes, "Bernard knew that if an issue was deemed of national security import, it 
attracted funds with a velocity that no other area of the U. S. government can match. He 
made it his mission to inject health, particularly global AIDS, into the national security 
agenda. " In short, Bernard was actively seeking to securitize HIV/AIDS to gain greater 
attention to the disease, an example of the supplicant model (Lee and McInnes 2004). 
One opportunity Bernard found to push this perspective was on the PDD that President 
Clinton had ordered in 1996. The PDD was languishing at the NSC. Bernard found the 
director of the project, David Gordon, National Intelligence Officer for Economics and 
Global Issues, and urged him to complete the paper. Gordon remembers that Bernard 
"made an appointment to see me and ginned me up to get me going on this paper with a 
writ from Sandy Berger. He pushed hard to get this going" (Behrman 2002: 45). 
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Bernard's efforts to link infectious diseases with national security within the U. S. 
government and to push the NSC to produce a report were effective. The NSC produced 
a classified version, the National Intelligence Estimate 99-17, in 1999. It was entitled, 
"The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States. " 
Unlike previous CIA and NSC studies of HIV/AIDS, this report had major effects on the 
political profile of infectious disease and HIV/AIDS in particular. 
5.4 U. S. National Intelligence Estimate 99-17 
Released in an unclassified version in January 2000, National Intelligence Estimate 99- 
17 (hereafter NIC 99-17) published by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) was the 
most in depth examination of global health issues by the American national security 
community to date. Similar to previous NIC reports on HIV/AIDS, NIC 99-17 is 
concerned with the economic, social and political implications of infectious disease. 
While recognizing the humanitarian impacts of infectious diseases, the report attempts to 
explicate the effects of infectious disease on the material interests of the U. S. In other 
words, the main referent object of Estimate, like most U. S. national security reports, is 
the United States. The title of NIC 99-17, "The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its 
Implications for the United States, " accurately reflects this communitarian national 
security perspective on infectious diseases. 
The main conclusion of NIC 99-17 was that emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases will "complicate U. S. and global security over the next 20 years" (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 5). The statement that U. S. security will be affected by 
infectious diseases was unprecedented in 1999. As discussed below, this designation 
was dismissed by critics in 2000 and beyond. However, this conclusion was hardly a call 
to arms to defeat infectious diseases. The report describes infectious diseases as having 
"implications" for the U. S., not explicitly as a national security threat to the U. S. NIC 
99-17 also uses the term "global security, " which broadens the mandate of the report to 
include most serious economic, social or political impacts of disease across the globe. 
(This reflects the Clinton administration's ambiguity about whose security the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic threatens. ) By stating that the epidemic threatens both U. S. and 
global security, NIC 99-17 purposely leaves this critical issue ambiguous. Finally, the 
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report suggests that these complications of U. S. and global security will occur "over the 
next 20 years, " an extremely long timeframe for national security analysis (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 5). These factors all served to downplay the conclusions of 
NIC 99-17. 
NIC 99-17 applies national security scenario planning to outline three possible futures of 
infectious diseases over the next 20 years. The most likely scenario for the future of 
infectious diseases is described as "deterioration, then limited improvement" (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 9). In this scenario, HIV/AIDS worsens from 2000-2010, but 
"decreases fitfully after that, owing to better prevention and control efforts, new drugs 
and vaccines, and socioeconomic improvements" (National Intelligence Council 2000: 
9). NIE 99-17 predicts that infectious diseases will continue to thrive in developing 
countries due to poverty and poor health care capacity, especially in the least developed 
countries. This future of steady progress could be imperiled by the appearance of a new 
and deadly infectious disease, a massive increase in rates of HIV/AIDS, or a bioterrorist 
attack using a highly contagious agent. Interestingly, the NIC 99-17 does not consider 
the effects of different U. S. actions and how they would impact these scenarios. The 
final impression is of a world of infectious diseases largely beyond U. S. control and 
likely to slowly improve without specific interventions. 
Although NIC 99-17 is focused on infectious diseases generally, the section on 
economic, social and political impacts of disease is centered on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
The report describes HIV/AIDS as having major macro and microeconomic effects, 
reducing GDP growth in highly affected countries, hurting corporate profitability 
especially in the mining industry, and hurting small farmers. The economic impact of 
HIV also extends to governments as the disease makes increasing claims on national 
health systems. The report echoes a common public health complaint that the massive 
public spending on HIV/AIDS "threatens to crowd out other types of health care and 
social spending" (National Intelligence Council 2000: 49). Even with highly affected 
countries spending large portions of their health care budgets on HIV/AIDS, most at the 
time would be unable to afford ARV's for more than a small percentage of their HIV 
positive populations. 
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The section on the social impact of infectious diseases is also dominated by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. NIC 99-17 warns that the reductions in life expectancy and the 
demographic effects of the epidemic will increase political instability and give rise to a 
generation of poor, angry and radicalized AIDS orphans with implications for the 
stability of other states and by extension, U. S. national security. 
At least some of the hardest-hit countries, initially in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
later in other regions, will face a demographic catastrophe as HIV/AIDS and 
associated diseases reduce human life expectancy dramatically and kill up to a 
quarter of their populations over the period of this Estimate. This will further 
impoverish the poor and often the middle class and produce a huge and 
impoverished orphan cohort unable to cope and vulnerable to exploitation and 
radicalization (National Intelligence Council 2000). 
NIC 99-17 returns to the issue of AIDS orphans by linking the breakdown of families 
due to disease, to social and economic dislocations, which then have follow-on political 
consequences. The report states that approximately 35 million children will have lost 
one or both parents to AIDS in 2000, and that number will rise to 42 million orphans by 
2010. The authors argue that these orphans in the highly affected countries will 
constitute a 
`lost orphaned generation' by 2010 with little hope of educational or employment 
opportunities, these countries will be at risk of further economic decay, increased 
crime, and political instability as such young people become radicalized or are 
exploited by various political groups for their own ends; the pervasive child 
soldier phenomenon may be one example. (National Intelligence Council 2000: 
50) 
The report suggests that further social and political instability is likely to result from HIV 
infection among political and military leaders. These infections may intensify struggles 
for power and undermine transitions to democracy. The NIC concludes that "the 
infectious disease burden will add to political instability and slow democratic 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, and the former Soviet Union, while 
also increasing political tensions in and among some developed countries" (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 50). These potential social impacts of HIV/AIDS are part of 
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the NIC's argument outlining the relevance of the pandemic to U. S. national security 
interests, and to securitize the disease. 
In the next section of the report, "Destabilizing Political and Security Impact, " NIC 99- 
17 offers estimates of HIV prevalence among selected militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(National Intelligence Council 2000: 50). Based on a 1999 unpublished report by the 
U. S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, which is part of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the report provides estimates of HIV infection in seven African 
militaries as follows: 
Country Estimated HIV Prevalence (percent) 
Angola 40 to 60 
Congo (Brazzaville) 10 to 20 
Cote d'Ivoire 10 to 20 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 40 to 60 
Eritrea 10 
Nigeria 10 to 20 
Tanzania 15 to 30 
Figure 5.1: Estimated HIV Prevalence in seven African Militaries. Source: 
National Intelligence Council (2000: 53) 
The original report by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center is classified, so the 
origins and methodology behind these estimates is unknown. 
These rates among African militaries are significantly higher than those among the same 
country's civilian population. NIC 99-17 echoes the UMAIDS 1998 report and attributes 
this to soldier's "risky lifestyles and deployment away from home" (National 
Intelligence Council 2000: 52). While African militaries are clearly at risk, the report 
also discusses the poor health status of the armed forces in Russia. The impact of HIV 
on armed forces will be greatest among "hard-to-replace officers, noncommissioned 
officers, and enlisted soldiers with specialized skills and among militaries with advanced 
weapons and weapons platforms of all kinds" (National Intelligence Council 2000: 52). 
137 
Despite these large effects, the authors think it is difficult to directly connect HIV 
prevalence and war fighting performance. They conclude that despite the lack of a direct 
connection, HIV will likely decrease combat readiness and capability among highly 
affected militaries. The linkage between HIV/AIDS and armed forces, originally 
outlined by the UNAIDS AIDS in the Military report, is the second part of the NIC's 
argument for the relevance of HIV/AIDS to U. S. national security interests. 
As the most in-depth analysis of public health issues by the U. S. national security 
community, NIE 99-17 would play a critical role in the securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
the U. S. While the report itself did not clearly argue that the pandemic posed an 
existential threat to the U. S., it persuasively outlined an argument suggesting that the 
pandemic would have serious implications for U. S. national security. Furthermore the 
authors of the Estimate, the U. S. NIC, were a highly credible securitizing actor at the 
center of the U. S. national security community. HIV/AIDS was not securitized fully by 
the publication of NIC 99-17, but both the arguments for securitization and a credible 
securitizing actor were in place. 
NIE 99-17 diverges starkly from traditional public health analyses in two ways. First, 
the de-classified estimate contains few references for the evidence it discusses. Most of 
the report consists of unsourced statements, such as "There were 19.5 million new 
malaria infections estimated in the Asia and Pacific region in 1998, many of them drug 
resistant, and 100,000 deaths due to malaria", that would require a reference if published 
in a scholarly journal (National Intelligence Council 2000: 28). While the seven charts 
and tables in the report do reference sources including the WHO, World Bank, and the 
Institute of Medicine, two of these reference unpublished and classified studies by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center. Arguably 
the most important and original information is contained in "Table 6" which lists "HIV 
Prevalence in Selected Militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa" (National Intelligence Council 
2000: 53). However, NIE 99-17 contains no methodology section or access to the 
original classified studies. Unlike data presented in public health or medical journals, 
there is no way to assess the design of the study or the sources of data, and therefore the 
accuracy of this information presented. While this information is clearly classified for 
reasons of national security, the classification of public health information and secrecy 
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about sources and study methodology represents a major departure from the scientific 
use of public health information. 
Second, the conclusions in the report are primarily based on logically extrapolating from 
epidemiological data to reach conclusions relevant to the national security community. 
This is because there is very little data that directly addresses the issues the report 
examines: what are the political effects of diseases and how might diseases impact 
militaries, peacekeepers and state stability. For example, the conclusion that "the severe 
social and economic impact of infectious diseases is likely to intensify the struggle for 
political power to control scarce state resources, " is not directly based on historical 
events but on a 1996 study by the State Failure Task Force (National Intelligence 
Council 2000: 10). This study found that infant mortality, much of which is caused by 
infectious diseases, was linked to political instability. This association is due to infant 
mortality being a good single measure for overall quality of life, which is also associated 
with political instability (Esty et al. 1999). Despite the State Failure Task Force's 
writing in 1999 that "we are certain that there is NO direct causal connection between 
infant deaths and ensuing political crises, " NIC 99-17 cites this study in support of the 
threat infectious diseases pose to state stability (Esty et al. 1999: 51). An Intelligence 
Officer involved in the preparation of the report admits that "there is no smoking gun but 
the logic is there" (Confidential Intelligence Interview). This logically extrapolating 
from the data is not scientifically rigorous, even if the subject matter is the spread of 
disease. This lack of scientific rigor is sometimes necessary in the national security field 
because data may not exist to answer questions that require immediate action. However, 
this lack of a scientific approach is significantly different from that of the public health 
field and raises questions about the use of public health data to assess national security 
issues. 
Despite the methodological shortfalls of the report, in the words of one U. S. Intelligence 
Officer, NIE 99-17 "opened the debate" on HIV/AIDS as a national security issue 
(Confidential Intelligence Interview). Similarly, David Gordon, the director of the team 
that produced the report, believes that the report "did have a big impact... " (Behrman 
2002: 42). Strong arguments for securitization of HIV/AIDS from a credible securitizing 
actor were now in place. 
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5.5 The Impact of NIE 99-17 
Why, after years of rapid growth of the pandemic and numerous NIC reports on the 
disease, did NIE 99-17 create an opening in the U. S. government to address HIV/AIDS? 
Gellman (2000a: Black and White para. 2) writes that the NIE 99-17 resulted in "a 
sudden urgency in the Clinton administration to act. No important new scientific feature 
of the epidemic had been discovered in a decade. What mobilized the government, after 
seven years of modest effort, has been difficult for its policymakers to identify. " Steven 
Morrison (Interview), believes that the emergence of UNAIDS and its improved 
estimates of the global epidemic helped move the policy debate on HIV/AIDS forward. 
Gellman himself provides some of the political context in an earlier article. He writes 
that African American leaders have "adopted the cause of AIDS in Africa" and are 
pressuring the U. S. to change trade policies that keep the price of ARVs out of reach of 
most in the developing world (Gellman 2000b: para. 7). AIDS activists also repeatedly 
"blindsided" Vice President Al Gore's presidential campaign by disrupting his campaign 
events and chanting "Gore is killing Africans, AIDS drugs now! " (Gellman 2000b and 
Richwine 1999: para. 10). These events seemed to have "accelerated the White House's 
response" (Gellman 2000b: para. 8). The convergence of these political factors with the 
emergence credible and shockingly large UNAIDS estimates of the global epidemic, as 
well as the previous framing of emerging diseases as threats to U. S. security by the IOM, 
seems to have opened policy space for the NIC's arguments on the relevance of 
HIV/AIDS to U. S. national security. 
In addition, a worry about legacy towards the end of the Clinton Administration also 
seems to have contributed to the sudden priority given to HIV/AIDS. The epidemic had 
been growing throughout the Clinton years, essentially in full view, but U. S. financial 
assistance for the pandemic had remained at low and only slowly growing levels (Kates 
and Summers 2004). 
Pervading the recent U. S. effort is a strong sense among participants of time 
misspent. The virulence of the pandemic was accurately foreseen, and `the 
United States didn't exactly cover itself with glory, ' said one close advisor to 
Clinton. `We saw it coming, and we didn't act as quickly as we could have, ' said 
Helene D. Gayle, a physician who directs AIDS prevention at the CDC. `I'm not 
sure what that says about how seriously we took it, how seriously we took lives in 
Africa. ' (Gellman 2000b: para. 25) 
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Gordon notes, "What [NIE 99-17] really did, was give a tool, for those in the 
administration ... to run with 
it" (Behrman 2002: 42). Ken Bernard, who pushed for the 
creation of the report itself, now had the implicit backing of the NIC to address the 
national security implications of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. He approached Leon 
Fuerth, Vice President Al Gore's national security advisor and expected U. S. National 
Security Advisor if Gore won the Presidency. Leon Fuerth (Interview) first heard of the 
links between HIV/AIDS and security thorough the classified version of NIE 99-17. He 
had developed a theory of "Forward Engagement" to address and ameliorate long-term 
threats to security that fit well with the NIE 99-17's vision of infectious diseases, 
HIV/AIDS in particular, causing political, social and economic instability (Fuerth 
Interview). Fuerth embraced the idea that HIV/AIDS should be addressed as a national 
security threat. Fuerth and Bernard agreed that a national plan on HIV/AIDS was 
needed. 
They needed a strategy that outlined the objectives, the costs, and the tasks... 
Armed with that strategy, they could take it to the deputies (a collection of the 
deputy secretaries and directors of key U. S. departments and agencies), and then 
to the principals (secretaries and directors). With their recommendation and the 
president's approval, it would become U. S. national security policy. The funds 
and structural reform, they suspected, would follow. (Behrman 2004: 230) 
Fuerth made Bernard co-chair of a new interagency working group on HIV/AIDS, along 
with Sandy Thurman, director of the White House Office of National AIDS Policy and 
"AIDS czar. " Despite high hopes, according to Behrman (2004), turf battles and 
personal differences between Bernard and Thurman undermined this process. Cultural 
differences between global health and national security also contributed to the group's 
failure. In the first and critical deputies meeting, Thurman presented a "threat 
assessment" on HIV/AIDS to members of the NIC in the White House Situation Room. 
Her presentation revealed the cultural divide between global health and national security 
policy communities, as well as different referent objects of the different communities 
(represented in this thesis as the communitarian - cosmopolitan divide. ) At the meeting: 
Thurman did not speak the same language as her "security" colleagues. She 
spoke of humanitarian suffering, orphans, mother-to-child transmission. The 
security crowd leaned back, eyebrows bent cynically. They were skeptical of 
"nontraditional" issues to begin with, and Thurman's briefing seemed more a 
"public service think piece" than a threat assessment... deputies meetings are 
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supposed to be conclusive, and for the most part it was "amateur hour, " and 
provided ammunition to validate the skeptics' doubts. (Behrman 2004: 237-238) 
Both cultural differences, and Thurman's discussion focusing on human suffering as 
opposed to U. S. strategic interests, precluded a successful meeting. Gellman (2000b: 9) 
echoes Behrman's description of the vastly different experiences and perspectives 
between the global health and national security communities with this anecdote: "So 
unfamiliar are public health agencies with the apparatus of national defense that one 
early task force meeting was delayed when Co-chairwoman Sandra Thurman, whose 
Office of National AIDS Policy is across the street from the White House, could not find 
the Situation Room. " Turf battles detailed by Behrman (2004) and the communitarian - 
cosmopolitan divide impaired cooperation and doomed the working group's efforts to 
directly engage the U. S. national security community in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
In April of 2000, Barton Gellman published his article in the Washington Post that 
brought the issue of whether HIV/AIDS was a threat to U. S. security into public view. 
The article was based on NIE 99-17 and the work of Bernard and Thurman's working 
group (Gellman 2000b). It was titled "AIDS is declared threat to security: White House 
fears epidemic could destabilize world" (Gellman 2000b). The article declared that the 
Clinton Administration believed that HIV/AIDS was a threat to U. S. national security, 
even though NIE 99-17 had specifically avoided this formulation. The article began: 
Convinced that the global spread of AIDS is reaching catastrophic dimensions, 
the Clinton administration has formally designated the disease for the first time as 
a threat to U. S. national security that could topple foreign governments, touch off 
ethnic wars and undo decades of work in building free-market democracies 
abroad. (Gellman 2000b: para. 1) 
Gellman's article provoked widespread public debate on HIV/AIDS and security that 
lasted through the 2000 presidential elections, and into the beginning of the Bush 
administration. While the article described the White House as declaring HIV/AIDS to 
be a threat to security, there is no official process for declaring a threat to national 
security or list of such threats, and no such action had taken place. Susan Rice, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa explains "There's no formal process. It's not like 
there's a process for designating somebody a state sponsor of terrorism... There's no 
such list of threats" (Behrman 2002: 5). Joe Lockhart, President Clinton's Press 
Secretary, was questioned on this issue two days after the article appeared. 
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Q: Joe, when did the NSC come to the decision that the global AIDS crisis is a 
threat to national security? 
MR. LOCKHART: The NSC has been working on this particular issue for now 
almost two years. I think two years ago they set up an office and put on some staff 
to deal with health issues, because they do, ultimately, go to our national security. 
I mean, if you look at Africa, where AIDS is now the largest killer of any diseases 
that exist, you have very staggering numbers... you've got projections in some 
places where 50 percent of the military will contract HIV-AIDS in the not too 
distant future. 
Those can be very destabilizing numbers. And they have an impact on us. We 
have an interest in Africa, as far as our own national security, and we need to look 
at this problem -- as the NSC has done, very much so this year, but going back 
over the last couple of years -- as a national security issue... 
Q: Joe, what transpired on this issue over the weekend? I mean, was there some 
announcement or something that NSC did -- 
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think the Washington Post decided to run a story on it. 
There was nothing -- I mean, there was no formal designation of this... 
Q: Joe, on Josh's question, are you saying that the NSC members did not vote, this 
is a threat to national security, something like that? Did not -- 
MR. LOCKHART: That's correct. No, there's no formal designation. We've been 
working on this. We put staff on as far back as two years ago, on the NSC, to deal 
with health issues, and AIDS in particular. (White House Daily Briefing, 2000: 
para. 26) 
As described above, NIE 99-17 does not unequivocally state that HIV/AIDS represents a 
direct national security threat to the U. S. David Gordon, the director of the NIE 99-17 
project, deliberately avoided stating that the disease posed a direct risk to U. S. national 
security. He explains his rationale: 
We didn't sort of say, here's the line where health issues become security 
issues... We didn't want to set up a line for what crosses over, because we never 
would have gotten that consensus with the Intelligence Community... The explicit 
judgment was of a much lower hurdle. It's that infectious diseases taken 
generally pose challenges to the United States on health and national security 
issues. We didn't try to disaggregate that and say this is, that isn't. (Behrman 
2002: 41-42) 
Despite NIE 99-17 carefully avoiding designating HIV/AIDS as a direct threat to U. S. 
national security, Gellman's article had the effect of forcing the Clinton administration to 
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back the article's claim that "AIDS is [a] declared threat to security. " The unpalatable 
alternative was to downplay the importance of HIV/AIDS at a time when the 
administration was trying to emphasize its attention to the issue. Ken Bernard welcomed 
the increased attention to the security implications of HIV/AIDS generated by Gellman's 
article: 
Barton Gellman's thing [that HIV/AIDS is a national security issue], which 
nobody [in government had] ever announced... it was very cleverly done. He did 
a good job and actually did us all a big favor... there was no point in time when 
the U. S. declared AIDS a national security issue. It was never declared a national 
security issue because until you got up to senior policy makers, people like 
Princeton Lyman, or Holbrooke, or for that matter, the Vice President's National 
Security Advisor Fuerth, nobody would ever take it seriously. (Bernard Interview) 
Gellman's article had pushed the arguments within NIE 99-17 into the realm of public 
debate. In the public discourse, a less nuanced view of the security implications of 
HIV/AIDS than that presented in NIE 99-17, prevailed. It became U. S. government 
policy that HIV/AIDS threatened national security, and thus the pandemic was 
securitized within the U. S. The emergency measures that resulted from securitization 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. A critical finding from these events is that HIV/AIDS 
was only fully securitized in response to Gellman's Washington Post article, and the 
accompanying political pressure to emphasize the importance of the pandemic. 
The Clinton Administrations new position on HIV/AIDS drew criticism as well. 
Republican Senator Trent Lott thought the Clinton administration was pandering to gay 
rights groups by calling HIV/AIDS a national security threat. Lott was asked if he 
thought HIV/AIDS was a national security threat. He responded: 
I saw that in the Washington Post this morning .... I didn't see 
it in other papers, 
and the answer is no, I don't. I guess this is just the President trying to make an 
appeal to, you know, certain groups. But no, I don't view that as a national 
security threat. Not to our national security interests, no. " (Lott 2000: para. 6) 
An article by Bruce Fein (2000) in the conservative Washington Times also derided the 
link between HIV/AIDS and security. He wrote that, in espousing this link to national 
security, the Clinton administration 
144 
neglected to note, however, that chronic convulsions, tyranny, corruption, civil 
insurrections, tribal, ethnic, and religious enmities, war and human-rights 
violations have been the soundtracks of Africa since decolonization commenced 
in 1957 decades before AIDS appeared on the dismal scene. 
At Present, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Burundi, the Congo, Uganda, and Angola are all plagued by acute internal or 
external conflicts, none of which features AIDS as even a supporting actor... 
If everything is a national security problem, then nothing is. A sensible political 
discourse about national security priorities and funding is arrested. When genuine 
dangers appear, the public may yawn, as if hearing the boy who shouted "wolf' 
too often. (Fein 2000: para. 4) 
Conservative columnist William F. Buckley Jr. argued that linking HIV/AIDS and 
national security was "rhetorical opportunism" that impaired analytical scrutiny of real 
security threats (Buckley 2000: para. 5). Similarly, David Sanger (2000: para. 4), a New 
York Times White House correspondent, asked: 
Just when does a big problem turn into a national security threat?... It is hard to 
tell. As the Clinton presidency winds down, the definition of national security 
threats has gotten ever fuzzier. Even some senior members of the administration 
worry privately that the White House regularly overplays its hand and should 
reserve the national security argument for events tightly linked to the prospect of 
the United States becoming involved in conflict. "There's a significant risk of 
crying wolf, " one of the president's top security advisers concedes. "This isn't 
Sputnik, " he added, in another allusion to the Eisenhower years, when appeals for 
education funds could be based on fears that the Russians were well ahead in the 
race to build the first I. C. B. M. 's. 
Clearly there is a strong moral argument for helping the destitute ravaged by 
AIDS, in Africa or elsewhere. And no doubt the disease could lead to political 
instability. But so can poverty, and the 1.3 billion people who live on less than a 
dollar a day trigger meetings at the World Bank these days, not in the Situation 
Room. 
Advisers to Mr. Bush, eager to portray the current occupants of the White House 
as long on butter and short on guns, carry the argument one step further: by 
making the list of security threats too long, they argue, the Clinton administration 
risks taking its eye off more imminent threats. Or as Paul Wolfowitz, dean of the 
school of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and one of 
those advisers, wrote recently, AIDS in Africa and the environment are serious 
problems, but calling them national security threats carries `the implication that 
conventional security is no longer something we need to worry much about. ' 
Ken Bernard believes that the critical responses to Gellman's Washington Post piece 
share a lack of understanding of the new post-Cold War security threats, including 
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diseases, which the U. S. now faces. After Gellman's article, "several people came out 
saying, poppycock... There was this big pushback. It was more pushback than was 
reasonable. It was like, me thinks thou protests too much. Why is it that this bothers you 
so much? And it's because they're much more comfortable with traditional security" 
(Bernard Interview). 
While there was resistance to this securitization of HIV/AIDS, emergency measures 
were adopted in the wake of the Estimate and its coverage in the press. U. S. funding for 
global AIDS was increased to US$450 million for 2001, a three-fold increase since 1999 
(Behrman 2004). In addition, the Clinton Administration appointed the first U. S. special 
envoy for HIV/AIDS. These measures had limited impact because they were 
implemented very close to end of its term in office, but they demonstrate the successful 
securitization of HIV/AIDS that resulted from the publication of NIE 99-17 and the 
resulting public discussion of the nexus. 
5.5.1 Discussion 
The creation, publication and declassification of NIE 99-17 was a major event in the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. More than any other single document, NIE 99-17 
both defined the links between HIV/AIDS and U. S. national security and brought those 
linkages to the attention of top-tier policymakers in the U. S. and abroad. Based in the 
communitarian perspective of national security, the Estimate presented data and outlined 
the ways in which infectious diseases could threaten U. S. and global security. However 
the publication of the Estimate alone did not serve to securitize the pandemic in the U. S. 
In fact, the Estimate scrupulously avoided the argument that HIV/AIDS was a direct 
national security threat to the U. S. because the authors felt the U. S. intelligence 
community would not agree upon such a statement. It was only when Gellman's (2000b) 
article appeared in Washington Post, provocatively entitled "AIDS is declared threat to 
security: White House fears epidemic could destabilize world, " that the Clinton 
Administration publicly embraced the argument that the pandemic was a threat to U. S. 
national security. While the creation of NIE 99-17 and increasing attention to the global 
pandemic would have ensured an increase in political attention to HIV/AIDS, it seems to 
have been a newspaper article that led the U. S. government to adopt the position that the 
pandemic was a threat to national security and securitize HIV/AIDS. 
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This case of securitization was informed by data produced by global health actors, 
primarily UNAIDS estimates of the global pandemic and on prevalence among armed 
forces, and Piot and the IOM's arguments on the threat emerging diseases, and 
HIV/AIDS in particular, posed to the U. S. interests. However, traditional public health 
actors played little role in the production of NIE 99-17 or the subsequent political debate 
that followed. In the end, despite policy space opened by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and accelerating globalization, UNAIDS evidence, UNAIDS, IOM and NIC 
arguments that HIV/AIDS threatened U. S. national security interests, and the efforts of 
people within the U. S. intelligence community to raise the profile of the pandemic, it was 
a strongly titled newspaper article that finally succeeded in creating the political pressure 
necessary to securitize HIV/AIDS in the U. S. Gellman's article forced the Clinton 
Administration to choose between backing the designation of HIV/AIDS as a threat to 
U. S. national security, or downplaying the importance of the pandemic at a time when 
the Administration was trying to emphasize its action against the disease for political 
reasons. This thesis argues that the securitization of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. was an 
intensely political process, in which the Clinton Administration and other actors involved 
in the securitizing move were influenced by these ulterior political motivations and 
considerations. 
Bernard played the pivotal role in gaining momentum for the Estimate and inserting the 
national security implications of HIV/AIDS into the policy process. Bernard has a 
public health background, but it was his strategic understanding of the culture and 
operations of U. S. national security enabled him, (in contrast with Sandra Thurman, ) to 
successfully introduce HIV/AIDS onto the U. S. national intelligence agenda. One of 
Bernard's self-described main goals was to link infectious diseases with U. S. national 
security to attract greater funding and political attention to global health. This is a clear 
example of the supplicant model, where public health frames issues as threats to national 
security seeking to benefit from the political power and resources of the security 
community. In this case, the supplicant model was successful in linking HIV/AIDS to 
national security interests and generating increased political attention. However the 
hazards of the supplicant model for public health were also clearly apparent. In framing 
HIV/AIDS as a national security threat, the supplicant model resulted in an Estimate 
focused on U. S. strategic interests rather than efforts to alleviate the human suffering 
147 
caused by HIV/AIDS. Elbe (2006b) clearly outlined this shift from a humanitarian to 
national security framework as one of the risks of securitization. 
It should also be noted that there was independent security community interest in 
addressing infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS. While there was also resistance from 
within the security community to studying public health issues, the security community 
acted with independent interest in infectious diseases in a way that is not fully accounted 
for by the models of engagement. Finally, Fidler's remediation model is highly relevant 
here in describing the factors behind health's rise into high politics. The political 
attention and funding that resulted from the NIE 99-17 were largely due to the potential 
impact of infectious diseases on U. S. strategic interests. It was, as the title of the 
Estimate suggests, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the 
United States that drove HIV/AIDS on the U. S. national security agenda and high 
political status. 
5.6 The United Nations Security Council, HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308 
Occurring concurrently in 1999 was planning for the first UNSC meeting HIV/AIDS. 
The UNSC had never met to discuss HIV/AIDS before, in fact, the Security Council had 
never met to discuss any health issue in the over 4,000 meetings held since its founding. 
The UNSC's meetings on HIV/AIDS, and resulting Resolution 1308, would securitize 
the pandemic at the central institution of international security and contribute to the 
rising political attention to HIV/AIDS. Looking back upon the meeting and resultant 
resolution from 2005, Executive Director of UNAIDS Peter Piot said: 
When we look at the history of the fight against AIDS, there is no doubt that 
resolution 1308 (2000) is a milestone in the response to the epidemic. By 
underscoring the fact that the spread of HIV/AIDS, if unchecked, may pose a risk 
to stability and security, the Security Council, through resolution 1308 has 
transformed how the world views AIDS. (United Nations Security Council 2005: 
5) 
Yet this case of securitization and resulting transformation of the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, as in the U. S. securitization of HIV/AIDS, was the result of an 
intensely political process which was strongly influenced by factors outside of the 
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field of global health. Far from being a clear recognition of the importance of 
HIV/AIDS to international security, as Not suggests above, the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS at the UNSC was resisted from the beginning. 
5.61 Planning and Reasons for the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS 
The idea to hold a UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS was Richard Holbrooke's, then U. S. 
Ambassador to the UN. Holbrooke is known as an ambitious diplomat who was 
appointed as Ambassador to the UN after negotiating the Dayton Peace Agreements that 
ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 19 In December 1999, Holbrooke was touring 
southern Africa with Russ Feingold, Chairman of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee's Subcommittee on Africa. Feingold describes Holbrooke as "one of the 
leading diplomats of the twentieth century, and he had never been to southern Africa" 
(Sternberg 2002). Holbrooke scheduled visits related to HIV/AIDS in each of the ten 
countries he visited. These he described as "horror shows" which had a strong effect on 
him (Behrman 2004). At one visit to an AIDS orphanage in Lusaka, Zambia, Holbrooke 
saw 
several hundred children, clothed in rags, gather at a former bus depot for a 
needed meal and free schooling. The American visitors were charmed by the 
children, their singing and dancing - and horrified to learn that at the end of the 
day they would be turned out into the streets to sleep and forage for dinner, 
sometimes trading sex for warmth or food. (Sternberg 2002: para. 17) 
On the flight home after this visit, Holbrooke telephoned UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. The U. S. was scheduled to have the rotating presidency of the first UNSC 
meeting of the new millennium. As the U. S. ambassador, Holbrooke could influence the 
agenda. Feingold describes the conversation: "It was at this point... that he just started 
doing what Dick Holbrooke does. I watched him call up the Secretary-General and tell 
him we have to have a Security Council meeting on AIDS. The Secretary General said, 
`We can't do that. AIDS isn't a security issue"' (Sternberg 2002: 18). Annan's response 
reflected how novel this conceptualization of HIV/AIDS was in 1999, even to persons 
19 One confidential interviewee told the following joke to illustrate Holbrooke's ambition: "What was the 
most dangerous place in Bosnia during the War? Between Richard Holbrooke and the CNN camera. " 
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knowledgeable about the pandemic. Nevertheless, Holbrooke wanted to hold a "Month 
on Africa" with a special focus on HIV/AIDS. 
This analysis argues that Holbrooke had at least four reasons for this. First, arising from 
his personal experiences, Holbrooke seemed to be genuinely concerned about the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and wanted to initiate more action to fight the disease. 
Second and similar to Bernard, Holbrooke felt that strategically calling the pandemic a 
threat to security would greatly increase the political profile of HIV/AIDS. Addressing 
the disease at the UNSC was an obvious choice for Holbrooke, because it was the most 
important and visible venue he had access to. But getting the UNSC to address 
HIV/AIDS was also important because he felt it could transform the treatment of the 
epidemic by policymakers from a low-level health issue, to an issue of international 
security addressed at the highest levels of government. Eddy, Holbrook's deputy at the 
UN, recalls why Holbrooke wanted the UNSC to address HIV/AIDS: "He believed that 
if you don't do it in the Security Council, it won't get done - it's the only [UN] body that 
gets things done" (Eddy Interview). To Behrman (2002: 71-72), Eddy recalls Holbrooke 
saying: "If we get AIDS in the Security Council that will begin to break down the 
stigma, that will begin to get more money to the issue, that will bring more leadership to 
the issue, and that will lead to a solution .... We have to get it into the Security Council 
for it to matter. " In short, Holbrooke thought he could transform the way the world 
addressed HIV/AIDS by getting the UNSC to securitize the pandemic. 
Holbrooke's third and critical reason for holding a "Month on Africa" was the 
longstanding issue of unpaid American assessed contributions to the UN. The U. S. owed 
the UN almost a billion dollars, and the primary mission of the U. S. delegation to the UN 
was to reduce these dues (Eddy Interview 2004; Nossel 2001). Nossel (2001: 96), who 
also served on Holbrook's staff at the UN, summarized this challenge as convincing 
"188 other countries to fork over more [money] so that - during the longest period of 
prosperity in its history - the world's richest country could pay less. " U. S. contributions 
to the UN were a longstanding thorn in the side of U. S. -UN relations and were, in 
Holbrooke's own words, his "number one issue" (Wallis 2001). To achieve this reform, 
Holbrooke needed votes and political capital. By holding a "Month on Africa" at the 
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UNSC, Holbrooke hoped to gain the gratitude of African states, which he could then ask 
for their votes to reduce U. S. dues to the UN. Eddy (Interview) recalls: 
Part of [Holbrooke's] motivation to do all the HIV work and counseling, I'm 
convinced that's because Africa has a lot of influence and votes in the UN and our 
number one objective was not HIV. Our number one objective internally was to 
get U. S. assessments reduced. We felt we were paying too much and in order to 
pay less, we needed a lot of countries to vote. 
The UNSC's "Month on Africa" and meetings on HIV/AIDS were part of a much larger 
and ultimately successful foreign policy gambit by the U. S. to win votes to reduce U. S. 
dues to the UN. 
Holbrooke's final reason for focusing the UNSC on the HIV/AIDS epidemic appears to 
have been for personal political gain. The background to Holbrooke's calculations was 
that Gore was in a tight race for the U. S. presidency, and had been heckled by AIDS 
activists during his campaign. As previously discussed, Gore's announcement of his 
presidential campaign was marred by AIDS protestors shouting "Gore is killing 
Africans, AIDS drugs now! " (Richwine 1999: para. 10) As before, these protests had 
pushed Gore and the Clinton Administration to further action on HIV/AIDS in an 
attempt to defuse the issue. 
Holbrooke was a rising Democratic diplomat, and on the shortlist to become Secretary of 
State in the event of a Gore win. Weeks before the UNSC session on HIV/AIDS, 
Holbrooke called Leon Fuerth (Gore's national security advisor) and asked if Gore 
would chair the UNSC session on HIV/AIDS. Holbrooke recalls that "Leon got it 
immediately and made it happen" (Behrman 2004: 163). Behrman (2004: 163-164) 
describes Holbrooke's political calculus in staging the meeting on HIV/AIDS at the 
UNSC and inviting Gore: "In one masterful stroke, Holbrooke managed to confer 
prestige on his event, and also alleviate a debilitating political liability for the VP, 
thereby tightening his already very strong relationship with Gore, and cementing his 
standing as the front-runner to become Gore's secretary of state. " In short, Holbrooke 
sought to provide a unique platform for Gore to cement his national security 
qualifications and address HIV/AIDS in hopes that this would improve his and Gore's 
political fortunes. 
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Interestingly, one consideration that did not seem to feature in Holbrooke's deliberations 
was strong evidence that HIV/AIDS could impact national and international security. As 
Annan's response to Holbrooke's call from Zambia in 1999 showed, HIV/AIDS was not 
yet considered a security issue. As described above, at this time, the classified NIE 99- 
17 report discussed the national and international security implications of infectious 
disease, but did not describe the HIV/AIDS epidemic explicitly as a threat to U. S. 
national security. Nonetheless, Holbrooke felt that his argument that HIV/AIDS could 
threaten national and international security was strong enough and he was famously 
"impervious to setbacks" (Sternberg 2002: 24). 
Holbroooke assigned Eddy, who had run the PRD in 1995, to be the lead for his plan to 
address HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. Eddy recalls Holbrooke arguing that HIV/AIDS "is a 
massive destabilizing force to nations... and it is a massive threat to peace and security, 
period. No nuances necessary" (Eddy Interview). But like Holbrooke, Eddy ran into 
resistance from the start. His first phone call was to Bill Wood, U. S. Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and UN expert. Wood 
was clear: "He said, RP [Eddy], you know, very pedantically, the charter of the UN 
Security Council says a `threat to peace and security, ' and that's not HIV, end of story. 
This just doesn't happen" (Eddy Interview). Wood was referencing Article 34 of the UN 
Charter, which outlines the responsibility of the UNSC: 
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security. (United Nations 1945: Article 
34) 
Anything that was not a threat to the "maintenance of international peace and security" 
was outside the purview of the UNSC. It seemed like a literal reading of the UN Charter 
would prevent the UNSC from addressing HIV/AIDS. However, Holbrooke seemed to 
embrace Buzan et al. 's (1998) view of security as an intersubjective understanding of 
what constitutes an existential threat, and is therefore subject to change though the 
process of securitization. In other words, HIV/AIDS could become an accepted threat to 
security if a credible security organization like the UNSC says it is. Eddy remembers his 
and Holbrooke's argument at the time: 
152 
It's like, this is a security issue because we say it is. It's not like he needs some 
sort of academic, stereotypical foreign policy officer to tell you, `Well, technically 
it's not a threat to peace and security and here's why and because of that 
technicality... ' If the Security Council says it is, it is. If the Council votes that 
the emergence of super large slurpees20 is a threat to peace and security, then it 
is. " (Eddy Interview) 
To try to gather more support for addressing HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, Eddy invited all 
interested countries and military attaches at the UN to a discussion of the issue. He 
hoped this would "be a great way for me to create a bunch of momentum that will allow 
me to get more progress in the [Security] Council" (Eddy Interview). However Eddy 
underestimated the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, and the difference between 
discussing HIV/AIDS in private and an open UN meeting. Eddy tells the story: 
So we walked into one of the huge conference rooms at the UN and every seat is 
full and it's like, what's going on here? So, there's 183 countries in the UN at 
that point, there's 15 that are on the Council and they're still there. Everyone's 
got one or two people in this room and I'm like, oh boy... I gave my statement on 
here's what we're trying to do and here's what's going on. There are a number of 
African Military Attaches who I had been working with, particularly the one from 
Nigeria, who was a General, he was a real alpha male African General, who 
would look you in the eye, squeeze your hand, quite a presence. And he would 
tell me, `look, this is a big deal. ' And the different Attaches would say `RP, this 
is a big deal, you've got to fix this, this is not just a peacekeeping issue, but it's 
just the issue that HIV really matters and my military's getting ripped up, the 
country's getting ripped up... ' there's no two ways about it, they were supportive 
of the issue. But once we got in the room, they weren't. They couldn't appear to 
be... The basic punch line from these guys was, `who do you think you are? 
You've just said in your statement, you're saying to the Council, that our nations 
are under some sort of siege or are unstable because of this virus, you know, 
that's the worst kind of hegemony, it the worst kind of paternalism, ' - all this 
crap. They have these buzzwords in the UN that are sort of a `get out of jail free' 
card. Anytime you can blame someone for paternalism, you win. Anyone you 
can blame for not paying their bills, you win. So you can imagine the U. S. gets it 
on both sides. And that's what they were basically saying - this is a paternalistic 
point of view; we're doing very well, thank you very much. Our country's not 
falling into a shifter, we do not have a lack of military control. And, of course, 
they had to say that. You're the Nigerian Military Attache, you can't sit in a room 
in front of every nation, you can when you're having a beer with RP, but you 
can't in front of 183 other countries, so it was really brutal. (Eddy Interview) 
When asked about why the African military attaches would not discuss the issue of 
HIV/AIDS and national security, Eddy replies: 
20 Super large slurpees are a North American partially frozen beverage that come in a variety of fruit and 
soda flavors. The UK equivalent is a Slush Puppie. 
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It was just face. Well, at the end of the day, they did it because they wanted to 
cable back to Kinshasa or whatever country capital it was and say, `look this is 
what happened, I stood up and said we're doing fine. ' And the alternative would 
be to cable back and say, `yeah, this guy from the United States got up there and 
said that there's a large number of sub-Saharan African countries that are in grave 
danger and I didn't do anything or agree with them' - they can't do that. And this 
is back when a lot of the thinking was still, kind of, perverted around the idea 
about like, tourism dollars are going to go down if people understand HIV/AIDS 
is a big issue here, or, you know, it was a lot of denial, a lot of wrong thinking. 
(Eddy Interview) 
Chastened by his failure, Eddy "went back and I talked to Holbrooke, and I said, `We 
just got pummeled' and he said, `well... so what, it's not up to them"' (Eddy Interview). 
By this, Holbrooke meant that only the permanent members of the UNSC, and not all the 
member states of the UN, decide what topics to address. Yet the U. S. still faced 
opposition from three of the five permanent members of the UNSC: France, China and 
Russia (Schoofs 2000). Only the UK tepidly supported U. S. efforts to address 
HIV/AIDS at the Security Council from the beginning (Eddy Interview). 
To overcome this resistance, the U. S. had to water down its proposed resolution on 
HIV/AIDS and draw a clearer link between the pandemic and the responsibilities of the 
UNSC. Eddy (Interview) recalls: 
Initially I said, I'm pushing for... straight up and down, AIDS matters. The 
resolution says it matters and you do all these things about it and it is a threat to 
peace and security - and it was like, no way - not going to happen. And then I 
went back and said, `Okay, what do we do? ' The next argument was, okay: it's a 
threat to the peace and security of Africa and here's why. All these facts, the 
militaries, and then the Africans said no. 
Interviewer: Sounds like they were extremely reluctant. 
Yeah, oh absolutely... somewhere I have my edits on the resolution which are 
fascinating because it starts like: HIV is a clear and present security danger to the 
future of the world and we will have to deal with it and every nation has to do the 
following things and, you know, absolutely true. And at the end of it we're like, 
you know: noted that some people sometimes think, when they're not really 
paying attention, that HIV might be an issue. The language just got so watered 
down. 
The U. S. delegation was having serious difficulty obtaining agreement on addressing 
HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. However, the U. S. delegation finally found the issue that 
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linked the HIV/AIDS epidemic to the responsibility to the UNSC: peacekeeping forces. 
As previously discussed, studies had linked UN peacekeepers to the rapid growth of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia and in Sierra Leone. Because UN peacekeeping 
missions are authorized by the UNSC, the behavior of peacekeepers on UN missions and 
their role in spreading disease could be viewed as a responsibility of the UNSC. This 
linked the pandemic to the UNSC's responsibility for the "maintenance of international 
peace and security, " and gave Holbrooke and the U. S. delegation the necessary rationale 
for addressing HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. 
Holbrooke repeated this link between HIV and peacekeeping constantly in the lead up to 
the UNSC meetings and during 2000. He told the UNSC, "We must avoid the supreme 
irony which would occur if, in the course of trying to prevent conflicts, United Nations 
peacekeepers spread a disease even more deadly than the conflicts themselves" (United 
Nations Security Council 2000b: 6). This wording placed HIV/AIDS solidly within the 
purview of the UNSC and greatly aided in gaining the support of the five permanent 
members of the UNSC, although Russia still opposed the session on HIV/AIDS and 
would refuse to speak. Holbrooke described this as "an act of classic Russian heavy- 
handedness... they opposed it, would go along with it because everyone else wanted it, 
but - and this had us all in the aisles laughing - they would refuse to speak. To which I 
was tempted to say, `Do you promise? "' (Schoofs 2000: para. 9). In short, this link 
between HIV/AIDS and peacekeepers, which would be a focal point of the UNSC 
Resolution 1308, was a political convenience used to gain acceptance for HIV/AIDS to 
be addressed by the UNSC. 
5.6.2 The 4087th Meeting of the UNSC, 10 January 2000 
On 10 January 2000, the first UNSC meeting of the new millennium convened to discuss 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition to being the first time a health issue had ever been 
addressed at the UNSC, the meeting also held a number of other `firsts' for the people 
who addressed the UNSC. Peter Piot, Mark Malloch Brown, James Wolfensohn and 
David Satcher, the heads of UNAIDS, UNDP, the World Bank, and the U. S. Surgeon 
General respectively, all made presentations to the UNSC. It was the first time anyone 
from UNAIDS, UNDP, the World Bank or the U. S. Surgeon General had ever addressed 
the UNSC. Public health and development organizations, even those that are part of the 
155 
UN system such as UNAIDS and UNDP, had never been invited to the UNSC because 
public health and development were generally deemed to be irrelevant to the high 
politics of security. James Wolfensohn explored this gap between the development and 
security communities in his comments, challenging the UNSC to recognize the work of 
international development as also contributing to international peace and security. 
Wolfensohn stated: 
I believe it is the first time that a President of the World Bank has ever attended a 
meeting of this body... I do not know a lot about the workings of the Security 
Council. I have images of you ladies and gentlemen meeting at midnight, having 
very important meetings, using high diplomacy and power politics to solve very 
important and pressing issues that face us: issues of conflict, issues of chemical 
weapons, issues of nuclear challenges and issues of security. The funny thing is 
that in Washington we think that what we do every day in terms of addressing the 
questions of development are actions which lead to the very same issue of 
security and peace (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 8). 
The UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS was breaking new ground, not only by considering 
development and public health pathways to security, but by discussing a highly 
stigmatized sexually transmitted disease openly and at the highest levels of international 
relations. Holbrooke recalled that British Ambassador to the UN Sir Jeremy Greenstock 
passed him a note during the first session on HIV/AIDS that said: "I daresay this is the 
first time the word 'condoms' has been used in the Security Council" (Holbrooke 2000a). 
Because of the subject matter and persons invited, the meeting of the UNSC to discuss 
HIV/AIDS was an unprecedented linkage of global health and international security. 
Two main themes emerged from the discussion at this meeting. First, advocates of 
human security used the meeting to call for broadening the purview of the UNSC beyond 
national and international security. In his opening address, Gore argued that by 
addressing HIV/AIDS, the UNSC was beginning to recognize the need to embrace a 
broader definition of security to include non-traditional security threats and human 
security issues. Gore states that HIV/AIDS "sets a precedent for Security Council 
concern and action on a broader security agenda... We must understand that the old 
conception of global security - with its focus almost exclusively on armies, ideologies 
and geopolitics - has to be enlarged" (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 2). Peter 
Piot seconds this notion of broadening the UNSC's purview beyond state security by 
arguing that HIV/AIDS in Africa had become "an issue of human security in all senses 
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of the word" (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 11). Mr. Chowdhury, 
Ambassador to the UN from Bangladesh, concluded his remarks by saying "We look 
forward to discussing other non-military threats to peace and security, including such 
overriding global priorities as poverty, environmental degradation, drugs, organized 
crime and so on. The world has changed, and the time has come to extend the concept of 
security as well" (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 17). Michel Duval, 
Ambassador to the UN from Canada, a major proponent of the concept of human 
security, reminded the UNSC that "Canada has consistently argued that the Council must 
broaden its definition of security to include non-traditional threats, especially those 
which affect human security" (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 4). These 
arguments illustrate how proponents sought to use the discussion of HIV/AIDS as a 
"Trojan Horse" to introduce human security issues into the work of the UNSC. 
However, it is important to recall that the vast human security implications of the 
epidemic were originally insufficient to allow debate on HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. Only 
when the epidemic was linked specifically to peacekeepers, and thus directly to the 
formal responsibilities of the UNSC, was the session approved by the permanent 
members of the UNSC. 
The second theme to the discussions at the UNSC meeting opposed UNSC involvement 
in human security issues, and argued for a limited UNSC role in addressing the 
pandemic. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued for a narrowly defined role in 
addressing HIV/AIDS through the UNSC's traditional role in preventing and resolving 
conflicts. He states that the UNSC's role "must be to prevent conflict from contributing 
to the spread of AIDS and from impeding the efforts that other partners are making to 
control it" (United Nations Security Council 2000a: 5). Dr. Amathila, Namibian 
Ambassador to the United Nations, echoes Annan's argument but pushes further against 
UNSC involvement with HIV/AIDS. She argues that: 
While the issue of HIV/AIDS is not under the purview of the Security Council, 
the primary responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security will contribute in a major way to minimizing the 
impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa. By effectively addressing conflict situations in 
Africa, the Security Council will no doubt assist African Governments in devoting 
more resources to tackling social and economic problems. (United Nations 
Security Council 2000a: 13-14) 
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Ambassadors from Canada, Ukraine and Jamaica also make this same point, arguing that 
the UNSC will aid the fight against HIV/AIDS through its existing role in preventing and 
resolving conflict in Africa and other regions. The discomfort with addressing 
HIV/AIDS at the UNSC expressed in these comments has a likely source in the politics 
of the UN, where traditionally humanitarian issues such as HIV/AIDS are addressed by 
the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly. States that are not 
permanent members of the UNSC may wish to maintain their ability to address 
humanitarian issues at either of these venues, which are more representative and provide 
greater leverage for smaller states in the policymaking process. 
5.6.3 UNSC Resolution 1308 
On 17 July 2000, the UNSC reconvened to discuss and vote on its first resolution on 
HIV/AIDS. Resolution 1308 recognizes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic "if unchecked, 
may pose a risk to stability and security... " (United Nations Security Council 2000c: 2). 
Despite this stated concern with the broad security implications of the pandemic, 
Resolution 1308 narrowly applies only to UN peacekeeping missions. This major 
limitation reflects the difficulties of the U. S. delegation in gaining approval to address 
HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. In the language of the UNSC, the Resolution "Expresses 
concern at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international 
peacekeeping personnel... " (United Nations Security Council 2000c: 2). The Resolution 
then encourages all UN member states to work with UNAIDS to develop strategies for 
HIV/AIDS "education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counseling, 
and treatment" of peacekeeping personnel (United Nations Security Council 2000c: 2). 
Finally, the Resolution requests pre-deployment and ongoing HIV/AIDS training for 
peacekeeping personnel. Bazergan (2004: 1) writes that the "diluted and formulaic 
wording [of Resolution 1308] hints at unease among many member states regarding the 
extent to which they are willing to engage with the issue of HIV/AIDS and 
peacekeeping. " 
Arguments against substantial UNSC involvement also emerge from the 17 July 2000 
meeting on HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping operations. Comments by Ambassadors 
Greenstock and Holbrooke reveal a behind-the-scenes critique of UNSC involvement 
with the issue of HIV/AIDS. The critique seems to follow two lines of thought. In the 
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first, the UNSC is seen to have usurped the power and responsibility of the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) by 
appropriating the issue of HIV/AIDS. Ambassador Greenstock condemns with light 
praise the U. S. efforts to bring HIV/AIDS to the Security Council, and argues that the 
disease is really the responsibility of the UNGA and ECOSOC: 
We welcome the initiatives that have been taken in the Security Council this year 
and pay tribute to the leadership of the United States... But the Council does not 
have the main responsibility in tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic. All of our 
delegations must work together in the General Assembly and in the Economic and 
Social Council to take concrete steps that will make a difference. (United Nations 
Security Council 2000b: 10) 
Bazergan (Interview) supports the conclusion that the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS 
raised tensions among the UNSC, ECOSOC and the UNGA. She says that the "remit of 
1308 was tight to stay within the Security Council's mandate. " This was to prevent the 
UNSC from "stepping on the toes of the General Assembly" (Bazergan Interview). 
In the second critique, the UNSC is seen to inappropriately infringe on national 
sovereignty by addressing the issue of HIV/AIDS and the disease among troops in 
countries donating peacekeepers. By 2000, the UN no longer honored the concept of 
national sovereignty to the extent that "what went on within states was no concern of any 
outsider" (Taylor 2001: 335). However, the balance between maintaining international 
order by respecting national sovereignty and upholding universal human rights by 
addressing issues within states was still important to the UNSC's operation, with respect 
of national sovereignty the rule and interventions on behalf of individuals and human 
rights the exception (Taylor 2001). Sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of countries were still "cardinal rules" of the international system and critical to 
the operation of the UN system (Wheeler 2000: 11). By addressing HIV/AIDS among 
peacekeeping forces, the UNSC seemed to be challenging these rules. Holbrooke seeks 
to answer both the ECOSOC/GA and sovereignty critiques in his opening statement at 
the July 17,2000 meeting: 
I want to say at the outset to my friends who are concerned about the issue of 
sovereignty and about what the Security Council should and should not do, that 
this draft resolution in no way infringes on the sovereignty or authority of 
countries... In no way do we undercut the work of our equally important 
Economic and Social Council; rather we reinforce it... To be sure, the Security 
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Council and the United Nations cannot require Member States to force 
involuntary testing of their troops. This would violate the United Nations respect 
for national sovereignty, but we recommend... and urge that all countries increase 
their testing, especially of those troops that will be send overseas. (United Nations 
Security Council 2000b: 5) 
Holbrooke's statement acknowledges the two arguments against addressing HIV/AIDS 
at the UNSC, and seeks to reassure member states before the vote on Resolution 1308. 
A separate critical issue that arose at the 17 July 2000 meeting was the beginning of a 
critical examination of how HIV/AIDS may impact on national security and state 
stability. During the 10 January 2000 meeting, Al Gore outlined how the epidemic may 
threaten international peace and security. He stated: 
By overwhelming the continent's health services, by creating millions of orphans 
and by decimating health workers and teachers, AIDS is causing social and 
economic crises, which in turn threaten political stability. It also threatens good 
governance through high death rates among the elites, both public and private. In 
already unstable societies, this cocktail of disasters is a sure recipe for more 
conflict and conflict in turn provides fertile ground for further infections. (United 
Nations Security Council 2000a: 5) 
At the 17 July 2000 meeting, Mr. Yusuf Juwayeyi, Malawi's Ambassador to the UN, 
questions this linkage between HIV/AIDS, political instability and conflict though 
examples of highly-affected countries. Mr. Juwayeyiargues that "the most severely 
affected countries - Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa - have been stable 
countries. There has not been any conflict in these countries for the past decade or two - 
and, for some of these countries, since their independence" (United Nations Security 
Council 2000b: 23). These comments mark the beginning of resistance to the linkage of 
HIV/AIDS and security based on the absence of evidence on this specific causal 
connection. 
5.6.4 Discussion 
Given the strong barriers to addressing HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, the occurrence of these 
meetings is all the more remarkable. This thesis finds that barriers to securitization at the 
UNSC were strong and took at least four forms. First, the inertia of precedent could 
have prevented the UNSC and its members from departing from tradition and addressing 
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a health issue for the first time. Second, internal turf wars among UN bodies led to 
opposition to addressing the disease in the UNSC, instead of the other organizations that 
address health-related issues. Third, political opposition to calling HIV/AIDS a national 
security threat, both in African countries and globally, due to the possible intrusion on 
national sovereignty that Resolution 1308 posed, proved a major hurdle to holding the 
UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS. Finally, there was slim evidence at that time that 
HIV/AIDS actually posed an explicit threat to national security and political stability. 
Holbrooke and the U. S. delegation overcame these barriers by focusing on the link 
between HIV/AIDS and peacekeepers, even though they would later admit that this link 
was "overblown" because of the very small number of peacekeepers who had been 
infected with HIV/AIDS while on missions (Eddy Interview). 
This thesis also finds that the motivations of Holbrooke and the U. S. delegation to the 
UN for seeking to securitize HIV/AIDS were multifaceted and not entirely related to 
fighting the pandemic. Holbrooke's "number one issue" was reducing U. S. dues to the 
UN, and his focus on HIV/AIDS was partially a means to win African votes for this 
cause (Wallis 2001: para. 8). In addition to Holbrooke's personal commitment to 
fighting the pandemic, his political ambitions to become Al Gore's Secretary of State 
were also factors in his efforts to securitize the pandemic. Despite serious resistance to 
addressing HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, the U. S. delegation's mixed motivations for 
securitizing the pandemic, and being forced to rely on an "overblown" linkage to obtain 
agreement on addressing the pandemic at the UNSC, the U. S. delegation successfully 
securitized HIV/AIDS at the most important forum of international security. 
S. 7 Conclusions 
This chapter has found that the NIC 99-17 report and subsequent debate, and the UNSC 
meetings on HIV/AIDS, successfully securitized HIV/AIDS in the U. S. and at the global 
level. However in both the U. S. intelligence community and the UNSC, securitization 
was far from clear cut. High-level political interests, unrelated to global health or 
HIV/AIDS, played a significant role in crafting both events. Specifically, the UNSC 
meetings on HIV/AIDS were championed by Holbrooke for a number of additional 
reasons unrelated to fighting the disease, including reducing U. S. assessed contributions 
to the UN and his own political ambitions. Furthermore, the UNSC meetings on 
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HIV/AIDS were marked by major disagreements about whether the UNSC should 
address the disease, whether HIV/AIDS was a threat to national or human security, and 
what action if any the UNSC should take to address HIV/AIDS. Similarly, NIC 99-17 
did not actually argue that HIV/AIDS was a direct national security threat to the U. S. 
HIV/AIDS was only discussed as a threat to U. S. security after the publication of a 
Washington Post article in 2000 which put pressure on the Clinton administration to 
embrace its designation as a security threat. In both cases, securitization of HIV/AIDS 
was greatly aided by fortuitous political situations and political agendas unrelated to 
global health. 
It is argued that two individuals, Ken Bernard and Richard Holbrooke, played critical 
roles in securitizing HIV/AIDS in the U. S. and at the UNSC. Without Bernard's ability 
to successfully frame infectious diseases as threats to U. S. national security, it is doubtful 
that NIE 99-17 would have been produced. Without Holbrooke's idea to address 
HIV/AIDS at the UNSC, and how doing so could aid other policy objectives, the UNSC 
meetings on HIV/AIDS would not have occurred. The UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS 
were entirely the product of Holbrooke and his staff's efforts. Thus the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS and resulting political "revolution" was also highly dependent on the actions 
of these two key individuals (Fidler 2004: 45). 
The critical importance of the broader political context and events, and personal 
advocacy by such individuals, only one of whom has direct public health experience, to 
the securitization of HIV/AIDS raises questions about the public health community's 
capacity to influence the security policy agenda. Global health actors played only a 
limited role in the actual events of securitizing the pandemic, or in motivating specific 
action by the U. S. intelligence community or at the UNSC. This analysis finds that the 
global health community had little direct influence over securitization, and thus the 
resulting transformation of the political status of the pandemic. 
In the 1990s, institutional actors from within the global health community, notably the 
IOM and UNAIDS, played an important role in creating a conceptual framework and 
evidence base that linked HIV/AIDS to national security interests. In particular, the IOM 
promoted the view that globalization was creating a highly interconnected world where 
national borders would no longer protect the U. S. from deadly infectious diseases 
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previously confined to the developing world, and Not of UNAIDS began to make 
securitizing arguments in 1999. This use of the supplicant model successfully laid the 
groundwork for the later securitization of HIV/AIDS by other actors. Both Bernard and 
Holbrooke also successfully used the supplicant model to gain attention to the disease by 
linking it to national security interests. 
UNAIDS also contributed to perceptions of HIV/AIDS as a threat to national militaries 
and UN peacekeepers with its 1998 AIDS in the Military report. While UNAIDS did not 
argue for the securitization of HIV/AIDS at this time, the global epidemiological data 
and information on HIV/AIDS among armed forces that UNAIDS produced provided a 
useful evidence base for proponents of securitization. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, this evidence base would come under greater scrutiny and come to be revised. 
Before Piot's securitizing moves in 1999, the provision of seemingly reliable statistics 
about both the pandemic and epidemics among armed forces contributed to arguments 
for securitization. The independent actor model best describes UNAIDS involvement in 
securitization before 1999, and thus this model served to indirectly contribute to the 
securitization of HIV/AIDS. 
The common theme through the securitizations of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. and at the 
UNSC is the relevance of political interests unrelated to HIV/AIDS in shaping events. In 
both cases, groundwork for securitization was in place, but securitization itself only 
occurred when outside political interests were aligned with addressing HIV/AIDS as a 
high political issue. Perhaps the lesson these events hold for global health practitioners 
is the need, not only to understand national security interests and culture, but the way 
high-level political interests must also be aligned to succeed in high politics. 
In the next chapter, we turn to the emergency measures that resulted from securitization, 
and examine the diverse consequences of the events described in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6: The consequences of securitization 
As described in Chapter 5, the securitization of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. and at the UNSC 
around 2000 led to an unprecedented elevation of the political status of HIV/AIDS. 
Accompanying this new political status was significant new funding to fight the global 
pandemic. This funding was given in amounts commensurate with the high political 
status of HIV/AIDS and vastly exceeded previous funding levels. The elevation of 
political attention and funding for HIV/AIDS is the clearest sign that emergency 
measures resulted from securitization. 
This chapter seeks to trace the consequences of the securitization of HIV/AIDS in both 
the U. S. and at the UNSC. The first section will examine the rise in funding newly 
available to fight the pandemic in the wake of securitization. However, while this rise in 
funding for HIV/AIDS was clear, the direct results of securitization at the UNSC and in 
the U. S. were less so. The next two sections will examine the results of these 
securitizations. In the first, the compromises which led to the UNSC meetings on 
HIV/AIDS would continue to limit the effectiveness of the UN's Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) actions to address the linkages between peacekeepers 
and HIV/AIDS. In the second, the Clinton Administration's embrace of HIV/AIDS as a 
threat to national security would be dismissed by the incoming Bush Administration, 
only to be embraced a year later after Secretary of State Colin Powell's advocacy for 
addressing the disease as a national security threat. HIV/AIDS would remain a high 
political issue in the new Bush Administration, but for a surprising set of political factors 
in which the national security implications of the disease did not figure prominently. 
Thus while the rise in political attention and funding in the aftermath of securitization 
benefited the fight against HIV/AIDS, the direct impacts of securitization at the UN and 
in the U. S. would prove to be significantly more complex. 
As well as providing a hitherto untold history of these events, a number of additional 
issues are addressed in this chapter including funding for HIV/AIDS, the nature of 
military HIV/AIDS programs, and the use of scientific data in the nexus. Because of the 
inclusion of these thematic issues, the structure of this chapter departs from a linear 
history in its attempt to trace the varied impacts of securitization. The first section shows 
that funding for HIV/AIDS increased significantly after 2000, with an important impetus 
for this increase being attributable to securitization. The next two sections continue the 
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history of events described in Chapter 5 by tracing the implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1308, and the evolving U. S. response to HIV/AIDS. This is followed by a 
brief section addressing the limited degree to which the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus has been accepted outside of the U. S. and UN, and the important American role in 
promoting this nexus. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the major revision to 
estimates of HIV prevalence among African armed forces, and what this revision means 
for the role of scientific data in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. 
6.1 Impact on the Political Priority and Funding of III V/AIDS 
The UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS, and declassification of NIE 99-17, marked a turning 
point in the international framing of, and response to, the disease. It is clear from public 
statements reviewed, and interviews with policymakers carried out by this research, that 
these events had a major impact on the political profile of the disease. On 19 January 
2001, at the third UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS, Peter Not noted specifically that the 
previous UNSC meetings had a major impact on the political profile of the pandemic: 
The global resolve to tackle AIDS has increased markedly in the six months since 
the Council's meeting held on 17 July. Many countries have revamped their 
AIDS plans, have made them more central to decision-making across government 
and have sought new resources and ways to direct them to the local community 
level. Many heads of State or Government at the Millennium Summit highlighted 
AIDS. Initiatives placing HIV in the mainstream of development took place at 
the G-8 meeting in Okinawa, in the European Commission and among many 
bilateral donors. Regional efforts have intensified as well, notably, in the 
Caribbean under the auspices of the Caribbean Community, with the commitment 
of the Association of South-East Asian Nations to a summit on HIV in South-East 
Asia and with a summit of the Organization of African Unity coming up... in 
Nigeria. (United Nations Security Council 2001 a: 7) 
Elbe (2006b: 121) describes these meetings as "the major international turning point in 
terms of conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue" and a "watershed" event. 
Behrman (2004: 164) writes that the UNSC meetings "helped gain the issue wider press 
play and prominence with legislators and policy makers" in the U. S. The UNSC 
meetings on HIV/AIDS, along with the declassification of NIE 99-17 and accompanying 
public debate, caused an explosion of academic, think tank and press interest in 
HIV/AIDS and the links between the pandemic and national security. With very few 
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exceptions, these examinations of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus were all 
published after 2000 in the wake of securitization. 
One strong indicator of the increased political priority of HIV/AIDS after securitization 
is the resulting increase in funding provided to fight the pandemic. This funding was 
provided for "global" or "international" HIV/AIDS, indicating that the funding was not 
for domestic prevention and treatment, but to fight the pandemic outside the borders of 
the state providing the funding. Kates and Lief (2006: 2) suggest that "funding from the 
G7 and other major donors for HIV/AIDS represents the bulk of such international 
assistance efforts overall, and therefore serves as an important gauge of the response to 
the epidemic. " UNAIDS (2003) analysis of global financing for HIV/AIDS, presented in 
Figure 9, reveals two significant observations. First, total international funding for 
HIV/AIDS was extremely low before 1999. Annual funding amounted to between 
US$300-400 million between 1996 and 1999, and was equal to or lower than this amount 
prior to 1996 (UNAIDS 2003). Second, funding increased dramatically from 2000, and 
has continued to grow since this date. This increase is consistent across bilateral funding 
sources, World Bank loans, UN organizations and donations from charitable foundations. 
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Figure 6.1: International HIV/AIDS funding: 1996 - 2001. Source: Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (2003). Report on the State of HIV/AIDS Financing. 
Geneva, UNAIDS: 18. 
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Looking at the US and UK specifically, two states which supported securitization at the 
UNSC, funding for HIV/AIDS underwent a similarly rapid increase beginning in 2000 
(Figures 10 and 11). Bilateral U. S. funding for HIV/AIDS, for research and to the 
Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, increased from 
approximately US$300 million in 1999, to over US$1 billion in 2002, reaching US $2.5 
billion in 2005. Bilateral aid for HIV/AIDS given by DFID shows a similar, although 
smaller increase in funding beginning in the year 2000. 
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Figure 6.2: U. S. funding for Global HIV/AIDS: 1986 - 2005. Source: Kates, J. and T. 
Summers (2004). U. S. Government Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Through FY 2005, 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Available at: 
http: //www. kff. org/hivaids/upload/U-S-Government-Funding-for-Global-HIV-AIDS- 
Through-FY-2005. pdf. Accessed 18 August 2006. 
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This rapid increase in funding for HIV/AIDS since 2000 has been widely noted (Kates et 
al. 2006; Merson 2006; UNAIDS 2006). Plot summarizes the situation in his 
introduction to the 2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic: "Total financing for the 
response in developing countries rose fivefold between 2001 and 2005" (UNAIDS 2006: 
Foreward). 
While the causes of this dramatic growth in funding for HIV/AIDS are multi-factorial, 
the securitization of HIV/AIDS must be considered one of the significant causes. This is 
supported by Merson (2006: 2416) who cites four developments that transformed the 
global response to HIV/AIDS, one of which is the concern that AIDS could threaten 
"global security. " Piot similarly concludes that the "global resolve to tackle AIDS has 
increased markedly in the six months since the [Security] Council's" meetings on 
HIV/AIDS (United Nations Security Council 2001 a: 7). This significant increase in 
funding to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic is the clearest consequence of securitization. 
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6.2 The Impact of Resolution 1308 on Peacekeeping Operations 
While the rise in political priority and funding for HIV/AIDS was a critical result of 
these meetings, it is also important to examine the impact of the UNSC resolution on 
HIV/AIDS. This first UNSC resolution on a health issue marks both the pandemic's rise 
among international security issues, and the limits of this securitization by the UNSC. 
This section will trace efforts to implement Resolution 1308 and what they reveal about 
the limits of securitization at the UNSC and the unintended consequences of politicizing 
the issue of HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping operations. 
The main provision of Resolution 1308 calls for the Secretary General to provide pre- 
deployment and continuing HIV/AIDS training for all UN peacekeepers. The 
responsibility for enacting this recommendation fell to the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNAIDS. These new responsibilities fell on the 
DPKO at a difficult time in its history. The rapid growth of large and complex UN 
peacekeeping missions in the 1990s had stretched the capabilities of the DPKO to 
manage missions. In 1999, two scathing reports were issued on UN peacekeeping 
failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda. As a result, the Panel on UN Peacekeeping 
Operations produced a report in 2000 intended to guide major reform of peacekeeping 
missions (known as the Brahimi Report) (Durch 2001). 
Six months after Resolution 1308 was passed, the DPKO seems to have taken little 
action to address HIV/AIDS. Bazergan (Interview), the DPKO HIV/AIDS advisor, 
believes that the DPKO did not know how to address the issue of HIV/AIDS because it 
was "out of their remit and comfort zone. " This indicates that little had changed in 
DPKO's perception of HIV/AIDS since the UNTAC mission in Cambodia in the early 
1990s. When the UNSC asked for a briefing from the DPKO on its implementation of 
the resolution, a meeting closed to the press and public was held. Holbrooke's comments 
following the meeting reveal that the reason for the closed meeting was the lack of 
progress the DPKO had made in addressing HIV/AIDS among peacekeeping forces. 
Holbrooke emerged from the meeting and told the press: 
We recognize that DPKO is overburdened and understaffed so what I'm about to 
say should not be regarded as a personal criticism of any individual in DPKO but 
I must tell you what I said in the closed meeting, that we find DPKO's 
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implementation of this resolution inadequate and insufficient given the gravity of 
the problem. Now they're trying, they're trying very hard. But they don't have a 
separate unit set up yet. UNAIDS wasn't even here today, the coordination 
between DPKO and UNAIDS and this meeting was either non-existent or 
insufficient. (Holbrooke 2000b: para. 7) 
Holbrooke's public scolding worked. On 19 January 2001, the UNSC held an open 
meeting on the DPKO's implementation of Resolution 1308. After Holbrooke's 
comments, a defensive Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno 
told the UNSC that: 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNAIDS this very morning 
signed a memorandum of understanding that... reaffirms our will to increase 
HIV/AIDS awareness programmes in peacekeeping missions within the overall 
strategic framework and technical support provided by UNAIDS. (United Nations 
Security Council 2001a: 5) 
The memorandum contained only the barest outline of how DPKO and UNADS would 
work together, leaving the financial arrangements between the organizations to be settled 
at a later date (UNAIDS 2001). While the memorandum seems to have been quickly 
drawn up to counter accusations that DPKO had done little to implement Resolution 
1308, Bazergan (Interview) states that it did serve to push the DPKO into action. To 
complement the DPKO's efforts, UNAIDS had established an office on AIDS, Security, 
and Humanitarian Response (UNAIDS SHR) in July 2000 to "coordinate UN efforts to 
address AIDS in national uniformed services and peacekeeping operations" (UNAIDS 
2005: 14). It was this office that worked with DPKO to develop a response to Resolution 
1308 and programs to prevent HIV/AIDS among peacekeepers. 21 
21 Since 2000, UMAIDS SHR and DPKO have worked together to create six interventions designed to 
reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeeping missions. First, as of 2005, major peacekeeping 
missions have full time HIV/AIDS advisors, while smaller missions have HIV/AIDS focal points 
(UNAIDS 2005). Second, UNAIDS and DPKO have attempted to strengthen pre-deployment HIV/AIDS 
training for troops. This has involved developing a training module and encouraging national IHIV/AIDS 
activities to focus on militaries and preparation for peacekeeping deployment. Third, HIV/AIDS advisors 
on missions provide in-mission training, consisting of an HIV awareness card available in twelve 
languages and peer education programs (UNAIDS 2005). Fourth, UNAIDS and DPKO ensure the 
availability of condoms to peacekeepers, while emphasizing that condoms are "not a license for sexual 
abuse" (UNAIDS 2005: 22). Fifth, voluntary HIV/AIDS counseling and testing is available during 
missions. As of 2006, DPKO follow the rights-based approach of UNAIDS to testing, however this policy 
is under review. Finally, HIV/AIDS advisors on missions seek to develop outreach projects to local 
communities around mission areas using peacekeepers as "agents of change" to educate and prevent 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2005: 24). These activities are supported by a small monitoring and evaluation 
component to assess the impact of these interventions and study the relationship between HIV/AIDS and 
peacekeeping (Bazergan 2006). 
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Despite Guehenno's presentation, Holbrooke still felt not enough was being done to 
implement Resolution 1308. Holbrooke stated: "Quite frankly, despite what we have 
heard today, I am still not satisfied" (United Nations Security Council 2001a: 12). While 
Holbrooke said the signing of a cooperative framework between DPKO and UNAIDS 
was an important start, the HIV/AIDS educational material DPKO presented was poorly 
written and five years out of date. Adding to his frustration was that the DPKO was still 
understaffed and a separate unit for HIV/AIDS not yet created within the DPKO. 
Dramatizing the issue, Holbrooke told the UNSC: "We spend billions of dollars on 
peacekeeping at the United Nations. We spend millions to protect our peacekeepers 
from terrorist attacks and from hostile forces. But I do not think we are spending even 
$500,000 yet to protect them from HIV/AIDS" (United Nations Security Council 2001a: 
12). The difficulties in establishing DPKO action on HIV/AIDS demonstrates an 
inability or lack of will to take action against the disease that is similar to DPKO actions 
during the Cambodia UNTAC mission. Only with a very public scolding by Holbrooke 
was DPKO pushed into action. 
Even after UNAIDS and the DPKO began to work cooperatively, they faced a number of 
serious challenges in seeking to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission among 
peacekeepers and the populations they serve. The first of these challenges involves 
DPKO's inability to even test peacekeepers for HIV/AIDS. Because of the UN's policy 
of non-discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS and respect for national 
sovereignty, the UN cannot require the peacekeeping personnel that are donated by 
member states to be tested for HIV/AIDS at any stage of their deployment (UNAIDS 
2005). DPKO can only discourage, but not require, countries from contributing HIV 
positive troops for peacekeeping operations (United States General Accounting Office 
2001). Because of these limitations, Resolution 1308 does not require, but only 
recommends "education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counseling, 
and treatment" of peacekeeping personnel (United Nations Security Council 2000c: 2). 
This is a major limitation of Resolution 1308 which severely undercuts the UN's ability 
to take effective action to prevent HIV transmission during peacekeeping operations. 
A second challenge to DPKO's implementation of Resolution 1308 was the weakness of 
the evidentiary base, and the DPKO's inability to collect new evidence, on the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS among peacekeepers or the public in post-conflict areas. In his 
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presentation to the UNSC, Guehenno pointed out that there is "generally a lack of 
reliable and complete data on HIV/AIDS in the places in which peacekeepers deploy" 
(United Nations Security Council 2001a: 3). Even if HIV/AIDS epidemiological data 
were being collected in a country before a peacekeeping deployment, the data collection 
would likely be crippled by the outbreak of conflict. Bazergan (2004) cites the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Cambodia as an example of the difficulties of obtaining data on 
HIV/AIDS during peacekeeping missions. 
HIV surveillance is problematic and rarely a priority in conflict and post-conflict 
areas and the resulting lack of baseline data in conflict-affected countries make it 
difficult to determine the impact of a peacekeeping mission. Cambodia, for 
instance, did not complete its first round of HIV sentinel surveillance until 1995, 
after the UN mission in the country had already come to an end - so it is 
impossible to compare the status of the epidemic before and after the mission. 
Moreover, the breakdown of health services, the mass movement of internally 
displaced people and refugees and the increased vulnerability of women and 
children to sexual abuse and exploitation, means that conflict itself, irrespective of 
a peacekeeping element, may aggravate the course of the epidemic. (Bazergan 
2004: 6) 
Thus there remained a lack of reliable baseline data on HIV/AIDS to accurately measure 
the epidemiological impact of peacekeeping missions, as well as limited opportunities to 
measure the impact of future missions. 
Similarly, DPKO has little ability to collect data on the health of its own peacekeepers. 
The conduct of a required pre-deployment medical exam for peacekeepers is conducted 
by the troop contributing country, not the UN (Bazergan 2004). While this exam is 
intended to exclude those with active signs of AIDS, countries do not have to report the 
results to the DPKO, and there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure the proper 
conduct of the test or even that those with AIDS are excluded. UN peacekeepers have 
died of AIDS during the mission in Liberia and the former Yugoslavia, clearly indicating 
that some countries are not preventing HIV positive persons from serving on 
peacekeeping missions (Bazergan Interview; Kingma Interview). Other countries do not 
test their troops for HIV/AIDS. Of the many countries that do test peacekeeping troops, 
none share these results with the UN (UNAIDS 2005). Guehenno describes the situation 
simply: "National governments do not, as a matter of practice, inform the United 
Nations that one or more of their personnel have contracted HIV/AIDS while on 
mission" (United Nations Security Council 2001 a: 3). This is another example of the 
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UN's limited ability to effectively act to limit the links between HIV/AIDS and 
peacekeepers. 
UNAIDS and the DPKO also face logistical challenges in educating and training 
peacekeepers about HIV/AIDS. Bazergan (Interview) describes peacekeepers as a 
"permanently mobile population. " Peacekeepers are deployed for four months to one 
year, and "contingents deploy and rotate at different times. As a result, a new peer 
education programme is required at each rotation" (Bazergan 2004: 8). These frequent 
troop rotations pose a "major hurdle" to providing even a minimum level of HIV/AIDS 
training to all peacekeepers (Bazergan 2004: 8). UNAIDS and the DPKO also faced 
religious and cultural objections to the provision of condoms and HIV/AIDS training. 
There is one report of "a contingent commander reportedly burning a consignment of 
condoms" (Bazergan 2004: 9). Dr Halle, the former head of the DPKO medical unit, 
said: "I do not expect a Muslim imam to promote the use of condoms. Nor do I expect a 
Catholic padre to do that" (Fleshman 2001: 18). The cultural diversity of missions also 
causes difficulties with language translation and cultural sensitivity in presenting 
education programs. "There may be over 30 different military and police contributors in 
any one peacekeeping operation - in Liberia, for example, 60 countries currently 
contribute uniformed personnel" (Bazergan 2004: 8). Rapid troop rotations, cultural 
objections to HIV/AIDS education and prevention, and cultural diversity in missions are 
all major challenges to implementing Resolution 1308. 
In addition to the above challenges to addressing the issue of peacekeepers and 
HIV/AIDS that result from the relationship between the UN and sovereign states, the 
securitization of the pandemic has created a highly politicized environment replete with 
"accusations, manipulation, and real concerns" about peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS 
(Bazergan Interview). Bazergan (2004: 11) writes that: 
the problem with regard to peacekeeping is that the issue get mired in accusations 
and counter-accusations about who is spreading HIV. Instead of considering 
HIV/AIDS as a global problem that needs a multi-sectoral response, some troop- 
contributing countries perceive the DPKO programmes to be an attack on the 
integrity and reputation of their armed forces. 
In other instances, certain parties within countries have politicized the issue of 
peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS in order to limit or shape UN involvement in a crisis 
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according to their interests. In 2001, Eritrea wrote to the UNSC requesting that troops 
deployed on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) be tested for HIV and 
then HIV-positive troops excluded. Eritrea justified its request by arguing that excluding 
HIV-positive peacekeepers was not a "`discriminatory practice' targeted at the UN 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), but was `standard national practice that has 
been in effect since 1993 "' (UN Integrated Regional Information Network 2001: para. 
1). Eritrea was conducting routine HIV testing of its army "based on the recognition that 
the army was one of the most sexually active segments of the population" and was 
"engaged in a very rigorous national campaign to prevent the spread of AIDS" (UN 
Integrated Regional Information Network 2001: para. 2). The presence of HIV-positive 
peacekeepers would undermine these efforts Eritrea argued. The UNSC denied Eritrea's 
request, which played a role in the negotiations for the UNMEE (Bazergan 2004). While 
Eritrea may have had legitimate concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS, their request to 
exclude HIV positive peacekeepers was also a stalling tactic. This is because, as 
previously discussed, DPKO had no ability to keep HIV positive peacekeepers from 
participating in missions. 
Sudan also announced a similar "AIDS-free policy" for African Union troops monitoring 
the Darfur region (Agence France-Presse 2004: para. 1). Aahmed Bilal Osman, Sudan's 
minister of health, explained that the measure was aimed at "safeguarding the health of 
the people of Darfur" (Agence France-Presse 2004: para. 1). Bazergan (Interview), 
however, feels that these concerns are a cover for political opposition to UNSC action on 
Sudan. Other examples of seeking to test and exclude HIV-positive peacekeepers have 
occurred during the Balkans conflict and in Sierra Leone (Elbe 2003). Bazergan 
(Interview) explains that the issue of HIV/AIDS and peacekeepers is "both a genuine 
concern and a political tactic" for governments. While peacekeepers spreading 
HIV/AIDS is a real issue, it is also being used "as a tool to create leverage for political 
interests" (Bazergan Interview). The lack of reliable data on rates of HIV/AIDS among 
peacekeepers and the epidemiological impact of peacekeeping missions have created a 
vacuum that is filled with political motives. Bazergan (Interview) concludes that "there 
is no good data, so the issue gets played out in the media" and used to support a 
country's political interests. 
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Those familiar with the machinations behind the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS and 
Resolution 1308, as described in Chapter 5, will not be surprised that the issue of 
peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS is highly political. As described, ulterior political goals in 
part drove Holbrooke to bring the issue of HIV/AIDS to the UNSC. For him, 
peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS was a way to link the disease to the mandate of the 
UNSC, but was not the primary issue of concern. In many ways, this situation has 
continued through UNAIDS and the DPKO's work. While data on peacekeepers and 
HIV/AIDS is limited, transmission of HIV/AIDS by peacekeepers is likely to have a 
greater impact on the credibility and trust in UN peacekeeping missions than on regional 
HIV/AIDS epidemics (Feldbaum et al. 2006a). The DPKO's HIV/AIDS programs are 
as much about managing the credibility of its missions as preventing HIV transmission. 
While the difficulties of implementing Resolution 1308 are substantial, the UNSC has 
built upon its mandate to address HIV/AIDS during peacekeeping operations in 
subsequent resolutions. Language encouraging efforts to "sensitize peacekeeping 
personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases 
in all its peacekeeping operations" is present in UNSC resolutions on Cote d'Ivoire, 
Burundi, Haiti and Sudan (UNSC 2004: 1; UNAIDS 2005). Resolution 1318 on conflict 
in Africa, and Resolution 1325 on women and children in conflict, encourage the 
incorporation of HIV/AIDS education into peacekeeping missions. Dr. Halle argues that 
the "DPKO's HIV/AIDS initiative is guided as much by Security Council Resolution 
1325 emphasizing the rights of women and children in conflict as it is by Resolution 
1308 on HIV and conflict" (Fleshman 2001: 18). In 2005, the UNSC issued a 
Presidential Statement reaffirming its commitment to Resolution 1308. Thus, while the 
link between peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS may have greater political than 
epidemiological impact, the UNSC's efforts to address HIV/AIDS continue. 
In summary, the securitization of HIV/AIDS at the UNSC demonstrates both benefits 
and hazards in the fight against HIV/AIDS. By addressing the disease at the UNSC, 
Holbrooke generated high level political attention on the pandemic and placed 
HIV/AIDS on the agenda of the preeminent organization concerned with international 
security. However, to table the issue at the UNSC, the U. S. delegation to the UN was 
forced to frame HIV/AIDS in relatively narrow terms that resonated with a strict 
interpretation of the mandate of the UNSC. This limited the scope of Resolution 1308 to 
175 
the issue of HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping operations. Given the UN's limitations on 
what it can require of member states and their armed forces, from a global health 
perspective, this narrower framing focused UNSC action on an issue peripheral to the 
global pandemic, and the UN's ability to address even this peripheral issue of HIV/AIDS 
among peacekeepers has been restricted. The UN's lack of authority to test 
peacekeeping troops, to gather data on HIV/AIDS during peacekeeping operations, or 
even to exclude HIV positive troops from UN missions indicates that the implementation 
of Resolution 1308 has been weak. The lack of data on peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS, 
and the use of the disease as a political tool to influence the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations, further politicizes the issue and impairs constructive action to implement the 
vision of Resolution 1308. 
6.3 National security and HIV/AIDS during the George W. Bush Administration 
A similarly complex situation resulted from the securitization of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. 
As in the case of the UNSC, the gains in political profile and funding for HIV/AIDS 
were the clearest results of securitization in the U. S. Securitization however played less 
of a role in guiding U. S. action on HIV/AIDS during the George W. Bush administration 
than could have been anticipated. Instead, the Bush administration embraced HIV/AIDS 
for a surprising set of political factors and foreign policy considerations. This section 
will trace the debate on securitization within the U. S. and its influence on the origins of a 
massive new U. S. aid initiative to address the pandemic. 
When the administration of George W. Bush took office on 20 January 2001, there were 
few reasons to think that the Administration would devote any attention to the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic or sustain policy attention to its links with national security. In an 
interview in 2000 as a presidential candidate, Bush discounted the strategic importance 
of the continent most affected by HIV/AIDS: "While Africa may be important, it doesn't 
fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them" (Behrman 2004: 246). In 
an article in Foreign Affairs, future national security advisor and Secretary of State under 
the Bush Administration, Condoleezza Rice argued that a Republican administration 
would refocus the U. S. on pursuing its own national interests (a communitarian position, ) 
rather than humanitarian interests or the interests of the international community. Rice 
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(2000: 47) wrote: "To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits 
all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. " Such statements indicated 
that the Bush administration would either not address HIV/AIDS as a high priority issue, 
or would only address the pandemic because of its impact on U. S. national security 
interests. 
A further indication that the Bush administration was unlikely to give concerted attention 
on HIV/AIDS, or its links to national security, was the abolishment of Ken Bernard's 
international health position at the NSC on the day the Bush administration took office. 
Policymakers have offered two interpretations of the abolishment of Bernard's position. 
In the first, the cutting of the position was seen as part of an overall redefinition and 
focusing of the NSC that often occurs with each change of administration (Confidential 
U. S. Government Interview). This view holds that the new administration did not 
undervalue global health, "just that it was better managed by HHS" and other agencies 
(Behrman 2004: 247). The second view, expounded by Steven Morrison, holds that the 
Bush administration explicitly rejected the links between health and national security and 
eliminated Bernard's position for that reason. Morrison (2005: 8) argues: 
When the Bush Administration came in, they initially rejected this notion [of 
HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security]. They saw it as poor wooly-minded 
thinking by the Clinton Administration and there were some tough criticism of 
this assertion. Where is the evidentiary base? Where have you seen states fail? 
Where do you see the actual outcomes? What is there beyond antidotal evidence? 
What are these assertions based on and more over if it is truly a security threat, 
then why isn't our government or other governments mobilizing with matching 
responses that are Security Initiatives? 
Morrison (2005) identifies Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice as 
the source of this skepticism. His perspective is supported by the wave of "ABC" 
(anything but Clinton) thinking that became an "underpinning credo" of the new 
administration (Behrman 2004: 247). 
In contrast, the new Secretary of State Colin Powell pushed hard against this skepticism 
and argued in interviews and a statement to the UN General Assembly Special Session 
on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) meeting that HIV/AIDS did indeed pose a national security 
threat. Powell spoke to the UNGASS five months after the Bush administration took 
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office, and put forth a forceful endorsement of the links between HIV/AIDS and national 
security: 
AIDS is not just a humanitarian or health issue. It not only kills. It also destroys 
communities. It decimates countries. It destabilizes regions. It can consume 
continents. No war on the face of the earth is more destructive than the AIDS 
pandemic. I was a soldier. But I know of no enemy in war more insidious or 
vicious than AIDS. An enemy that poses a clear and present danger to the world. 
The war against AIDS has no front lines. We must wage it on every front. 
(Powell 2001: para. 15) 
Powell is not on record describing how he came to these beliefs. Laurie Garrett 
(Interview) speculates that because Powell is Jamaican in origin, where prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS is over I%, he may have known people affected by the disease. 
Powell was supported in his views by CIA Director George Tenet. Tenet had been CIA 
Director since 1997 and therefore oversaw the production of the seminal NIC 99-17 
report. CIA directors are not often replaced when a new administration is elected, so 
Tenet represented a perspective from the intelligence community that was less affected 
by the Bush administration's new approach. In a U. S. Senate Committee on Intelligence 
hearing discussing worldwide threats, Tenet stated on 7 February 2001: 
AIDS in Africa basically takes generations out of play. And then you have 
refugee flows. And then you have economic disasters. And then you have civil 
wars that require exfiltration and some kind of involvement whether you choose 
to or not. And while we all believe we're immune from this, we're not. At some 
point somebody has to be responsible for it. (Schneider and Moodie 2002: 1) 
Morrison (2005) also notes that support for considering HIV/AIDS a threat to national 
security was found in the U. S. Congress, from the influential International Crisis Group 
which published the 2001 report HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, and from Nicholas 
Eberstadt, an influential conservative scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who 
would later publish The Future ofAIDS in the widely-read publication Foreign Affairs. 
In the face of this pressure, Cheney seemed to relent. Interviewed by Tim Russert on the 
television programme Meet the Press in 2001, Cheney argued that HIV/AIDS was in fact 
of great concern to the Bush administration. Cheney (2001: para. 2) said: "The president 
agrees wholeheartedly this is a terrible tragedy for mankind, and the numbers are, as you 
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suggest, when you think about the literally millions and millions of people whose lives 
are now at risk, because of the AIDS virus, we clearly have an obligation to help for 
humanitarian reasons, and we will. " Morrison (Interview) says Russert then "cornered" 
Cheney into admitting that HIV/AIDS was a threat to U. S. national security in this 
exchange: 
MR. RUSSERT: Colin Powell says this is national security issue for the United 
States. Do you agree? 
CHENEY: I think he's right. Yeah. (Cheney 2001: para. 5) 
Russert's question had forced Cheney into a choice, between dismissing the links 
between HIV/AIDS and national security and therefore the popular Secretary of State 
Powell's strong views on the subject, or agreeing that the pandemic was a threat to U. S. 
national security. Cheney's endorsement of Powell's views on the nexus was a product 
of this calculation. As in the Clinton Administration, political pressure played a key role 
in the Bush Administration's adoption of national security language to describe the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
6.3.1 The "Next Wave of HIV/AIDS": Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China 
In 2002, two major reports from the U. S. intelligence community directly embraced the 
linkage between HIV/AIDS and national security. The first, entitled The Next Wave of 
HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China, is a U. S. Intelligence 
Community Assessment and update of the seminal NIE 99-17 discussed in Chapter 5. 
While the Next Wave assessment builds upon the work of NIE 99-17, it focuses 
specifically on five countries that are of major strategic importance to the U. S. and "are 
major regional or global players" (National Intelligence Council 2002: 7). Even more 
than the NIE 99-17, the communitarian perspective of this assessment is clear from its 
focus on countries of strong strategic interest to the U. S. The Next Wave writes that 
these countries have also been selected because they are: 
" Among the world's most populous countries, together representing 
over 40 percent of the world population. 
" In the early-to-mid-stages of an HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
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" Led by governments that have not yet given the issue the sustained 
high priority that has been key to stemming the tide of the disease 
in other countries. (National Intelligence Council 2002: 1) 
The assessment argues that these countries will constitute a "second wave" of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic beyond the "first wave" in sub-Saharan Africa. The assessment 
estimates that by 2010, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India and China will together have 50- 
75 million HIV positive persons, while sub-Saharan Africa will have 30-35 million 
infected. In other words, by 2010 these five countries "collectively will have the largest 
number of HIV/AIDS cases on earth, " and will surpass sub-Saharan Africa as the 
epicenter of the pandemic (National Intelligence Council 2002: 7). 
The assessment asserts that all five countries will have difficulties controlling their HIV 
epidemics in the short to medium term. Citing the success models of Uganda, Thailand 
and Brazil, the assessment argues that none of the five countries has so far shown the 
political leadership necessary to replicate these successes. The assessment concludes 
that HIV/AIDS will have "significant economic, social, political, and military 
implications in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China, " although the prevalence of 
the disease will remain below rates in sub-Saharan Africa (National Intelligence Council 
2002: 22). Nigeria and Ethiopia will be the "hardest hit" countries, where HIV/AIDS 
will kill government and business elites, slow economic growth, and complicate the 
staffing of the military officer corps (National Intelligence Council 2002: 22). The 
assessment argues that "the further deteriorating of already weak government institutions 
by the escalating HIV/AIDS crisis could leave Nigeria and Ethiopia seriously weakened 
states and is likely to reduce their ability to continue to play a regional leadership role" 
(National Intelligence Council 2002: 23). In Russia, the HIV/AIDS epidemic will 
exacerbate the health and demographic crisis while slowing economic growth. While the 
assessment estimates that India and China together will have the largest number of 
people with HIV/AIDS by 2010, it concludes that the low prevalence rates in these 
countries will lessen the social, political, economic and military impact of the 
epidemic22. 
22 More specifically, the assessment notes that the Nigerian military is concerned about the loss of key 
personnel to AIDS, and has mandated HIV/AIDS training for soldiers. The Ethiopian government "does 
not appear focused on AIDS, " and has focused instead on the conflict with Eritrea (National Intelligence 
Council 2002: 19). The Russian government has been similarly inactive and "faces so many other serious 
problems that HIV/AIDS is unlikely to receive high-level attention for an extended period until the 
economic and security costs of neglect become more tangible" (National Intelligence Council 2002: 19). 
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We believe that the HIV/AIDS epidemic, by itself, will not pose a fundamental 
threat through 2010 to the rise of China and India as major regional players. 
Given the relatively low current prevalence rates and the relatively long period 
from infection to death, the two countries can manage the impact of the disease 
through the end of the decade. (National Intelligence Council 2002: 25) 
Like previous U. S. intelligence assessments of HIV/AIDS, the Next Wave report is 
located within a communitarian perspective. The report focuses on Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Russia, India and China because they are strategically important to U. S. national security 
interests, as opposed to the health burden posed by HIV/AIDS per se. The assessment 
also specifically focuses on the military, economic and political impacts of the pandemic. 
The Next Wave assessment, in particular, raises Elbe's concern that securitization can 
shift funding and attention from countries in greatest need, in terms of health burden 
from HIV/AIDS, to countries of strategic interest, in this case to the U. S. While the Next 
Wave report does not suggest shifting HIV/AIDS funding, it framing of the problem in 
terms of U. S. national security interests gives priority attention to strategically important 
states over, for example, the highly-affected region of Sub-Saharan Africa. If all U. S. 
funding for HIV/AIDS were to follow a security-driven logic, funding for HIV/AIDS in 
Sub-Saharan Africa would be reduced with devastating public health consequences. 
However, a security-driven approach to American funding for HIV/AIDS has not been 
embraced, as the discussion of the PEPFAR initiative (Section 6.3.3) will demonstrate. 
6.3.2 2002 U. S. National Security Strategy 
The second report from the U. S. intelligence community under the Bush Administration 
to address the links between HIV/AIDS and national security is The National Security 
Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (hereafter the Strategy). Ina major 
reorientation of U. S. national security strategy, the Strategy focuses on global terrorism 
The Indian government created the National AIDS Control Organization and has taken other steps to raise 
HIV/AIDS awareness. However, conflict with Pakistan and religious tensions are higher priority issues for 
the Indian government. The Chinese government has become more open in acknowledging its rising 
levels of HIV/AIDS. The assessment suggests this development is due to "senior leaders... concerned 
about the potential economic, social, and political ramifications of the spreading disease" (National 
Intelligence Council 2002: 20). Despite the increased political attention to HIV/AIDS in China, domestic 
funding for HIV/AIDS is low, other issues have higher priority, and local governments may stifle 
implementation of education and prevention programs. The assessment also notes that weak health 
infrastructure and the high cost of ARVs will inhibit efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in each country. 
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and states believed to harbor terrorists. This is a clear response to the events of 11 
September 2001 (9/11), when al-Qaeda attacked the U. S. from a safe harbor within the 
"failed state" of Afghanistan. Declaring an end to the twentieth century's wars over 
ideas and expansionist states, the Strategy declares: "America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones" (White House 2002: 1). 
Health issues play an unusually prominent role in the Strategy, which is better known for 
announcing the Bush administration's policy of preemption against terrorist threats. The 
Strategy also introduces a new framing of the relevance of infectious diseases to U. S. 
interests that incorporates, but differs significantly, from the IOM's earlier arguments 
(White House 2002). Public health issues are discussed in six of the nine chapters of the 
Strategy, and in the introductory letter by President Bush. HIV/AIDS specifically 
garners six mentions in the Strategy and one in the introductory letter. In comparison, 
the previous U. S. statement of national security policy, President Clinton's 1998 A 
National Security Strategy for a New Century, discusses public health only as a 
secondary issue to bioterrorism and environmental degradation, while mentioning 
HIV/AIDS only once (White House 1998). Health received no attention in national 
security strategies before Clinton's 1998 strategy, although President Carter did 
emphasize the "human right to health" in his foreign policy (Fidler 2004a: 15). The 
higher profile of HIV/AIDS, and public health issues as a whole, in this key statement of 
U. S. security policy under the Bush administration signaled the increasing importance 
given to infectious diseases by the U. S. security policy community since securitization. 
The Strategy states that it is based on a distinctive union of American values and national 
interests, and its references to global health and HIV/AIDS follow this dichotomy. 
Importantly, this framing of the problem can be seen as an attempt to link the 
communitarian interests of U. S. national security with cosmopolitan values. In the first 
of three major sections that discuss global health issues, the White House (2002: 10) 
describes disease, war and poverty in Africa as threatening "both a core value of the 
United States - preserving human dignity - and our strategic priority - combating global 
terror. " Here the Strategy embraces the links between disease and state failure, 
describing them as both unjust and dangerous to U. S. interests. In this way, the authors 
are arguing that American strategic interests overlap, or are even the same as those of 
global health. In other words the Strategy argues that by investing in global health, the 
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U. S. can help Africans suffering from disease, as well as better ensure the creation and 
maintenance of peaceful and stable African states that will improve U. S. national 
security. This represents a new framing of the relevance of global health issues to U. S. 
national security, which incorporated both strategic interests and humanitarian concerns. 
The second discussion of global health issues comes in the section on economic growth, 
free markets and free trade. This section begins by stating "A strong world economy 
enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the 
world" (White House 2002: 17). Investments in health are justified as policies that 
generate "higher productivity and sustained economic growth, " and therefore improve 
U. S. national security (White House 2002: 17). Again, American strategic interests are 
argued to overlap with actions that improve health. 
The final discussion of global health issues occurs in the section on expanding 
development though opening societies and democratization. The section begins by 
arguing that extensive global inequalities are "neither just nor stable" (White House 
2002: 21). The goal of securing public health, through fighting HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis is presented as a major component of ensuring development, economic 
growth and reducing global inequalities (White House 2002). 
Permeating throughout the Strategy's discussions of HIV/AIDS and other public health 
issues is the idea that improving global health and fighting HIV/AIDS is consistent with 
U. S. strategic interests. Thus the Strategy argues that the pursuit of U. S. communitarian 
interests will concurrently, and without conflict, also support cosmopolitan values such 
as improvements in global health. This argument, and the higher priority given to health 
issues in the Strategy, essentially espouses the "revolution" model put forth by Fidler 
(2005a: 5), whereby traditional divisions between material interests and normative values 
collapsed, leading to health being addressed, at least partially, for its own inherent value. 
However, this conclusion cannot be fully embraced, as the U. S. National Security 
Strategy is not a precise representation of U. S. policy for two reasons. First, unlike U. S. 
intelligence assessments, the National Security Strategy is intended to be a widely 
available public statement of administration policy. Therefore, the extent to which the 
linkage of U. S. strategic interests to cosmopolitan values in the Strategy is for the benefit 
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of U. S. public image at home and abroad must be seriously considered. The linking of 
communitarian interests and cosmopolitan values in the Strategy may be a public 
relations effort to improve opinions on U. S. foreign and security policy. Second, the 
Strategy is a declaratory document that does not serve as a guide to U. S. policy or 
funding, has no legally-binding power over U. S. government actions. Legislation 
concerning HIV/AIDS and other global health issues is crafted by the U. S. Congress, 
while other policies towards global health issues are made by departments within 
government, not the National Security Strategy. Therefore the authors of the Strategy 
were not bound by legislative requirements but were free to use rhetorical argument to 
best support the new national security strategy. Both these factors consequently 
undermine the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from the Strategy. 
However, the unprecedented profile given to public health issues in the Strategy does 
suggest that certain public health issues including HIV/AIDS have become part of the 
high level political agenda. The Strategy also introduces a new framing of HIV/AIDS 
and global health issues, which recognizes both their strategic and humanitarian 
relevance to U. S. national security and foreign policy objectives. 
6.3.3 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
With the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate on the next wave of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in countries critical to U. S. strategic interests, and the higher 
priority given to HIV/AIDS and public health issues in the U. S. National Security 
Strategy of 2002, it appeared that HIV/AIDS had now become accepted within the 
security policy community as a threat to U. S. national security. Just four months after 
the publication of these documents, President Bush announced a massive increase in U. S. 
spending on HIV/AIDS in developing countries under the US $15 billion five-year 
PEPFAR initiative. In contrast, U. S. funding for global HIV/AIDS at the height of the 
Clinton Presidency was US$360 million per year (Kates and Summers 2004). The next 
day a New York Times headline concluded: "Bush proposal on AIDS funds shows 
concern about security" (Stolberg 2003: headline). Journalist Sheryl Gay Stolberg 
(2003: para. 1) wrote that Bush was recognizing "that by creating political and economic 
instability abroad, AIDS is also a national security threat that could breed the next 
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generation of terrorists. " Implied in this article is the idea that only relevance to national 
security could justify such expenditures. 
While the linking of HIV/AIDS with the U. S. national security strategy and the 
announcement of PEPFAR funding would seem to coincide, interviews carried out for 
this research with U. S. policymakers, including persons working within the PEPFAR 
program, indicate that concern about the national security implications of HIV/AIDS did 
not drive the creation or operation of PEPFAR. Bush announced PEPFAR during his 
2003 State of the Union speech. In the speech, Bush (2003: section on HIV/AIDS) gives 
his public rationale for the initiative as a humanitarian effort to save millions of lives by 
providing ARV therapy to those suffering from HIV/AIDS in Africa: 
Today, on the continent of Africa, nearly 30 million people have the AIDS virus - 
- including 3 million children under the age 15. There are whole countries in 
Africa where more than one-third of the adult population carries the infection. 
More than 4 million require immediate drug treatment. Yet across that continent, 
only 50,000 AIDS victims -- only 50,000 -- are receiving the medicine they need. 
Because the AIDS diagnosis is considered a death sentence, many do not seek 
treatment. Almost all who do are turned away. A doctor in rural South Africa 
describes his frustration. He says, `We have no medicines. Many hospitals tell 
people, you've got AIDS, we can't help you. Go home and die. ' In an age of 
miraculous medicines, no person should have to hear those words. 
AIDS can be prevented. Anti-retroviral drugs can extend life for many years. And 
the cost of those drugs has dropped from $12,000 a year to under $300 a year -- 
which places a tremendous possibility within our grasp. Ladies and gentlemen, 
seldom has history offered a greater opportunity to do so much for so many. 
Bush (2003: section on HIV/AIDS) described PEPFAR as "a work of mercy, " and did 
not mention any of the national security implications of HIV/AIDS. The public rationale 
given for the initiative is that treatment with ARVs is achievable, affordable, and the 
morally right thing to do. Instead of adopting the IOM's arguments, or the Strategy's 
formulation of global health issues having both strategic and humanitarian implications, 
Bush presented PEPFAR as a purely humanitarian endeavour. 
Nazanin Samari-Kermani (Interview), a White House Fellow at the State Department 
who helped design PEPFAR, says that the national security implications of HIV/AIDS 
are "hardly mentioned at all... Proof that providing AIDS drugs could work was the 
reason for launching PEPFAR. " Behrman (2004) traced the secret meetings of the high- 
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level group charged by Bush to develop PEPFAR before it was announced in his speech. 
The mission of this secret group was to "reset the bar with respect to U. S. policy on the 
issue George W. Bush was steadily coming to think of as the defining humanitarian 
catastrophe of our time" and recalibrate the level of U. S. investment to fight HIV/AIDS 
(Berhman 2004: 291). The group's primary questions were: was treatment for 
HIV/AIDS affordable, was providing ARV therapy in Africa on a large-scale viable, and 
could doing so have a measurable impact on HIV/AIDS? When, "after months of 
deliberations the group determined that drugs were now affordable and treatment was 
viable, " the PEPFAR initiative was launched (Behrman 2004: 294). After the clear issue 
of humanitarian need, the viability of providing widespread access to ARVs in Sub- 
Saharan Africa was a key rationale for PEPFAR. 
The humanitarian nature of PEPFAR can also be seen in the choice of the fifteen focus 
countries named: Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and 
Zambia. Of these, only Ethiopia and Nigeria are "next wave" countries singled out 
previously by the U. S. intelligence community. One unnamed U. S. State Department 
official (Interview), who works on international health, confirmed that the U. S. chose 
countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS and where enough health infrastructure existed to 
achieve results in increasing AIDS treatment and prevention. These findings suggest that 
PEPFAR was not designed or motivated by the perceived linkages between HIV/AIDS 
and U. S. national security interests. 
The adoption of a humanitarian rationale for PEPFAR suggests that a reinterpretation of 
the 2002 National Security Strategy's focus on HIV/AIDS is required. In 2002, the 
unprecedented focus on global health issues within the Strategy seemed to suggest the 
successful integration of the pandemic into U. S. national security considerations. Instead 
it was the second part of the Strategy's framing of global health issues, the focus on their 
humanitarian impact that would motivate action on HIV/AIDS. Seen in light of the 
announcement of PEPFAR, the Strategy may have been the Bush Administration's move 
away from securitization, and towards humanitarian rationales for addressing the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
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Of course even as a humanitarian endeavour, the PEPFAR initiative was not free from 
politics. In addition to the publicly stated humanitarian rationale for PEPFAR, there is 
widespread agreement behind the scenes that the desire to improve the U. S. global image 
in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war was a major factor in the launch of PEPFAR. 
Morrison (Interview) called PEPFAR the "soft twin of Iraq" and argued that the 
administration hoped PEPFAR would demonstrate that Bush was interested in more than 
going to war with Iraq. Laurie Garrett (Interview) describes PEPFAR as "a foreign 
policy gamble to soften the attack in Iraq. " RP Eddy (Interview) described PEPFAR as 
"a good piece of chess gamesmanship - meaning, nice to meet you, we're the United 
States and we're going to invade Iraq... We're going to invade Afghanistan... but we're 
also going to do this massive AIDS program. " The New York Times wrote: "As Mr. 
Bush prepares for possible war with Iraq, his new commitment to global AIDS suggests 
an emerging geopolitical reality: if the United States is going to present itself as having a 
moral imperative to stop terrorism, it must also take up the cause of morality in a manner 
that does not involve dropping bombs" (Stolberg and Stevenson 2003: para. 7). 
Behrman (2004: 306-307) describes the Bush administration's desire to present both the 
hard and soft sides to U. S. power in the political imagery orchestrated during the State of 
the Union speech: 
[T]he president's guest of honor, sitting to the first lady's right, Dr. Peter 
Mugyenyi, the physician from Uganda who had consulted with the [PEPFAR) 
team and played a central role in their efforts. The first lady was flanked on her 
other side by a uniformed military servicewoman. It was the desired snapshot: to 
one side the stick and on the other the carrot, American might and beneficence, 
both on display. 
Thus while PEPFAR was not directly driven by the national security implications of 
HIV/AIDS, the timing of its announcement, and perhaps its origins, were associated with 
broader foreign policy and national security objectives of the Bush Administration after 
9/11. 
A final and major motivating factor in the creation of PEPFAR was the support and 
encouragement of Christian conservatives. Support among evangelical Christians for the 
U. S. to address the global pandemic had been building since conservative Senator Jesse 
Helms told a conference, run by the religious charity Samaritan's Purse, that he was 
ashamed that he had not done more concerning the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Helms 2002). 
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In a letter to the Washington Post, Helms (2002) emphasized that mother to child 
transmission of HIV/AIDS could be prevented, which "publicized the fact that in Africa 
the disease was usually transmitted heterosexually, reaching audiences who had 
previously disregarded its spread among homosexuals or considered it a God-sent 
punishment" (Burkhalter 2004: 10). Burkhalter (2004: 8,14) writes that the Bush 
administration was "prodded by its conservative evangelical base" to address HIV/AIDS 
and that "the entry of religious conservatives into the struggle has helped galvanize U. S. 
AIDS policy and given the issue a welcome hearing in Congress and the White House. " 
Christian conservatives were pushing for the U. S. to become more involved in efforts to 
fight the pandemic for humanitarian reasons, and were not seemingly motivated by 
securitization and national security arguments about HIV/AIDS. 
The combination of these factors - humanitarian need, proof that scaling up AIDS 
treatment was achievable, the war in Iraq, and conservative religious support - all appear 
to have contributed to the creation of PEPFAR. Despite the appearance that perceived 
national security implications of HIV/AIDS played a key role in the formation of the 
initiative, the evidence challenges this assumption. Instead, the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS drove the issue to the highest levels of the U. S. government 
and provided new political support for addressing the pandemic. However, once there, 
HIV/AIDS was treated primarily as a humanitarian issue with foreign policy benefits for 
the U. S. by the Bush Administration. PEPFAR, the U. S. 's massive scaling up of 
HIV/AIDS funding and flagship program to fight the disease was a humanitarian 
initiative and foreign policy gambit to soften the image of the U. S. before the Iraq 
invasion, but was not driven by the national security implications of the pandemic. 
The complex political undercurrents that defined HIV/AIDS as a political issue in the 
U. S. since 2000 also illustrate the unpredictable nature of high politics. As a low politics 
issue during the early Clinton Administration, humanitarian arguments proved 
insufficient to muster significant political action to address the pandemic. However once 
HIV/AIDS became a high politics issue through securitization, as described in Chapter 5, 
humanitarian arguments gained footing within a broader foreign policy rationale. 
Conservative evangelical groups were critical to putting forth this humanitarian rationale 
for addressing the pandemic. This represents an arresting reversal of the traditional 
foreign policy hierarchy, where a cosmopolitan perspective that supports humanitarian 
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action is more politically motivating than a communitarian perspective linked to material 
interests. This situation would seem to support Fidler's (2005b: 184) revolution model, 
where support of global health is embraced as a "pre-eminent political value. " However, 
it is unlikely that HIV/AIDS would have been addressed at a high political level at all if 
not for securitization. Only once HIV/AIDS was a political priority did the Bush 
Administration address the disease through a cosmopolitan perspective. Even then, the 
announcement of PEPFAR was clearly used to support ulterior U. S. national security 
objectives in relation to the Iraq War. Therefore, Fidler's (2006b) remediation model 
may still accurately describe the relationship between HIV/AIDS and political priority 
during the Bush Administration. 
6.3.4 U. S. Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DIIAPP) 
While the PEPFAR initiative was not overtly concerned with U. S. national security, the 
U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) was quietly building a small program that fully 
embraced the links between HIV/AIDS and U. S. national security. The Department of 
Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) is a unique military-to-military 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and training program. DHAPP is designed to reduce 
the spread of HIV/AIDS in foreign militaries in pursuit of the national security objectives 
of preventing state failure, terrorism, and supporting African peacekeeping operations. 
The DHAPP initiative is important to examine as the main U. S. initiative that directly 
resulted from, and was motivated by, the securitization of the pandemic. 
Beginning in March 2001 with the militaries of nine African countries, DHAPP rapidly 
expanded to provide assistance for HIV/AIDS prevention among troops in 71 countries 
by 2005 (Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program 2005a, 2005b). Lim 
(2004: 14) describes the range of HIV/AIDS prevention services DHAPP provides: 
"The AIDS prevention program provides funding for surveys on knowledge, attitudes, 
and practices among foreign troops, as well as educational and training materials. " 
DHAPP works to expand access to voluntary testing and counseling facilities, reduce 
stigma associated with HIV/AIDS among the armed forces, and provide force-wide 
testing to willing militaries (Lim 2004). Funding is available for expanding health care 
infrastructure, from construction of new facilities to the purchasing of laboratory 
equipment including "HIV diagnostic kits, CD4 cell counters, and other sophisticated 
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medical devices" (Lim 2004: 14). DHAPP also provides training in the U. S. for foreign 
military physicians, and sponsors regional workshops on HIV/AIDS for military 
personnel. 
In contrast with PEPFAR, the rationale behind DHAPP is closely linked to addressing 
the national security implications of HIV/AIDS. According to a key informant 
interviewed by this research, the U. S. military is most concerned that AIDS will cause 
militaries to lose "highly specialized professional soldiers, " and that the loss of these will 
have a strong effect on their militaries (Military Interview). The interviewee explained 
that the strength of a military depends on its non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who 
have eight to fifteen years of experience. Serving this period in the military is essential 
to ensuring experienced management of the armed forces. However, this length of time 
is also sufficient for symptoms of AIDS to develop if a NCO is HIV-positive. The 
concern of the U. S. military is that the loss of NCOs to AIDS will cause the 
"professional ethos of the military to wither" (Military Interview). If lost, the military 
loses valuable leadership, the ability to train new NCOs, and established knowledge to 
effectively operate independently. The interviewee likened the loss of NCOs to AIDS to 
"barnacles on the hull of a ship" (Military Interview). The interviewee also explained 
that, in high prevalence areas, the impact goes beyond the prevalence of HIV-positive 
soldiers. In these areas, uninfected solders, or those who are HIV-positive but do not 
have AIDS, become responsible for the care of family members who have HIV/AIDS. 
In the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe, where military infection rates are above 20%, 
this can reduce the military's effective strength by 50% claims the interviewee. 
While the U. S. military views HIV/AIDS prevention within militaries to be important, it 
is observed that militaries are often overlooked in civilian prevention programs. One key 
informant noted that "if the U. S. military is not involved, then militaries get overlooked 
or forgotten" in civilian HIV/AIDS programs (Military Interview). The interviewee 
stated that "we often assume that the military has its own health system, but military 
funding is for tanks and bullets, there is no money for health promotion or education. " It 
was also pointed out that working with foreign militaries is often more productive than 
similar work with foreign governments. "Militaries are often the most functional arm of 
a government... they are an entity you can work with and get things done" (Military 
Interview). DHAPP personnel believe that the program therefore plays a unique role in 
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the global fight against HIV/AIDS by providing support to the uniformed services. 
Executive Director of the DHAPP Schaffer (2006: video) states: 
Military populations are often excluded from the HIV/AIDS prevention programs 
in the civilian communities. In addition, military populations believe that civilian 
programs do not understand their situation and don't apply to them. The DoD 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Program fills this gap. 
Beyond the direct impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries, the DHAPP is motivated by the 
potential indirect effects of HIV/AIDS on state stability, terrorism, and peacekeeping 
operations. Colonel Edward Huycke, the command surgeon for the U. S. European 
Command (EUCOM)23 states that, at the "U. S. European Command, we see this HIV 
and AIDS pandemic through a national security lens and through a global war on terror 
lens 
... we view the HIV/AIDS as one of the serious threats within the area of 
responsibility" (CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS 2005: 22). Kathy Ward of the 
International Crisis Group says that "DOD sees a particular security interest in pursuing 
HIV/AIDS prevention activities with foreign militaries because the spread of HIV is a 
major destabilizing factor in developing societies, leaving them vulnerable to unrest or 
infiltration by terrorist elements" (Fisher-Thompson 2005: para. 11). 
According to a confidential key informant (Military Interview, ) the U. S. is particularly 
concerned about the effects of the pandemic on state stability. The threat of "failed 
states is the central reason this program exists" (Military Interview). The interviewee 
stated that, with HIV/AIDS causing decreasing life expectancy, falling GDP, loss of life, 
loss of jobs, increasing crime, "you have to wonder if this all will cause state collapse. " 
DHAPP is "making a modest investment early, and the payoff is in avoiding future 
crises" and state instability (Military Interview). 
This concern over state instability focuses on both preventing humanitarian crises that 
may result in demands for U. S. action, and fears that terrorists can use a failed state as a 
base for operations. Colonel Huycke places DHAPP's efforts to fight HIV/AIDS within 
the context of the "War on Terror": 
23 EUCOM is one of is one of five geographic combatant commands within the U. S. Department of 
Defense, responsible for all U. S. military activity within its area of responsibility. EUCOM's area of 
responsibility includes all of Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa except for Egypt, Sudan, 
Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia. See: http: //www. eucom. mil/english/index. asp and 
http: //en. wikipedia. ori/wiki/United States European Command for more information. 
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The concern of the EUCOM is that with the societal stresses associated with the 
loss of the leaders, or the loss of the stabilizing influence that the number of 
places in Africa that are hit hard by the HIV/AIDS epidemic will become places 
where terrorist move and flourish. Because that is a concern we view the efforts at 
prevention of HIV/AIDS and treatment where appropriate as helpful on the war 
on terror. The EUCOM is not fighting the war on terror perhaps the way that the 
United States Central Command [who oversees operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan] is but we view this a long-term, very important contribution to the 
war on terror. (CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS 2005: 37) 
DHAPP also argues that it supports U. S. strategic interests by helping to maintain full 
staffing levels and operation of UN and regional peacekeeping operations with non-U. S. 
troops by limiting rates of HIV/AIDS in troop contributing countries. Lim (2004: 13) 
writes that the effect of HIV/AIDS on peacekeeping operations and regional stability are 
also primary reasons for helping foreign militaries address HIV/AIDS: 
Military forces with significant HIV rates cannot engage as effectively in peace- 
keeping efforts, and may not be able to maintain their own nation's security, 
which in turn may lead to regional instability and increased conflict. Thus, U. S. 
national security interests are served by promoting the health and well being of 
foreign uniformed military personnel. 
The key informant within the military (Military Interview) explains the political reasons 
behind DHAPP's efforts to support peacekeeping operations: 
[T]he U. S. has an allergy to using U. S. troops for peacekeeping... The UN 
depends on the 3rd world to supply peacekeeping troops. If there are not enough 
healthy soldiers from these states, either we need other nations to contribute 
peacekeeping troops or it won't get done. It is in our (U. S. ) national interest to 
leverage the assets of other nations for peacekeeping. 
Colonel Huycke also focuses on peacekeeping in explaining the U. S. strategic concern 
with high infection rates among African militaries: 
If a military, African military is infected, seriously infected by HIV/AIDS, what 
does that mean to us? And our concern is that with the weakened military there is 
an increased potential for conflicts, conflicts in which U. S. interest might be 
threatened and which we might have to be involved. An impact on peacekeeping 
operations, you know, we very much are interested in having Africans take care 
of Africans when it comes to peacekeeping operations on the African Continent. 
And the impact of deployability on the militaries is very, very important. (CSIS 
Task Force on HIV/AIDS 2005: 22) 
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Kathy Ward of the International Crisis Group also notes that DHAPP's efforts are 
intended to limit the U. S. military's involvement in African crises, saying that the DoD 
interest in HIV/AIDS "comes at a time when the United States hopes to increasingly use 
African and other regional forces to provide significant contingents for operations to 
reduce pressure on overextended U. S. forces" deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq and in the 
war on terror (Fisher-Thompson 2005: 12). 
The confidential military interviewee argues that in addition to concerns about state 
stability, terrorism, and peacekeeping, the DHAPP provides a diplomatic service for the 
U. S. In much of the world, "the U. S. military is the best funded and most visible [U. S. ] 
presence" (Military Interview). DHAPP shows that the U. S. is "willing to engage on a 
broad variety of things including HIV, not just terrorism or loose nukes" (Military 
Interview). The interviewee explains that there is hope that this broader engagement, 
outside of the so-called War on Terror, allows the U. S. to more effectively engage 
countries and build stable relationships. The interviewee explains that DHAPP "is an 
investment in both you and us. The fewer problems you have, the fewer problems for us. 
In the long-term, this is win-win" (Military Interview). 
According to the confidential Military Interview, the long experience in the U. S. of 
treating HIV-positive soldiers contributed to gaining expertise in HIV/AIDS prevention 
and treatment that the DHAPP now shares. The U. S. began force-wide screening for 
HIV/AIDS in 1986. With hundreds of soldiers infected, HIV/AIDS was a "big, looming 
concern" of the U. S. military (Military Interview). The interviewee explains that after a 
painful process of developing policies for treatment of HIV/AIDS, the U. S. military now 
has a good system for caring for HIV-positive soldiers, as well as effective prevention 
education and testing policies (Military Interview). Dr. Richard Schaffer, director of 
DHAPP, says that foreign militaries recognize U. S. experience preventing and treating 
HIV/AIDS among its military forces. He states: 
They recognize that 20 years ago we were very much in the same position they 
are in, where we were just starting to set up our policies, just starting to figure out 
how to deal with our own infected members. So many of them feel we are in a 
different situation than they are, but they do recognize that we have a history that 
is similar, possibly, to theirs currently. (Basu 2005: Military to Military HIV 
Prevention, para. 14) 
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This U. S. military experience was the genesis of the DHAPP, while concerns about state 
failure, terrorism, and peacekeeping, as well as the foreign policy benefits of engaging 
foreign militaries on HIV/AIDS, drove later implementation of the program. 
Given PEPFAR's humanitarian orientation, it is only the much smaller DHAPP that has 
been the American HIV/AIDS program which seeks to directly address the links between 
the disease and U. S. national security. This program, framed within a communitarian 
perspective on national security interests of the U. S. military, seeks to prevent and treat 
HIV/AIDS among underserved (in terms of HIV/AIDS programs) and high-risk military 
populations. This research finds that the primary goals of this initiative are to stabilize 
foreign militaries, prevent state weakness due to HIV/AIDS, ensure the health of 
militaries that donate forces to peacekeeping operations thereby limiting the need for 
U. S. military contributions, and support ulterior U. S. diplomatic goals. This is a unique 
example of the U. S. pursuing global health activities because they directly support 
national security objectives. 
It is argued in this research that this is a further example of Fidler's (2005b: 184) 
remediation model, confirming that when "diseases threaten... national security, military 
capabilities, geopolitical or regional stability... foreign policy makers take notice. " 
Furthermore, DHAPP's efforts to directly address the national security implications of 
HIV/AIDS for the U. S. may have allowed the Bush Administration greater latitude to 
adopt a humanitarian rationale for PEPFAR. 
6.4 The HIV/AIDS - national security nexus outside of the U. S. and UN 
The HIV/AIDS - national security nexus has remained limited outside of the U. S. and 
UN. No other countries to date have publicly embraced the links between the disease 
and national security at the state level, and implemented programs to directly address the 
national security implications of the pandemic since its securitization in 2000. There has 
been talk, but little action to suggest that emergency measures have been adopted 
because of securitizing moves. This brief section will describe how both wealthy donor 
countries outside of the U. S., and states affected by HIV/AIDS, have declined to 
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securitize the pandemic. Examining some the reasons why states have not sought to 
securitize the pandemic also further illuminates commonalities between the cases of 
securitization in the U. S. and at the UN. Despite a lack of securitization at the national 
level, African and U. S. militaries maintain a strong interest in addressing HIV/AIDS, 
suggesting that aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus will remain relevant 
despite a lack of securitization outside the U. S. and UN. 
6.4.1 Western donor countries and high prevalence states 
In contrast with the U. S., to date other major donor countries including the UK, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan, have rarely framed HIV/AIDS as a threat to their national security, 
or implemented programs to address the national security implications of the disease. In 
his review of foreign policy in the U. S., UK, Canada and Australia, McInnes (2004: 39) 
finds that the "link between health and development is stronger than that between health 
and foreign policy. " Furthermore, he finds that health issues remain a low priority in the 
foreign policies of the UK, Australia and Canada. Health issues are not even mentioned 
in the section on global security threats in Australia's 2003 White Paper on foreign and 
trade policy, while Romanow (2002) finds that "the broader area of health promotion is 
very much an afterthought in Canada's foreign policy" (McInnes 2004: 34-35). A 
review of Japan's response to HIV/AIDS contains no mention of the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS, and HIV/AIDS is actually a lower priority for Japanese 
foreign aid than tuberculosis, polio, and parasitic diseases (Japan Center for International 
Exchange 2004). 
Although the UK was broadly supportive of U. S. efforts to address HIV/AIDS within the 
UNSC, as described in Chapter 5, and has given high priority to the disease in the 
provision of development aid through DFID, the UK has not chosen to securitize 
HIV/AIDS. In a review of UK policy towards HIV/AIDS, Feldbaum (2005b: 2) finds 
that "the UK foreign policy community has neglected to address HIV/AIDS" while the 
links between health and national security "are weak to non-existent. " While aspects of 
the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus "are mentioned in publications on 
HIV/AIDS.. . the UK 
has taken little action to use foreign policy to fight HIV/AIDS or to 
address the security implications of the epidemic" (Feldbaum 2005b: 13). Furthermore 
an advisor to DFID, the lead agency in the UK overseas response to HIV/AIDS, has 
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called the links between HIV/AIDS and state instability "a bit unrealistic" (Ingham 2004: 
para. 1). In short, other donor countries have maintained aid programs for HIV/AIDS, 
but have not securitized the disease nor sought to address the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS in their aid programs. 
Some states highly affected by HIV/AIDS have occasionally described HIV/AIDS in the 
language of national security24. In a well-publicized example, President of Botswana 
Festus Mogae described HIV/AIDS in terms of the survival of Botswana: "We are 
threatened with extinction. People are dying in chillingly high numbers. It is a crisis of 
the first magnitude" (Rollnick 2002: 4). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander 
Zhukov has described HIV/AIDS as "an issue of strategic, social and economic security 
of the country" (World Bank 2005). One hundred and forty two HIV infections out of a 
total population of 8,020 caused the Minister of Health for Fiji Solomoni Naivalu (2004) 
to describe HIV/AIDS as a threat to Fijian national security. Outside observers have also 
considered HIV/AIDS to be a direct threat to highly affected African states (Ostergard 
2002; Price-Smith 2002). However, while these descriptions frame the disease as a 
national security issue and are securitizing moves, the respective governments have not 
securitized the disease by enacting emergency measures to address the disease. 
Although Botswana has implemented a strong public health response to HIV/AIDS in an 
attempt to ameliorate the impact of the disease, there is no evidence that using the 
language of national security was critical to this response25. Similarly, the Russian 
response to HIV/AIDS has been sluggish, "mired in moralism and xenophobia, " and not 
characterized by the priority of a national security threat (Alcorn 2006: headline). Thus 
even in states where HIV/AIDS has been described as posing a direct threat to national 
security, the disease has not been securitized. 
Explanations for why HIV/AIDS has either remained a low politics issue outside of the 
US and UN, or been addressed as high politics but not within the context of 
securitization, are numerous and varied. A major barrier to securitization may be the 
24 Excepting the examples of Uganda and Thailand discussed in Chapter 4. 25 Fanny Chabrol (2008) suggests that Botswana may be considered a case of another country which has 
securitized HIV/AIDS. She argues that the emergency measures enacted in Botswana, in the wake of 
Mogae's statement, mobilized government funding to provide ARV treatment and routine HIV testing. 
However, Botwana is a unique country in terms of its wealth, governance, and relationships with aid 
donors, which complicates this finding. Detailed research on the process of securitization in Botswana is 
needed, including a history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, to understand whether Mogae's 
statements did indeed securitize the Botswanian epidemic. 
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lack of clear data or examples to support the idea that HIV/AIDS can threaten a state's 
political, economic and military security. Although this lack of data did not prevent 
securitization in the U. S. and UN, it was an important criticism of securitization in both 
cases. Furthermore, outside of the U. S. and UN, the lack of data may present a greater 
barrier. The comment that the links between HIV/AIDS and national security are "a bit 
unrealistic" by a DFID advisor suggests that the lack of data is a barrier to securitization 
in the UK (Ingham 2004: para. 1). 
A bias against addressing non-traditional threats to security played a large role in 
resistance to securitization in the U. S. and UN, and is a likely cause of resistance to 
securitization in other countries. Another explanation may be that in many wealthy 
donor countries aside from the U. S., health and development are already political 
priorities for government action. While not on par with the national security of these 
states, there may be less need in these states to drive HIV/AIDS up the political agenda 
by linking the pandemic to national security considerations. 
However the most salient way to explain why securitization has been limited to the U. S. 
and UN is not found in the numerous reasons why other states have not securitized the 
disease, but in the commonalities between the successful cases of securitization. The 
clear common factor between the two cases of securitization was the involvement of U. S. 
actors. The work to produce NIE 99-17 was obviously based within the U. S. intelligence 
community, while in the case of the UN, the U. S. Ambassador and delegation to the UN 
led efforts to securitize HIV/AIDS at the UNSC. This suggests a much stronger 
tendency to link issues with national security considerations in the U. S. than in other 
countries. 
Answering why the U. S. would be more likely to link issues with national security 
considerations requires an anthropological investigation that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. King (2002) argues that the current linkage of global health issues to state 
security interests is a modern expression of the long-standing alignment of public health 
with state security and economic interests. The "emerging diseases worldview" 
(described in Section 5.1, ) combines these historical ideological connections with 
growing American anxiety about globalization, to produce a persuasive narrative about 
the threat of emerging diseases, including HIV/AIDS (King 2002: 767). This narrative 
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was developed in the U. S., and specifically targeted U. S. policymakers through its appeal 
to economic and security interests. Ingram (2005b) further observes that the linking of 
global health to national security in the U. S. may be attributed to the emerging diseases 
worldview, U. S. global economic and military interests that may be impeded by disease 
outbreaks, and experiences of September 11`h and the 2001 anthrax attacks. (Cooper 
(2006) also discusses links between emerging diseases and changes in U. S. defense 
policy during the George W. Bush administration. ) Furthermore, as the world's sole 
remaining superpower, with global security interests and unparalleled ability to project 
force, the U. S. generally places a strong focus on security as the most critical issue in 
world affairs. This focus on security in the U. S. is likely stronger than in countries with 
more regional and local security interests, as well as limited abilities to project force 
beyond their borders. Because of this, linking issues to national security interests is 
likely more effective in the U. S. than in other countries of achieving the aim of raising an 
issue higher on the policy agenda. Because this linkage is effective, it may be pursued 
more often in the U. S. than in other countries. 
6 . 4.2 African militaries 
A number of African military leaders have publicly stated that HIV/AIDS represents a 
threat to the security of their armed forces. Major General Bakwena Oitsile of Botswana 
argues that if "the security forces become weaker due to ill health, the countries' 
constitutions could easily be challenged. The political structures that that ensure 
democratic governance could be threatened" (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report 2003: 
para. 1). Victor Simunja (2001: para. 1), Namibian Deputy Minister of Defence, 
similarly said that HIV/AIDS is "affecting security and military establishments to the 
core. " The rates and impact of HIV/AIDS in the South African armed forces has also 
received extensive public attention (Hosken 2004; Meyer 2004; Heinecken 2001 c and 
2003). For the purposes of this thesis, while these are not cases of securitization where 
emergency measures have been adopted by states, African military involvement in 
fighting HIV/AIDS is an important component of the nexus and illustrates the 
complexity of gauging the impact of the pandemic on African militaries. 
Martin Rupiya (Interview), a former member of the Zimbabwean armed forces and 
senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, argues that most 
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African militaries have recognized the problem of HIV/AIDS. Rupiya (Interview) 
argues that militaries in Africa have been able to take the lead in addressing HIV/AIDS 
because national governments have devolved HIV/AIDS policies down to the military 
and other sectors. Rupiya (Interview) describes the armed forces as "go getters, " working 
with "a disciplined, isolated community" that has helped create successful HIV/AIDS 
prevention programs. 
Agnes Binagwaho, executive secretary of Rwanda's National AIDS Council, confirms 
that the military is leading the fight against HIV/AIDS in Rwanda. Binagwaho states: 
"The outside help [from DHAPP) has been critical... I think our best AIDS program is 
the one run by the military. The military here in Rwanda have done it the right way from 
the beginning" (Donnelly 2004: para. 4). Rupiya says that "the militaries are well ahead 
of many sectors in their own societies" in addressing HIV/AIDS (Goering 2006: para. 7). 
Rupiya continues to argue that: 
The military's inherent structure of discipline and following commands... has 
helped ensure regular condom distribution, regular AIDS testing and that If IV- 
positive soldiers take their anti-retroviral drugs. And because military readiness is 
key to national security, militaries have made controlling AIDS a priority. In 
many cases, `the armed forces have had a greater response' to the region's AIDS 
pandemic than national governments... (Goering 2006: para. 8) 
While Rupiya does argue that HIV/AIDS is affecting African militaries, Rupiya believes 
that talk of African militaries being "hollowed out" is exaggerated. He explains that 
military programs to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS are often ahead of civilian HIV/AIDS 
programs in the same country. Military leadership in addressing HIV/AIDS is actually 
resulting in African militaries acting as "change agents" and providing a positive 
example of leadership against HIV/AIDS for other government sectors (Rupiya 
Interview). This strong response Rupiya suggests, combined with rejecting HIV-positive 
recruits and reassigning HIV-positive troops, has greatly reduced the implications of the 
disease for national security and African militaries (Rupiya Interview). Stuart Kingma 
(Interview) offers a more skeptical perspective on this success. Kingma argues that by 
rejecting HIV-positive troops from military service, armed forces have reduced rates of 
HIV, but that this is not the same as instituting programs to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. 
He says that many militaries have yet to institute these programs, which will undermine 
progress against the disease in both military and civilian populations. Rupiya (Interview) 
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concludes by warning that the DHAPP is the primary source of HIV/AIDS aid to African 
militaries and that the military progress in fighting the disease to date is "only happening 
with this outside aid" (Rupiya Interview). In is important to note that other countries 
have been less forthcoming about the impact of the disease on their militaries. Garrett 
(2005: 27) recalls that the "first public acknowledgement of HIV's devastating toll on the 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) came in 2004, with China's expulsion of a third of the 
ZNA officers sent to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for advanced training, due to 
their HIV infection status. " 
This brief review of HIV/AIDS policies outside of the U. S. finds that the securitization 
of HIV/AIDS since 2000 appears to have largely been an American phenomenon. 
Neither other major donor countries, nor states highly affected by HIV/AIDS, have 
formally framed the disease in security terms, or sought to specifically address the 
national security implications of the pandemic. The factors that resisted securitization in 
the U. S. and the UNSC, including a lack of direct evidence, a bias against addressing 
non-traditional threats to security, and a lack of need to securitize issues that are already 
government priorities, likely contributed to the absence of securitization in other 
countries. However presence of U. S. actors in both cases of the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS suggests that linking issues with national security considerations is more 
common and beneficial in the U. S. policy environment. Despite the lack of 
securitization of HIV/AIDS outside of the U. S. and UN, many African militaries work 
with the U. S. DHAPP to limit the impact of HIV/AIDS on military populations. This 
interest from both African and U. S. armed forces suggests that the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus will continue, especially the focus on HIV/AIDS among armed forces, 
despite an absence of widespread securitization of the disease. 
6.5 Secret data: revision of HIV prevalence estimates among armed forces and 
peacekeepers 
The final section of this chapter will examine a development that illuminates the 
complex role evidence has and continues to play in the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus. As well as examining why evidence of HIV prevalence among armed forces is 
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difficult to accurately ascertain, this section illustrates the role evidence has played in 
securitization and one resultant danger of the nexus. 
During 2005-2006, a small number of publications called into question long-standing 
assumptions about extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence among African armed forces. 
HIV/AIDS prevalence in these militaries was previously reported as 2-5 times higher 
than civilian populations, with some military units demonstrating 40-60%, and even 90% 
HIV prevalence. This data was used by securitizing actors in the U. S. and UNSC in 
support their arguments. However recent publications have argued that a significant 
downward recalibration of these estimates and assumptions is required. 
Most militaries classify rates of HIV/AIDS within the military as a state secret and, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the UNSC does not have the authority to test donated 
peacekeeping troops. Because of this secrecy, and an absence of reliable alternative data 
or studies, most authors before 2005 have relied almost exclusively on two reports: 
AIDS and the military (UNAIDS 1998) and the NIE 99-17 (National Intelligence 
Council 2000). The UNAIDS (1998: 3) report describes rates of HIV/AIDS among 
armed forces as "2 to 5 times higher than in civilian populations" and up to "50 times 
higher or more" in times of conflict. The data within the NIE 99-17 report was based on 
an unpublished 1999 report by the U. S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, and 
describes rates of HIV infection in seven African militaries as ranging between "10 to 60 
percent" (National Intelligence Council 2000: 10). Of particular note in the NIE 99-17 
report are estimated rates of HIV in the militaries of Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo of 40-60%, and in Tanzania of 15-30% (National Intelligence 
Council 2000). Because these were the only available published rates of HIV/AIDS 
within armed forces, they have been widely reproduced and cited as a component of the 
evidence on the nexus (Feldbaum 2005a; Singer 2002; Heinekin 2001 a, 2001 b; Elbe 
2002,2003; Tripodi and Patel 2002). 
Since 2005, and based on a limited amount of new data, a number of authors have 
questioned whether these estimates are too high, in some cases, by significant margins. 
Garrett (2005: 25) writes that agencies including "the CIA and U. S. Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), used indirect data to conclude that infection rates in some African 
militaries were as high as 75 percent. Such speculations appear to be off target. " 
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Feldbaum et al. (2006a: 775) argue that "HIV prevalence among armed forces is equal to 
or slightly greater than civilian rates from the same country. " Calling the idea that 
militaries have higher rates of HIV/AIDS than their civilian counterparts a shibboleth, 
Whiteside et at. (2006: 202,206) contend that "HIV prevalence among new recruits is 
low and probably even lower than in civilians of the same age, " but "expect prevalence 
to be higher among longer-serving soldiers than comparable civilian populations. " de 
Waal (2005: 2) summarizes the situation regarding changing perceptions of HIV 
prevalence among armed forces: 
For about a decade, conventional wisdom among researchers and advocates has 
been that rates of HIV prevalence are typically two-to-five times greater among 
soldiers than comparable civilian populations. While HIV levels in military 
populations remain a controversial and inadequately-evidenced subject, we can 
say with confidence that this is not the case in sub-Saharan Africa. It may have 
been true at an early stage of the epidemic in that continent, when general 
population HIV prevalence was in the order of 2-5% while rates in some 
militaries were considerably higher... Such claims served a useful purpose in 
sounding the alarm and making armies take notice of the problem. Current data 
indicate that these elevated levels are not found in sub-Saharan Africa today. 
These more recent analyses have been supported by denials from countries rumored to 
have high rates of HIV/AIDS within their militaries. For example, South African 
Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota declared that there was no AIDS crisis within SANDF 
(South African National Defence Force), and that "Just like the rest of South Africa, the 
defense force has members who are infected with the virus. This does not mean that we 
are experiencing major problems or facing a disaster" (Hosken 2004: para. 10). Richard 
Shaffer, director of the DHAPP, said he found no evidence of the previously reported 
high rates of HIV among militaries. "There isn't a military in Africa that has got much 
more than a one-third prevalence rate" (Donnelly 2004: para. 21). These opinions 
represent a significant recalibration of publicly available estimates of HIV prevalence 
among militaries, especially in Africa. 
However, the situation regarding estimates of HIV/AIDS in militaries remains opaque. 
The downward recalibration of estimates is based on a small number of military studies, 
confidential or unpublished information, and guesswork. Whiteside et al. (2006: 202- 
203) write that their conclusions are "based on some limited data from the military, 
extrapolations from other data, and epidemiological logic. " Garrett's (2005) conclusions 
are based on public statements as well as unnamed sources, while Feldbaum et al. 
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(2006a) is based on interviews with U. S. and African military officials. No 
comprehensive epidemiological surveys have yet been conducted or published to 
confirm this downward revision of estimates. 
Assessing the situation is admittedly complex which adds to the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate data. Rates of HIV/AIDS within a military may vary widely based on 
"demographic structure of an army, its conditions of service and manner of deployment, 
and its HIV/AIDS programme" (Whiteside et al. 2006: 206). These complexities will 
largely determine how HIV/AIDS affects a military. For example, the strategic impact 
on a military of the loss of a new recruit versus the loss of a general varies enormously. 
Furthermore, the subject of HIV prevalence in militaries is highly politicized and 
governments may have a strategic interest in preventing the publication of accurate rates 
which may be embarrassing or signal weakness to a state's enemies. A confidential 
military interview carried out for this research yielded the observation that the greater the 
rate of HIV in a military, the more closed that military is about the information. The 
interviewee added that some militaries do not perform force-wide screening for 
HIV/AIDS because they lack the skills to manage such a large database. However the 
interviewee states that other militaries do not want to have precise figures of HIV rates, 
which allows those militaries to truthfully answer that that do not know the prevalence of 
HIV in their armed forces. Still other militaries describe reports of rates of HIV in their 
military as inaccurate, while refusing to provide actual rates of HIV prevalence (Military 
Interview). Martin Rupiya (Interview) says it is wrong to believe that accurate statistics 
are available in countries like Congo or Angola where there is very little medical 
infrastructure. General Carlton Fulford Junior, former Deputy Commander of U. S. 
European Command and Director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the U. S. 
National Defense University, emphasizes the difficulties of obtaining accurate estimates 
of HIV prevalence in foreign militaries: 
Those numbers are the best that we have so keep that in mind. They are the best 
that we have and they are very, very, very questionable. Let me take Nigeria as a 
case in point... First of all the figure is about eight percent... Number two 
Nigeria doesn't test, so I don't know where that number comes from. I have zero 
faith in that number... we're working very hard on a country-to-country study to 
determine what is factual and what is anecdotal so that we can better deal with the 
challenge, and it's hard. Some countries are open, so refuse to talk about the 
issue, some don't have a clue and don't want to know what the real issue is. So 
when you see numbers like that, keep that in the back of your mind that that's 
203 
very questionable and in many cases the problem is much, much worse than those 
numbers might show. (CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS 2005: 34-35) 
The difficulties in ascertaining true rates of HIV/AIDS among militaries and 
peacekeeping forces have resulted in a situation where rumor and poorly understood 
studies are prevalent. As Bazergan (Interview) says: "there is no good data, so the issue 
gets played out in the media. " A prominent example of this has been the inaccurate 
report that 89% of SANDF members who were tested were HIV-positive. This 
alarmingly high percentage was reported under the headline "SANDF unveils shock Aids 
data" (Meyer 2004: headline). The article continued: 
The combat readiness of the South African National Defence Force is under 
threat, with the latest results of an Aids project showing that an overwhelming 89 
percent of those soldiers who volunteered for testing were HIV-positive... In the 
first six months of the project 1089 soldiers volunteered to be tested, of whom 
947 were found to be HIV-positive. (Meyer 2004: para. 1) 
This statistic was used in the article to contradict the South African military's assertion 
that 20-25% of its forces were HIV-positive. 
In fact, this study had been conducted at an HIV/AIDS clinic setup by SANDF and the 
DHAPP (Military Interview). Those tested either suspected or already knew they were 
HIV-positive (Military Interview). These factors heavily biased the final result of 89%, 
rendering it specious. However, unlike scholarly publications, media reports did not 
consider how selection bias (self selected sample of soldiers) led to data that was not 
representative. It is because of national security concerns that rigorous scientific studies 
of the military prevalence of HIV are not conducted, scientifically reviewed, or 
published, which results in the issued being played out in the media. 
The downgrading of estimates of HIV/AIDS prevalence among African militaries 
illuminates the differences in how global health and national security data is treated. 
Global health data is peer-reviewed, with the intent that published data will contribute to 
improved health. In contrast, data on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many militaries is 
either unwelcome or classified as a national security secret. Ken Bernard (Interview) 
describes this difference in approach to data collection and reporting: 
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The real difference is how people deal with intelligence. Intelligence in the health 
world is always unclassified. It's always open source, it's always freely 
distributed as a matter of good conscience and, of course, in the security world, 
information is power and information is not be shared, except with allies or those 
who are co-sharing with you. And there's a huge amount of distrust between the 
health communities and the security communities on intelligence... 
Overall, the continued classification of data on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS within the 
military has contributed to inaccurate and misleading reports in academic journals, mass 
media and intelligence reports. Furthermore, this has prevented the accurate evaluation 
of HIV/AIDS education and prevention efforts by such organizations as DHAPP, DPKO 
and UNAIDS. As Feldbaum et al. (2006a: 777) argue, "Countries classifying 
information on HIV/AIDS in their armed forces as national security secrets hinder the 
targeting, operation, and evaluation of HIV prevention and treatment programs for both 
soldiers and civilian populations that interact with them. " The more recent downward 
revision of HIV/AIDS prevalence estimates among African militaries underscores the 
limitations of the data on HIV/AIDS among militaries and peacekeeping forces. This 
does not entirely suggest that the links between HIV/AIDS, the military and 
peacekeeping forces have lessened or are inconsequential. For example, UNAIDS 
(1998: 3) estimates that military prevalence of HIV/AIDS are "2 to 5 times higher than in 
civilian populations" is incorrect largely because civilian rates of HIV/AIDS have risen, 
not because military prevalence has significantly decreased, although some of the highest 
estimates appear to be inaccurate. What this demonstrates is that accurate assessment of 
the national security implications of HIV/AIDS must remain suspect because of the poor 
quality of this data. 
Two major lessons emerge from this consideration of the evidence base for the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. First, the history of data on HIV/AIDS among 
armed forces demonstrates major differences in the handling of information within and 
across the national security and global health communities. The classification of 
HIV/AIDS data among armed forces represents a potentially negative effect of the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, that may be viewed as a specific example of Elbe's 
(2006a) warning concerning reduced transparency potentially resulting from 
securitization. This classification and secrecy around global health data undermines both 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs by preventing proper targeting and 
evaluation of programs. Keeping this data secret also contributes to inaccurate 
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assessments of the impact of HIV/AIDS in both news and intelligence reports. Second, 
the role of evidence in the history of the nexus and securitization has been complex. 
Data on HIV/AIDS among armed forces from UNAIDS and the NIE 99-17 report was 
used to support arguments for the securitization of the pandemic, but has now been 
questioned and partially discredited. However, the existence of evidence for the 
pandemic's impact on national security was never the main motivating reason for 
securitization at the UNSC or in the U. S. While evidence was used to support 
securitization, the process occurred for political reasons as described in Chapter 5. 
Because of the barriers to collecting accurate data on HIV/AIDS among armed forces, 
the limited role of evidence in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus will likely 
continue. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The securitization of HIV/AIDS by the U. S. intelligence community and the UNSC 
contributed to a major rise in the international political status of the pandemic. In the 
wake of securitization, HIV/AIDS became a high politics issue which was frequently 
handled at the highest levels of government. Demonstrating this rise in political status 
was a marked increase in funding provided to fight the global pandemic across 
international organizations, UN agencies, foundations and bilateral aid from donor 
countries. While the transformation of HIV/AIDS into a high politics issue cannot be 
solely attributed to securitization, both Merson (2006) (the former head of the GPA) and 
Piot (United Nations Security Council 2001a) (current head of UNAIDS) cite the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus as playing a major role in elevating the political 
status of the pandemic. 
Increasing the political status and funding for an issue is the main intended benefit of 
securitization. As Elbe (2006a: 120) clearly describes, "a successful `securitization' of 
HIV/AIDS could accrue vital economic, social, and political benefits for millions of 
affected people by raising awareness of the pandemic's debilitating global consequences 
and by bolstering resources of international AIDS initiatives. " As this chapter has 
shown, the securitization of HIV/AIDS did indeed result in increased political and 
financial commitments to fight the pandemic. Securitization at the UNSC and within the 
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U. S. intelligence community also legitimated "breaking of the rules" that had long kept 
health issues separate from the work of the UNSC and U. S. national security (Suzan et 
al. 1998: 33). 
While the broad benefits of securitization on political attention and funding were 
significant, the specific results of securitization by the U. S. intelligence community and 
at the UNSC were more limited. In the case of the UNSC, the need to tailor action to the 
narrow issue of HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping focused UNSC efforts on an issue 
peripheral to the main drivers of the global epidemic and where the UN's ability to 
implement effective action to prevent transmission of the disease to and from 
peacekeepers was limited. Furthermore, securitization at the UNSC did not legitimize 
the breaking of longstanding rules that govern DPKO authority over testing and 
screening of peacekeepers, thus ensuring action on HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping 
operations would remain of limited efficacy. That securitization did not legitimize the 
breaking of these rules is not surprising, as the issue of peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS was 
not presented as an existential threat to peacekeeping operations, but as a means of 
linking the issue to the UN Charter. These political compromises allowed HIV/AIDS to 
be securitized by the UNSC, but also severely limited the UN's ability to effectively 
address the issue of peacekeepers and HIV/AIDS. 
Similarly, specific U. S. action on the security implications of HIV/AIDS was limited 
even after three major U. S. intelligence publications examined the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus. Discussion of HIV/AIDS as a national security issue had elevated the 
disease into the realm of high politics and succeeded in generating emergency measures 
including the massive scaling up of U. S. funding for global HIV/AIDS in the PEPFAR 
program. However, most of this funding was not directed at the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS, or even towards countries of strategic importance to U. S. 
interests. For the Bush administration, the national security implications of HIV/AIDS 
were less compelling than other foreign policy, political, and humanitarian rationales for 
addressing the pandemic. Thus while the broad benefits of securitization in both 
political attention and funding were clear, specific and effective action to address the 
HIV/AIDS - national security nexus was limited in both the U. S. and UN. 
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Two serious, potentially negative aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus 
outlined by Elbe (2006) were the shifting of funding from civilian to military HIV/AIDS 
programs, and the abandonment of addressing the disease through a humanitarian and 
development framework in favor of a national security perspective. Peterson (2002) also 
feared that describing HIV/AIDS as a national security threat would relieve the West of 
their moral obligations to address health issues that did not impact on their national 
security. Findings on the genesis and implementation of the PEPFAR initiative 
demonstrate that these potentially negative aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus have not materialized within the U. S. response to HIV/AIDS. There is little 
evidence that the U. S. response to HIV/AIDS has or will take on an excessive focus on 
militaries or national security interests. Neither have descriptions of HIV/AIDS as a 
national security threat diminished the moral aspects of responding to the pandemic. In 
fact, the moral obligation created by the availability of ARVs in developed but not 
developing states was the key public rationale for the PEPFAR program. Nor has 
securitization at the UNSC resulted in a shift by UN agencies away from addressing the 
humanitarian aspects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Countries outside of the U. S. have 
refused to securitize HIV/AIDS, making it also unlikely that their response to HIV/AIDS 
will be securitized or primarily driven by national security interests. These specific fears 
about the negative impacts of securitizing HIV/AIDS have not materialized as a result of 
securitizations in the U. S. and at the UNSC. 
Finally, the downward revision of estimates of HIV/AIDS prevalence data among 
African armed forces demonstrates both a negative impact of the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus and the generally poor quality of epidemiological data that has been used 
as evidence for the national security implications of HIV/AIDS. The differences in how 
data are treated between the national security and global health fields represent a major 
fault line in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, with the potential to limit 
cooperation and understanding of the links between disease and security. Classification 
of data on HIV/AIDS in armed forces, which Elbe (2006a) indicates may be a 
consequence of reduced transparency resulting from securitization, also has the potential 
to undermine public health by preventing the proper targeting, implementation and 
evaluation of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs among both civilian and 
military populations. That the main epidemiological evidence for the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus has been substantially revised also confirms the limited role 
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scientific evidence played in major securitization events. This chapter concludes that 
political currents and interests, even if unrelated to global health issues, played a more 
significant role in securitization than did scientific evidence on the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
While diseases have affected security interests throughout history, the latter half of the 
twentieth century was characterized by a separation of public health activities from 
power politics and state security. National security in the West was focused on winning 
the Cold War and exclusively studied "the threat, use, and control of military force" 
(Walt 1991: 212). Separate from security interests, public health developed into a 
humanitarian and technical field which was often normatively opposed to the politics of 
state interests and the Cold War. Then in the brief span of a decade, global health and 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic in particular, were transformed into high politics issues that 
were seriously debated by national and international security communities. Fidler (2004: 
45) describes this as an unprecedented "revolution" where the "last decade has witnessed 
the previously obscure and neglected policy area of public health shed obscurity and 
neglect to become the subject matter of intense national and homeland security, foreign 
policy, and global governance debates. " The policy process behind this linking of global 
health and national security through the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and what this has meant 
for global efforts to fight the disease, has been the subject of this thesis. 
The purposes of this thesis have been to create a detailed history of the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus, locate this history within competing conceptual understandings 
of security, and to assess the role of global health actors in the nexus and the risks and 
benefits of using this nexus to promote global health action. After the introductory 
chapters, literature review and review of conceptual frameworks, Chapter 4 sought to 
reintroduce and examine older cases of securitization, Chapter 5 traced the history of the 
major securitizations of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. and at the UNSC, and Chapter 6 sought to 
understand the consequences of these securitizations. 
7.2 The process and consequences of the securitization of HIV/AIDS 
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Based on the analysis of this research, a number of conclusions about the questions 
posed by this thesis may be addressed. 
Where policy makers have framed HIV/AIDS as a direct threat to national security, 
and prioritized the disease as an issue of high politics, high-level political attention 
and funding for the fight against HIV/AIDS has accrued. 
The clearest example of this is Thailand's response to HIV/AIDS in the early 1990s. 
The perception that HIV/AIDS threatened Thailand's military, economic growth and 
demographic future was a key factor in bringing the disease to the highest levels of Thai 
politics, where it was addressed by the Prime Minister and Ministry of Defense as well 
as other ministries. Thailand then crafted a successful multi-sector response to the 
disease that is described as one of the few success stories in the global response to 
HIV/AIDS. In Uganda, the threat HIV/AIDS posed to the Ugandan military and 
President Museveni's powerbase lead to Museveni's early and outspoken actions to 
address the disease. Museveni's high level leadership contributed to successful 
HIV/AIDS prevention programs that, by most accounts, reduced the national prevalence 
of the disease. 
Thailand and Uganda are the only two developing countries to succeed in reducing their 
national prevalence of HIV/AIDS before the advent of ARVs. Treating the disease as a 
threat to their national security was a key factor in Thailand's, and to a lesser extent, 
Uganda's success. The political and financial resources generated by the securitization 
of HIV/AIDS in these countries greatly benefited their fight against HIV/AIDS, reduced 
the prevalence of the disease among Thais and Ugandans, and provided the first two 
success stories in the fight against HIV/AIDS among developing nations. 
Even viewing HIV/AIDS as an indirect threat to national security, such as seems to be 
the case in the U. S. under the Bush administration, has elevated the disease to high 
politics in the U. S. and contributed to the PEPFAR program's large scaling up of 
resources to address the global pandemic. Similarly, consideration of HIV/AIDS at the 
UNSC was one of a small number of developments in 2000 that elevated HIV/AIDS to 
the highest levels of international politics and facilitated the increasing international 
political commitment and funding available to fight the pandemic. Thus, in these three 
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countries and at the international level, securitization and consideration of the national 
security implications of HIV/AIDS has generated strong political and financial support 
targeted at fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
The policy response to the securitization of HIV/AIDS, to date, has been focused on 
enhancing public health action, with some attention to prevention and treatment 
among armed forces. 
Against the expectations of some commentators, states that have securitized HIV/AIDS 
have responded by enhancing public health efforts to fight the disease. In both Thailand 
and Uganda, securitization resulted in strong government responses based in public 
health principles that worked to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among both civilian 
and military populations. Prevention among armed forces was a component of these 
responses, but not an overriding focus. Consideration of HIV/AIDS as a threat to U. S. 
national security was followed by the PEPFAR program, which supports public health 
prevention and treatment programs in 15 states and is generally unrelated to direct U. S. 
national security interests. Only the much smaller DHAPP program focuses funding 
specifically on prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS among foreign armed forces and 
on ameliorating the national security impacts of the pandemic on U. S. interests. At the 
international level, the largest impact of the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS has been to 
aid the raising of political attention and funding for HIV/AIDS to their highest levels in 
history. The DPKO and UNAIDS efforts to address the issue of HIV/AIDS among UN 
peacekeepers also resulted from the UNSC meetings, but these efforts have limited 
political and financial support and are restricted to the specific population of UN 
peacekeepers. In these four important cases, consideration of the national security 
implications of HIV/AIDS resulted in enhanced public health-led efforts to address 
HIV/AIDS. A major fear, discussed by both Peterson (2002) and Elbe (2006a), of a 
militarized or intelligence community-driven response to HIV/AIDS, has not resulted 
from any of the securitization events to date. Indeed securitization of HIV/AIDS has so 
far predominately supported and enhanced public health action. 
Many of the predicted potentially negative aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security 
nexus have so far not materialized in countries that have viewed HIV/AIDS as a 
national security issue. 
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The majority of Peterson's warnings about linking HIV/AIDS to national security, and 
Elbe's potentially negative aspects of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, have not 
occurred in states that have securitized the pandemic. Specifically, Peterson's critique 
stated that there were no benefits of securitization, and that arguing that diseases were 
national security threats would relieve Western powers of their moral responsibility to 
respond to health crises. The cases of Thailand and Uganda demonstrate clear benefits 
of securitization in accruing political and financial support to fight the pandemic, as did 
the UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS. The U. S. PEPFAR program's main public rationale 
was humanitarian and the program has little relation to U. S. national security interests, 
further indicating that the discussion of the national security implications of HIV/AIDS 
did not undermine arguments for moral responsibility. 
Of Elbe's four dangers of securitizing HIV/AIDS26, there is no evidence from the 
examples of securitization in Thailand, Uganda, U. S., or the UNSC that these dangers of 
securitization have occurred widely, or occurred as a direct result of securitization, with 
the exception of reduced transparency around HIV/AIDS data among military forces. 
State mobilization caused by securitization has been a major and positive factor in the 
Thai and Ugandan responses to HIV/AIDS. The securitization of HIV/AIDS in the U. S. 
has not removed the disease from cosmopolitan or altruistic frameworks, although 
DHAPP is addressing HIV/AIDS among military populations. Neither have these 
countries moved HIV/AIDS funding for access to ARVs towards armed forces and elites 
to the detriment of civilian populations. Finally, discussion of HIV/AIDS at the highest 
levels of government and international politics has contributed to a destigmatization of 
the disease. The experience of these countries bears a much closer resemblance to Elbe's 
(2006a) list of the benefits of securitization. 
While Elbe's (2006a) negative aspects of securitization have not materialized during the 
time span of this thesis, they cannot be discounted. As the HIV/AIDS pandemic grows, 
new countries may view the disease as a threat to their national security. If these 
countries are prone to political repression and civil rights violations, such as China or 
26 These dangers are: 1) excessive state mobilization to fight HIV/AIDS will undermine and override civil 
liberties; 2) securitization will move HIV/AIDS from a cosmopolitan and altruistic framework towards a 
state-centric national security framework; 3) securitization will cause funding and access to 
ARVs to shift 
from civilian populations to the armed forces and political elites; 4) describing HIV/AIDS as a threat 
to 
national security will increase stigmatization of those living with the virus. (Elbe 2006a) 
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Russia, the results of securitization may be significantly worse. Similarly if the 
pandemic becomes more directly linked to the national security interests of powerful 
nations, engagement on HIV/AIDS may be increased focused on limiting the strategic 
impacts of the disease, rather than on those most in need. 
Other hazards of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, particularly the 
cosmopolitan - communitarian divide between global health and national security, 
and the classification ofpublic health data, have been problematic. 
While many of the anticipated adverse implications of securitization do not seem to have 
been realized to date, hazards in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus remain. 
Differences between global health and national security, embodied in the cosmopolitan - 
communitarian divide, represent a fundamental, ongoing challenge of the nexus. In the 
history constructed by this thesis, these differences have undermined the ability of each 
community to constructively engage with the other to address HIV/AIDS and its 
implications for national security. The KGB HIV/AIDS disinformation campaign 
represents an egregious example of the unfettered pursuit of communitarian interests 
over cosmopolitan values. Differences in referent objects and culture led to the failure of 
securitization moves by the CIA in the early 1990s. Cultural differences between public 
heath and national security were also the cause of Ken Bernard's difficulty in linking 
HIV/AIDS to national security in U. S. policymaking circles. Furthermore, these cultural 
differences were a strong contributing factor to the backlash against the findings of the 
NIC 99-17 and the resistance to holding UNSC meetings on HIV/AIDS. The 2002 NIC 
Next Wave report exemplifies a national security perspective on the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
by focusing on countries of strategic significance to the U. S., rather than a global health 
and cosmopolitan focus on those countries with the greatest need. While none of the 
countries that have securitized HIV/AIDS has based their response to HIV/AIDS on their 
national security interests, the cosmopolitan - communitarian divide has and will 
continue to make cooperation between the global health and national security 
communities difficult. The different objectives and referent objects of the two 
communities will make genuine synergies of interest difficult to achieve, while the 
starkly different cultures of the communities will hinder understanding and cooperation. 
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A second, problematic challenge of the nexus is the radically different treatment of data 
between the global health and national security fields. While publication of 
epidemiological data is a mainstay of public health research, publication of data on 
HIV/AIDS among armed forces may be perceived as a threat to national security and 
thus a practice to be avoided. This is a hazard of the nexus, and is a consequence of 
reduced transparency associated with securitization (Elbe 2006a). Keeping public health 
data secret can have negative impacts on public health efforts. Specifically, the 
classification of data on HIV/AIDS prevalence among armed forces and peacekeepers 
undermines the targeting, implementation and evaluation of public health efforts to fight 
HIV/AIDS. Without accurate data, these three aspects of public health programs are 
compromised. Furthermore, secrecy surrounding HIV/AIDS data among armed forces 
seems to have resulted in the widespread publication of overestimates of prevalence data 
among African armed forces. The intelligence community's reticence about publishing 
sources and methods of analysis severely undermines the quality of data publicly 
available to assess the national security implications of HIV/AIDS and the impact of the 
disease on military populations. While conducting rigorous epidemiological studies on 
the HIV/AIDS -national security nexus is needed on both public health and national 
security grounds, the different treatment of data between these two communities 
represents a major challenge to cooperation. 
The primary role of the global health community in the securitization of HIV/AIDS 
has been limited to the production of epidemiological data on HIWAIDS, which has 
then been used by non-health policy actors to argue for securitization as part of their 
own policy agenda. 
The primary role of global health actors in instances of securitization has been to 
produce relevant epidemiological data on HIV/AIDS. In Uganda and Thailand, 
HIV/AIDS prevalence data among military forces was the genesis of securitization in 
each country. Similarly, the publication of rigorous global prevalence data by UNAIDS 
beginning in 1998 provided the foundation upon which efforts to securitize the disease in 
the U. S. and at the UNSC were based. The production of relevant data on the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic by the global health community has been a critical contribution to efforts to 
understand the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus and securitize the pandemic. 
After 
the production of epidemiological data however, the role of global health actors in the 
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direct events of the securitization of HIV/AIDS has been limited. With rare exception 
have global health actors participated directly in arguing for the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS. Ken Bernard, Peter Piot, and the U. S. IOM are three examples of global 
health actors contributing to the events of securitization. 
While epidemiological data has been the global health community's main contribution to 
the securitization of HIV/AIDS, epidemiological evidence has not driven the political 
events of securitization. Desire to drive HIV/AIDS up the policy agenda and ulterior 
political motives played a much stronger role than HIV/AIDS prevalence data in the 
cases of securitization in the U. S. and UNSC. Data was used by policymakers when it 
buttressed their claims, but there was no demand for rigorous, peer-reviewed studies of 
the nexus before political action was taken. Thus the importance of evidence, as well as 
global health actors, in cases where HIV/AIDS was securitized should not be 
overestimated. 
The limited role of evidence and global health actors in the history of the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus raises two major concerns for the global health community. 
First, global health has not been in control of the high-level politics surrounding 
HIV/AIDS and its securitization. Securitization, and the major political and financial 
benefits it generated, occurred with little global health discussion or direction. In the 
case of the U. S., the intelligence community initiated study of the national security 
implications of the disease. At the UN, the securitization of HIV/AIDS was driven by 
Richard Holbrooke and his concerns about U. S. dues to the UN and his political future in 
the event of a Gore presidency. In neither case did global health actors play a 
substantive role. As Garrett (2000a: 550) writes: "public health was on board the train, 
but clearly not in the conductor's seat. " This should worry global health leaders, because 
the treatment of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has evolved with little direct input from global 
health. That this evolution has raised money and summoned political will to fight 
HIV/AIDS is good and indicates that other powerful policy communities are recognizing 
the relevance of HIV/AIDS to their work. However, a future evolution of the response to 
HIV/AIDS may not be as beneficial and global health leaders seem to be in little position 
to influence the debate. 
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The second concern is that the role of global health in producing epidemiological data 
relevant to the HIV/AIDS -national security nexus may be becoming more difficult to 
achieve. Data on HIV/AIDS among the armed forces has always been scarce, with even 
the most recent downward revision of estimates based on limited data and interviews. 
The perception that HIV/AIDS can present a threat to national security may make 
countries even less willing to conduct research, share or publish HIV/AIDS data among 
armed forces or peacekeepers. If research is conducted, it may be performed by the 
militaries themselves or in cooperation with DHAPP and kept classified. This raises the 
question of whether the global health community will even be able to contribute new 
epidemiological data about HIV/AIDS and national security to the debate on 
securitization. 
7.3 Strengths and weaknesses in conceptualizing global health as a "security" issue 
The four conceptual frameworks reviewed in this research, namely the Communitarian - 
Cosmopolitan Model, Models of Engagement, High - Low Politics Model, and 
Cause of 
the Transformation Model, have been relevant in this analysis of the HIV/AIDS - 
national security nexus. Each model addresses a different aspect of the nexus, and each 
has shown relevance in explaining certain events in the nexus. However, the application 
of these models has illuminated a number of strengths and weaknesses of current 
conceptualizations of the nexus. 
Lee and McInnes' (2004) Models of Engagement describes a number of ways in which 
the public health community may interact with the national security community, and the 
effects of each model of interaction on the influence and independence of public health. 
This model is driven by a concern that the more powerful security community will only 
engage with certain public health issues that threaten state interests, leaving the major 
causes of disease and death in the developing world unaddressed. Three of the models of 
engagement offered, including supplicant, Trojan horse and independent actor, were 
found to correspond to certain events in the nexus. Public health as an independent actor 
characterized the role of public health in the production of epidemiological data in 
Thailand and globally by UNAIDS. The efforts of the IOM and Ken Bernard to link 
public health to U. S. national security are easily categorized as the supplicant or Trojan 
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horse model. These models are useful in weighing the relative benefits of each approach 
over the course of the events described. However a major failing of this model, in terms 
of its ability to explain the historical events of the nexus, is its omission of the possibility 
for independent security community action on HIV/AIDS. The early U. S. intelligence 
reports on HIV/AIDS, the KGB disinformation campaign, and the DHAPP are all 
examples of important events and activities in the nexus that were driven by the 
independent interest and action of the security community. Thus while the type of public 
health engagement with the security community is important, this analysis has shown 
that perhaps more critical to the history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus 
has 
been the influential actions of the security community on the pandemic. 
An extension of the Models of Engagement to include the actions of the security 
community is thus warranted. As the KGB disinformation campaign makes clear, 
independent security community action on HiV/AIDS has not always been benign. 
Therefore a revised Models of Engagement should not only account for the actions of the 
security community, but the intention of these actions. A three-part framework for 
security community intentions to supplement the Models of Engagement could include 
categories for security community engagement that was: 
I. malignly intended to pursue the objectives of the security community, (such as the 
KGB disinformation campaign); 
2. intended to address the strategic implications of specific global health issues, (such as 
the U. S. intelligence reports on infectious diseases); or 
3. intended to benefit both national security objectives and public health (such as the 
DHAPP). 
Incorporation of security community involvement into the Models of Engagement would 
enhance this framework's ability to explain events in the nexus, as well as prepare the 
global health community for the likelihood of continued independent security 
community interest in global health issues. 
The Communitarian - Cosmopolitan model, which focuses on the different referent 
objects, objectives and cultures of the national security and global health communities, 
was particularly useful in explaining critical differences between the dominant 
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perspectives of the two policy communities that, in turn, inhibited cooperation and action 
on the nexus. For example, the different referent objects and cultures of the two 
communities created major barriers for both the U. S. intelligence community and the 
UNSC in addressing HIV/AIDS, and played an important role in the failure of early U. S. 
intelligence reports to securitize the epidemic. Many of the difficulties encountered by 
Ken Bernard in introducing global health issues into the U. S. security analysis Bernard 
himself attributed to cultural differences between the communities. Finally the objective 
of the security community to pursue national interests clearly explains the perspective 
taken by the U. S. intelligence estimates on infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS. The 
Communitarian 
- Cosmopolitan Model provides a useful and simple dichotomy for 
understanding critical differences between the global health and national security 
communities. However, this model holds little predictive value and does not account for 
activities that bridge communitarian and cosmopolitan interests, such as the DHAPP. 
Thus this framework is best utilized as a descriptive framework for explaining past 
difficulties in bridging the national security and global health communities. 
Similarly, the High - Low Politics Model provides a useful, descriptive shorthand 
for 
describing the relative priority given to public policy issues. Public heath has 
traditionally been relegated to low, or even "really low politics, " while national security 
is almost synonymous with high politics (Fidler 2005b: 180). That each community is 
closely associated with the opposed categories in this model makes this framework a 
Particularly accurate descriptive tool. A final unique advantage of this framework is that 
the high vs. low politics categories are terms understood and used by the policymaking 
community. Therefore the policymaking community may actually utilize these terms in 
explaining the increase in the pandemic's political status, providing a useful bridge 
between academic and policymaker analysis of the nexus. Despite these advantages, the 
High - Low Politics Model only provides a descriptive shorthand for the communities 
involved, and proves most useful in serving as the basis of next "cause of the 
transformation" model. 
The Cause of the Transformation model is the most analytically ambitious of the 
conceptual frameworks on the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus. It 
does not seek to 
describe the nexus, or the differences between the two communities involved, but to 
explain the reasons behind the rise of HIV/AIDS from low to high politics. Fidler's 
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(2005a) three categories for explaining this transformation are. Revolution, Remediation 
and Regression. The revolution model posits that the traditional dichotomy of high and 
low politics has collapsed because of the recognition that health is a "pre-eminent 
political value for 21 " century humanity" (Fidler 2005b: 184). This thesis finds no 
evidence to support this assertion. The second explanation is regression, whereby the 
worsening of HIV/AIDS and other global health problems has caused the rise in political 
status of the pandemic, While the extent of the pandemic must be considered a 
contributing factor to the transformation of the political status of HIV/AIDS, the final 
remediation model incorporates this perspective and provides the most robust 
explanation of the transformation of HIV/AIDS into a high political issue. 
The remediation model argues that the transformation of HIV/AIDS into a high political 
issue is due to the increasing threat the pandemic poses to state capabilities and material 
interests. The traditional foreign policy hierarchy of issues remains intact, what has 
changed is the perceived relevance of HIV/AIDS to state national security and material 
interests. This remediation model is strongly supported by the evidence analyzed by this 
thesis. In nearly every case of successful and attempted securitization in this thesis, 
including Uganda, Thailand, U. S. intelligence studies of HIV/AIDS, and the DHAPP, 
HIV/AIDS was addressed primarily because it was perceived to threaten strategic 
interests. In the only exception at the UNSC, the strategic impact of HIV/AIDS on 
Peacekeepers was critical to allowing the pandemic to be addressed, even through the 
full reasons for securitization were more complex. Thus the remediation model provides 
the most robust conceptual explanation for the rise of HIV/AIDS into a high political 
issue. 
7.4 Final Observations 
In their major work on securitization theory, Buzan et al. (1998: 23) define "security" as 
a "move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue 
either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. " The authors differentiate 
between issues that are nonpoliticized, politicized, and securitized. In theory, 
securitized issues are dealt with above the "normal haggling of politics" and thus 
decisively by top leaders (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Edkins (1999: 11) actually calls 
securitization a form of "depolitization" because "issues of `security' are more removed 
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from public debate and decision than issues of `politics... " The evidence presented in 
this thesis provides an opportunity to comment on this question of securitization vs. 
politicization, and to evaluate the type of politics that has resulted from the securitization 
of HIV/AIDS. 
This thesis has argued that securitization of HIV/AIDS has occurred in Uganda, 
Thailand, the U. S. and at the UNSC. While the case of the UNSC was complex, in each 
country case study, HIV/AIDS was argued to be an existential threat to a referent object 
which justified the use of emergency measures, thus meeting Buzan et al. 's (1998) 
criteria for securitization. In each case, discussion of HIV/AIDS broke the rules that had 
traditionally defined how each government addressed health issues, and transformed the 
response to the pandemic in terms of political priority and funding. However, in none of 
these cases did HIV/AIDS rise entirely above politics, to be considered apart from public 
debate. Nor did securitization of HIV/AIDS serve to "silence opposition" or serve as the 
basis to address the pandemic "with less democratic control and constraint" (Buzan et al. 
1998: 29). The case studies examined in this thesis instead suggest that securitization 
transformed treatment of the pandemic from low politics into an issue that was more 
properly politicized in relation to its perceived impact on each state. 
This raises the question of whether HIV/AIDS was actually securitized or only 
politicized. There is little question that, in the cases discussed in this thesis, HIV/AIDS 
meets the criteria for securitization outlined by Buzan et al. (1998). However, the 
pandemic was not treated in the same manner as more traditional security threats, such as 
an imminent terrorist or nuclear attack, would be approached. It may be argued that this 
difference is evidence that the pandemic was politicized rather than securitized. This 
thesis argues that this perspective is not persuasive. Equating the pandemic with an 
imminent military attack ignores the longer timeframe of the HIV/AIDS threat, and the 
need to use non-military means to mount a successful response to the disease. The 
absence of high-priority, emergency national security meetings on HIV/AIDS is entirely 
appropriate to the perceived threat the diseased posed to these states, and not convincing 
evidence of a lack of securitization. Thus, securitization of HIV/AIDS did move the 
disease beyond the previously established "rules of the game" into high political status, 
but did not elevate the disease above the day to day political process because such a 
response was not necessary. In the case of HIV/AIDS, securitization resulted in a 
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politicization of the epidemic which was commensurate with the perceived threat the 
pandemic posed. 
A final and separate observation concerns the role of technology in transforming a 
perceived threat to national security. Technological advancement has often held the 
potential to alter threats to security or military balances of power. The development of 
ARVs to treat HIV/AIDS, and associated efforts to drastically reduce the price of these 
drugs for persons in highly affected and poor countries, may represent technological and 
social changes that strongly alter the perception of the national security impacts of 
HIV/AIDS. 
While debate about the political, military, social and economic impact of the pandemic 
(all reasons cited as justification for impact on national security) will likely continue in 
future, the availability of effective and relatively affordable treatment for the disease may 
be transforming affected government's perceptions of the threat of HIV/AIDS. In 2000 
when many of the securitization arguments were made, ARV treatment had been 
developed but was too expensive for all but a few elites in affected developing countries. 
Governments fearing HIV/AIDS might cause political, economic or social instability, or 
weaken their militaries, had few options other than to prioritize actions to prevent further 
spread of the disease. By 2008 however, ARV treatment costs had been drastically 
reduced and some progress had been made on distributing the drugs in developing 
countries. Consequently, governments may begin to be less likely to consider 
HIV/AIDS as a threat to national security as ARVs become more available and relatively 
affordable to treat the disease. Even if HIV/AIDS were to cause political, economic, or 
social instability in a country, and this thesis has argued that there is little evidence to 
date that this has occurred, the opportunity to provide ARVs widely would likely 
ameliorate the severe social or political impacts of the disease. Thus, it may be 
increasingly unlikely that HIV/AIDS is perceived as a threat to the national security of 
states in future. 
7.5 Recommendations 
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In this analysis of the history of the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus, the remediation 
model has most accurately described the nature of the relationship between global health 
and national security. The nexus has shown that, when HIV/AIDS was successfully 
linked to the strategic and material interests of a state, that state has responded with 
increased political attention and funding. The robustness of this remediation model 
holds important implications for strengthening efforts to address HIV/AIDS and global 
health issues more broadly. 
First, the global health community should accept the remediation model as accurately 
describing the basic underlying structure of the relationship between global health and 
national security. The expectation that high-level national security policy makers will 
seriously address global health issues because they cause human suffering, even on a 
massive scale, is not supported by this thesis. Global health practitioners who argue that 
global health programs are as important as traditional national security issues because 
they kill millions of people are simply not taken seriously within the foreign policy and 
security communities. Accepting the remediation model is critical to avoiding 
unsuccessful engagements such as Sandra Thurman's presentation of humanitarian 
impacts of HIV/AIDS to the U. S. National Security Council. However, when global 
health issues have been convincingly linked to national security considerations, ie. 
securitized, or are linked to the material interests of states, rapid governmental action on 
global health has resulted. Accepting this relationship, and the continued existence of 
the traditional foreign policy hierarchy of issues, will enable global health actors to more 
convincingly engage with the foreign policy and national security communities. 
Acceptance of the remediation model is the price of admission to the "situation room" 
and engagement with the foreign policy and security communities. 
The continued existence of the traditional foreign policy hierarchy does not however 
mean that there have not been seismic shifts in the political relevance and status of global 
health. Fidler's "revolution" has occurred and has changed the landscape of global 
health. Previously uncommon linkages between global health issues and national 
security, foreign policy, military and intelligence communities have become common 
and politically salient. Diplomatic and military efforts to address global health problems 
have increased, as have academic programs on global health at schools of international 
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relations. 27 The increased relevance of global health to other powerful communities will 
present increasing opportunities to seek areas of mutual interest and cooperation. The 
global health community should not retreat into its technical, anti-state interest, and 
politically-isolated past. Instead the public health community should knowledgably 
engage with the foreign policy and national security communities to better address global 
health needs, while understanding these other community's interests and objectives. 
Engagement is critical if the political and economic aspects of global health problems are 
to be successfully addressed. 
The shape of this engagement with foreign policy and national security interests will 
likely take forms that are both comfortable and uncomfortable for the global health 
community. Cases where diplomacy acts to aid global health, such as U. S. State 
Department efforts to restart polio vaccination in Northern Nigeria, will be easily 
welcomed. Cases where the U. S. military seeks to win hearts and minds through public 
health interventions will not be welcomed by many in global health. While the benefits 
and risks of each form of engagement may be debated, what is most critical is the ability 
of global health practitioners to positively shape the engagement to the benefit of global 
health. This will require global health leaders who understand the remediation model 
and the communitarian - cosmopolitan divide, and who can effectively promote the 
interests of global health in the arena of high politics. The global health community 
must also start training such leaders. It is too rare a global health practitioner, such as 
Ken Bernard, who can straddle the worlds of global health and national security 
successfully, Schools of global health will continue to provide technical training in 
epidemiology and biostatistics, but must expand their education to include basic training 
in international relations. In many cases, this can be simply accomplished. Many of the 
leading schools of global health, including the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and the Harvard 
School of Public Health, are co-located with excellent schools of international relations. 
Stronger links and joint-teaching between these sister schools would greatly improve the 
ability of global health students to understand the political and economic ramifications of 
global health problems, and to work across disciplines to improve global health. A new 
27 Such programs include the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations Center for 
Global Health Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Global Health and 
Foreign Policy Initiative, and the University of Denver's Josef Korbel Graduate School of International 
Studies Global Health Affairs program. 
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WHO initiative on global health diplomacy, and the 2006 Oslo Ministerial Declaration 
(2007) on foreign policy and global health, launched by seven Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, are also welcome attempts to better understand the linkages between global 
health and foreign and security policy. 
In addition to leadership, the role of global health in producing epidemiological data and 
its influence should be addressed. Epidemiological data, however flawed, on HIV/AIDS 
among armed forces was a critical initiator to securitization efforts in Thailand and 
Uganda. However this thesis found little evidence that epidemiological data was a 
driving component of policy in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus at the UNSC or 
the U. S. Epidemiological data on HIV/AIDS was used to provide support for 
securitization, but only when the data supported pre-existing policy objectives. Because 
of this, the global health community should accept that programs to address high 
political issues, such as HIV/AIDS now is, will not be entirely driven by evidence. 
Politics will always play a role, as it does in national security, economic, foreign policy 
and environmental policy. However, global heath practitioners have the opportunity to 
inform and shape policies by conducting rigorous research on the national security and 
foreign policy impacts of global health problems. Paradoxically, the lack of evidence- 
driven policy in the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus to date may have created more 
demand for this research as the interactions between global health and national security 
communities deepen. Rigorous research on, for example, the impact of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic on state stability, armed forces, peacekeeping operations, and democracy 
would likely find a very receptive audience in both the national security and global 
health communities. This represents a strong opportunity for the global health 
community to substantively contribute to our understanding of the HIV/AIDS - national 
security nexus, and the broader relationship between global health and foreign policy. 
In the view of this thesis, the HIV/AIDS - national security nexus should elicit more 
optimism than concern about future efforts to improve global health. The links between 
global health, national security and foreign policy have contributed to the rapid elevation 
of global health into high politics, where global health issues have received political 
attention and funding unrivaled in the history of public health. Downsides to this nexus 
do exist, although these are not predominantly the risks typically associated with the 
nexus. This thesis has found that in countries where HIV/AIDS was securitized, 
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enhanced public health action against the disease followed. There is little evidence that 
securitization undermined humanitarian rationales for addressing the disease, nor did 
securitization result in approaches to the pandemic led by security services or the police. 
While such potentially negative impacts of securitization cannot be ruled out, this thesis 
argues that the larger barriers to successful cooperation between global health and 
national security communities are the communitarian - cosmopolitan divide and 
divisions over the uses of data between the communities. In particular, the 
communitarian - cosmopolitan framework describes a deep divide between the global 
health and national security communities which will continue to impact on their 
interactions, from the interpersonal to global levels. Better understanding this divide is 
the first step to more constructive relationships between the global health and national 
security fields. 
In many ways, the securitization of HIV/AIDS and other recent events have returned 
public health to a more politicized environment reminiscent of the period before the 
1950s. Given the scale and human impact of many global health challenges, high level 
political action would seem a welcome and necessary context to address them. A 
technical, non-political perspective, to which some in global health aspire, neither 
accurately describes the true nature of global health, nor the most likely strategy to rally 
sufficient political and financial support to successfully address them. Whether the 
global health community can successfully navigate its newfound role in high political 
circles, to achieve real gains in global public health while maintaining its independence 
and humanitarian perspective, will be a key challenge in the years ahead. 
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